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by

Germán Muchnik-Izón
B.A., Economics, Boston University, 2000
M.A., Economics, University of New Mexico, 2007
Ph.D., Economics, University of New Mexico, 2011
ABSTRACT
This work applies revealed and stated preference methods for valuing changes in the
provision of environmental and health care goods. It estimates non-market benefits to
society from protecting forest lands from commercial activities and elicits individuals’
preference (e.g., willingness to pay) for expanding health care coverage to the uninsured.
Health care provision policies can save lives but also increase costs, and may work best
when done in combination with behavioral and health interventions that promote healthy
life styles such as protecting public forest lands.
Chapters 2 and 3 apply the hedonic pricing empirical framework to investigate
whether protecting public forest lands generate economic values that capitalize in the
labor and housing market. Chapter 2 investigates the role of natural amenities, in the form
of Inventoried Roadless Areas (IRAs), in the Southwest United States (US). IRAs are
defined as Public Forest or Grasslands exceeding 5,000 acres that are undeveloped areas
with little or no timber harvest and no human construction (USDA 2001a). In light of the
current legal debate over whether to open IRAs to commercial activities or to maintain
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them in their pristine status, a better understanding is needed about the values that these
lands in particular may have within a regional economic context, as observed in housing
and labor markets. Based on this motivation, these chapters distinguish between
congressionally-protected lands also called wilderness areas, IRAs, and the all inclusive
open space definition of a public land (e.g., public forest areas in the National Forest
System) to estimate the implicit values that individuals have for these lands (e.g., off-site
benefits). After accounting for the presence of spatial dependence (e.g., spatial lag and
spatial error models) these chapters show significant off-site benefits for living in
proximity or in areas with high percentage of IRAs. Scale and zoning effects (e.g.,
ecological fallacy, Doll et al. 2004) due to the aggregation of data into predefined
administrative boundaries (such as Census tracts) are addressed in chapter 3 by using
micro-data with a sample of matched wage-earner housing units.
Chapter 4 uses survey-based data to address changes the in provision of a different
good with public attributes: expanding health care coverage to the uninsured in New
Mexico. One year after Affordable Care Act (ACA) became law public support for such a
reform is still significantly divided (42% in favor and 46% against, The Kaiser Family
Foundation, 2011). Given the desire to provide universal health coverage but the
reluctance to pay higher taxes at the national level, would a state-based reform receive a
majority support from New Mexicans? While New Mexican may widely express support
for health care reform, they may be collectively and politically unwilling to finance
expansion to all the uninsured, with either higher taxes or increased premiums. As such,
the results also suggest that an incremental approach, in the search for majority support

vii

(and presumably more political support), might be to expand health care coverage to
specific segments of the population such as individuals with chronic conditions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: Non-market benefits, positive externalities, and the allocation and
value of resources with public good attributes.

In a market system, the allocation of resources is determined by the equilibrium price
and quantity resulting from the interaction of buyers and sellers. This system allocates
resources such that people who value goods the most receive them and firms that can
produce goods at the least cost produce them. Given this outcome, nobody can be better
off without making somebody worse off if a different allocation were chosen. (e.g.,
Pareto optimal allocation). However, depending on the nature of the good and the
presence of externalities, the allocation of goods based on this system may not be socially
optimal (e.g., resources are not allocated to their highest and best use). This is the case for
resources that generate economic benefits that are not entirely captured by their market
price or that have public good attributes (e.g., non-rival and non-excludable). A plausible
mechanism to correct or minimize this market failure is for the allocation to be
determined or facilitated by the government. Nevertheless, this requires policymakers to
quantify the values of increments or decrements to the quantity or quality that the public
good in question offers to its passive and active users. In this work, the social allocation
of two types of goods that have public good attributes is analyzed: management of forest
lands and the provision of health care coverage in the United States (US). More
specifically, this work assesses monetary values for changes in the provision of protected
forest areas and public health insurance.
The management process that should govern forest lands in the US has been the
center of an ongoing debate (Aarons 2011). The increase in productivity experienced in
1

the extractive industry as a result of technological improvements, such as in timber and
mining activities, has allowed significant expansion of the supply of these materials
(Loomis 2003). However, higher productivity for commercial purposes has been
historically in conflict with other benefits that these lands may provide, including
recreational opportunities and ecosystem services (e.g., carbon sequestration and clean
air). These competing uses of public lands became more noticeable at the end of the
1960s when the US Congress passed three legislative actions concerning the management
process of these lands: The Wilderness Act of 1964, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of
1968, and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (Loomis 2003). These Acts
introduced a legal process under which the allocation of these resources would be
determined based on the evaluation of costs and benefits generated by the different end
users (Loomis 2003). In the case of the Wilderness Act, the policy debate has been
focused on preservation versus development of public lands. Under this Act, a public
land can be declared a congressionally-protected area by prohibiting commercial
activities or any type of human intrusion (e.g., construction of properties), if the benefits
in its preserved status are deemed to be higher than what society must give up to enjoy
such a resource allocation (USDA 1964). This Act rests on the argument that since forest
lands generate both commercial and non-commercial benefits to society, markets cannot
be relied upon to provide accurate measures of non-market values.
Non-market benefits refer to economic (e.g., and non-economic values (e.g.,
ecosystem services) that open spaces provide to society by keeping them in their
preserved status (e.g., undeveloped and pristine status). Since some of the services
provided by public forests do not have an observable demand function, the values that
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these resources provide to society may not fully capture the importance that they have as
non-market resources. Thus, ignoring non-market benefits may result in a resource
misallocation, thereby reducing both the efficiency of public policy and net social
welfare.
Market failure may also result from the presence of externalities that arise when the
choice of production or consumption of some individuals affects the welfare of other
individuals. In this case, the market price does not fully capture the value of a good since,
for instance, an individual consuming a good may increase not only his utility but also the
utility of individuals around him. As a result, the social marginal benefit would exceed
the private marginal benefit and the market system would provide a quantity level that is
less than what is socially optimal.
The presence of positive externalities has been at the center of the debate over
whether universal health care is a socially optimal provision of health coverage. The need
to address the problem of an increasing uninsured rate has been shared by past and
present administrations (The Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) 2009). In the 1990s and
early 2000s, the public debate over “unmet needs”- gaps in health care insurance
coverage- at the federal and state level has been extensive (KFF 2009). Those supporting
a government intervention in expanding health coverage to the uninsured view health
care as a right that all citizens should have regardless of ability to pay. Since the market
fails at achieving such provision, a redistribution mechanism is needed in order to extend
coverage to those individuals left out of the market. Implicit in this argument is the idea
that individuals may recognize that health care produces positive externalities, and thus
support programs out of self-interest (Mooney 2009; Case et al. 2009). In this case, the
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government may intervene by introducing a “corrective” subsidy. Thus, correcting the
market provision of a good with positive externalities entails providing public good or
quasi-public good. However, this requires a redistribution of resources and utility from
the insured individuals to the uninsured. Funding the subsidy requires an increase in taxes
which shifts individuals’ budget constraint and utility down.
One way to address the allocation problem that these two goods present to
policymakers is to implement methods for valuing changes in the provision of public
lands and health care coverage. A plausible approach is to measure non-market values in
terms of consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP), which can be an important information
input to social benefit cost analysis. This approach is based on the hypothesis that
individuals’ WTP can be either elicited via a survey or can be indirectly estimated based
on observable or behavioral patterns (e.g., expenditures for other goods or decomposable
variation in observed market prices). There are two sets of basic approaches that have
been widely used to measure such benefits: the stated preference and the revealed
preference approaches. These methods are used to value willingness to pay (or
willingness to be paid) for changing the provision of a public good, assuming that an
individual’s utility is a function of private and non-market goods (Mitchell and Carson,
1995).
The stated preference method is a survey based approach that elicits people’s
preferences or values for changes in the provision of a good. In this case, two types of
survey instruments are used: discrete choice and stated choice valuation techniques
(Freeman 2003). The latter presents respondents different alternatives being considered
and asks the respondents to rank them in order of preference. This information allows a

4

researcher to estimate the value that respondents may have for a specific attribute (e.g.,
marginal rate of substitution). The discrete choice valuation instrument elicits monetary
values for a specific change in the provision of a good and can provide two types of WTP
measures: single bounded and double-bounded amounts. In the first case, respondents are
asked whether he or she would be willing to pay a specific dollar amount. A “yes”
response would indicate that the amount asked is the least the individual would pay for
such a change. Additional information can also be elicited with the inclusion of follow-up
questions depending on whether a respondent answers a “yes” or a “no” to the first
choice question. A higher amount is asked if a “yes” response is given and a lower
amount is asked in the case of a “no” to the first amount. This type of question is referred
to as the double-bounded valuation instrument. Since the reliability and validity of
discrete choice results depend in part on how questions are presented and asked, a major
concern with this approach is the degree of bias in the responses (Champ et al. 2009;
Little and Berrens, 2004). Since discrete choice questions are non-binding (e.g., only
hypothetical scenarios are presented) respondents may overstate their true WTP by
ignoring their budget constraints, which is referred to as hypothetical bias (Vossler et al.
2003; Champ et al. 2009). This bias refers to estimating WTP amounts larger than what
respondents would pay if the change of provision were to take place. Several calibration
methods have been used to account for this bias including follow up questions based on a
numerical scale.1

1

Berrens et al. 2002; Norwood et al. 2008; Li et al. 2009; Vasquez et al. 2009
5

1.1 Empirical Developments in the Stated Preference Method
In the last forty years, the Contingent Valuation (CV) method has been used
extensively to elicit public preferences and values for changes in the provision of
environmental goods (Carson and Mitchell 1995). One of the first versions of the stated
preference method was introduced by Ciriacy-Wantrup (1947), a strong supporter of
“direct interview method” for “collective, extra-market goods”. He hypothesized that
public goods generated benefits that were not captured by market transactions.
While this technique was originally developed to estimate recreational use values
(Davis 1963), there was an increasing concern that individuals may care about
environmental resources regardless of their desire to use them.2 This concept, initially
coined existence value (Krutilla 1967) later became known as passive-use values. During
the late 1970s and 1980s the number of studies estimating passive-use values
significantly increased. These included benefits of reclaiming coal mining areas (Randall
et al. 1978), protection of endangered species (Samples et al. 1985), preservation of wild
and scenic rivers (Walsh et al. 1983), existence value of endangered species (Brookshire
et al. 1983) and the value of wilderness (Walsh el al. 1984).
The increase in CV studies was partially due to the enactment of U.S. laws that
allowed nonuse benefits to be included for estimating punitive damages (e.g., U.S.
District Court : Ohio v. Department of Interior 1989). The 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill
2

Early CV empirical applications primarily focused on assessing monetary values in for

changes in access to outdoor recreation. The need to better understand public attitudes
towards access to forest lands and water based recreation was the major driver for
recreation-based studies (Carson and Hanemann 2005).
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court case sparked an intense debate over the validity of stated preference method to
estimate passive use values.3 In light of this debate, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) convened a blue ribbon panel headed by two
Nobel Prize Laureates to evaluate the application of this technique to estimate nonuse
values (Arrow et al. 1993). This state-of-the-art assessment concluded that the use of the
stated preference method in judicial and administrative decision-making was valid as
long as the studies follow specific guidelines (see Arrow et al. 1993).4

3

Passive use values represented a significant percentage of Alaska’s total economic

damages assessment (Carson et al. 2003).
4

An important suggestion by the NOAA Panel was on the type of elicitation format for

asking valuation questions. In particular, the Panel recommended the use of the
dichotomous choice (DC) format in which respondents have to give a Yes or No vote to a
hypothetical referendum scenario with a specific payment amount. Since different
payment amounts are randomly assigned to each respondent, the estimation of the WTP
function is feasible. This elicitation format for asking valuation questions has desirable
communication and incentive compatibility properties (Hoehn and Randall 1987;
Mitchell and Carson 1989). As opposed to an open-ended (OE) format in which
respondents must state a dollar amount, in a hypothetical referendum valuation question a
respondent either takes or leaves a specific dollar amount much like many private and
political market decisions.
7

Following the 1993 NOAA report, the number of empirical papers applying the stated
preference method significantly increased. In 2005, the production of CV applications
totaled 742 studies compared to twenty-five in 1974 (Carson and Hanemann 2005).5
1.2 CV Applications in Health Care
The growth in the CV literature has been partially driven by the implementation of
survey-based studies in areas outside the environmental field. Health is one area where
the evaluation of health policies is increasingly relying on the CV method. The main
focus of the early papers applying this method was measuring the willingness to pay for
reducing mortality risk (see Carson and Hanemann 2005 and Jones-Lee 1974). Yet,
health policy decisions were primarily based on cost effectiveness or cost-utility studies,
such as maximizing quality adjusted years (QUALY) subject to a budget constraint
(Smith and Sach 2010). In the late 1980s, an increasing interest in measuring morbidity
effects was one of the main reasons for the unprecedented increase in the number of
health studies applying CV methods (Diener et al. 1998; Olsen and Smith 2001).6 In later
years, the range of applications broadened to areas such as discount rates for treatment
options (Ganiats et al. 2000), drug therapy options (Johannesson and Fagerberg 1992),
and benefits of pharmacy services (Reardon and Pathak 1988).
In particular, health care papers applying the CV method can be divided into two
types of studies: (1) ex post evaluations of a specific treatment/disease; and (2) ex ante
5

During the 1994-2000 period, the number of papers applying the CV method averaged

between 400 and 500 per year (Carson and Hanemann 2005).
6

Between 1990 and 2005, the number of CV applications to health related issues

increased from three to thirty-eight (Smith and Sach 2010).
8

evaluations of probable changes in health status. Since the individuals participating in an
ex post evaluation survey are either experiencing or have experienced the disease in
question, the valuation question elicits used values. In the ex ante surveys, the valuation
in question involves changes in the provision of public goods and respondents are usually
selected from the general population.7 Thus, both used values and non-use or option
values may be obtained (Smith and Sach 2010).8
7

Three types of respondents can be indentified in health studies applying the CV method:

users, convenience sample and the general population (Smith and Sach 2010). Since expost studies evaluate specific treatments, the target population is usually patients and
therefore, use values are estimated.
8

As of 2005, almost 60 percent of CV studies have been conducted to elicit only use

values. In an example of an ex post CV study, Greenberg et al. (2004) apply a referendum
valuation question to a sample of patients with coronary artherosclerosis (n = 1,729) to
assess individuals’ WTP for treatments that decrease the risk of restenosis and repeat
revascularization after undergoing percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI). PintoPrades et al. (2007) use both ex ante and ex post referendum valuation method to estimate
WTP for a medicine (Eplerenone) that reduces the risk of death after myocardial
infarction. Using a sample of ninety-two patients with type-II diabetes in Germany,
Hammerschmidt et al. (2003) use both a dichotomous choice (DC) and payment card
elicitation method to estimate WTP for reducing the risk of three diabetic outcomes.
Similarly, Whynes et al. (2003) compares WTP for colorectal cancer screening (n =
2,800) under an open-ended (OE) framework and the referendum valuation method.

9

As the number of studies applying the CV method to elicit public preferences for
either a particular treatment (e.g., ex post) or for a proposed public program (e.g., ex ante)
continues to accumulate, careful attention needs to be paid to the study design and
estimation methodology. While the NOAA Panel’s recommendations have a particular
focus on survey-based studies evaluating environmental goods, the CV guidelines to
health care applications are still fairly unclear (Smith and Sack 2010). There remains
ongoing debate over whether stated preference surveys should be applied to inform
policymakers on health-related issues (and for other applications to public good
provision), and persistent concern over minimizing potential hypothetical bias (Champ et
al. 2009; Little and Berrens 2004). Yet, continued exploration and applications of stated
preference approaches can help better understand and systematically elicit patients’ and
the public’s health care preferences (Smith and Sach 2010).
In this work, an ex ante evaluation is conducted based on a singled-bounded discrete
choice survey instrument to analyze the public support for expanding health care
coverage in New Mexico. In this case, the target sample is the general population and the
type of benefits measured is non use values. In light of the Affordable Care Act (ACA)
signed into law on March 23, 2010, the question becomes, how should the information
presented here be used in the current policy debate? This Act is estimated to provide
coverage to an additional 32 million uninsured individuals by 2019 (The Kaiser Family
Foundation 2011). Two of the most salient aspects of the reform are the requirement that
individuals either maintain minimum health insurance coverage or pay a penalty in the
form of a tax (e.g., individual mandate) and the expansion of Medicaid to individuals that
were previously not eligible. The ACA law requires that nearly all individuals under 65
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earning up to 138% of the federal poverty level (FPL) receive health coverage under
Medicaid by 2019.
One year after ACA became law public support for such a reform is still significantly
divided (e.g., in a June Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) poll, 42% of the people polled
were in favor and 46% were against, KFF 2011). The current economic recession has
brought numerous concerns about the feasibility of such a plan. At the forefront is the
fiscal impact that ACA may have on state budgets given their current level of deficit. In a
2011 Kaiser Family Foundation report, a five-state analysis shows that the impact of
expanding Medicaid eligibility on state budgets ranges from high budgetary costs to low
savings. For instance, for the state of Texas (TX) this would increase costs by $27 billion
compared to savings of $0.8 billion for Maryland (MD). One of the main reasons cited
for these findings is the size of states’ uninsured gap (KFF 2011). Being the state with the
highest uninsured rate, TX uninsured gap is 11.4 percent of its total population compared
to 5.4 percent for MD.
While the state of New Mexico was not included in this analysis, looking at the
number of uninsured adults that would become eligible for Medicaid gives an idea of the
impact that this may have on its budget. Since about 12.1 percent of the adult population
in NM below 138 percent the federal poverty line does not have insurance, NM may not
experience any savings by 2019.9 In light of this, states like NM may have to finance the
new net health care costs by increasing state and local taxes. For policymakers, studies
like the one presented in chapter 4 may reveal useful information to identify the public’s
9

In NM, the total number of individuals under 65 earning up to 138% of FPL is 238,200

in 2010. Based on a total population of 1.97 million, this represents 12.1 percent.
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willingness to pay for expanding health care coverage in anticipation of potential cost
increases as Medicaid eligibility is expanded.
1.3 Revealed Preference Method
Another set of approaches used to measure the impact that a change in the provision
of a good would have on individuals’ welfare is the revealed preference method. In this
case, the value that a non-market good provides to society is inferred by analyzing
individuals’ purchasing decisions of private goods (Freeman 2003). This technique
estimates the marginal implicit prices of the characteristics that differentiate goods in a
market (Freeman 2003). In this method, individuals indirectly reveal the willingness to pay
for environmental good through surrogate market prices. In this case, a relationship between

the demand for the public good and the demand for a private good is determined such that
the values society gives to the public good can be estimated.
Ridker and Henning (1967) authored the groundbreaking study using hedonic methods to
show empirically that the level of pollution in St. Louis affects housing prices. Their model
used data at the Census tract level over individual level observations of housing values. The
authors contend that the errors in estimating the values of individual homes will cancel out
across the Census Tract assuming they are random. These findings paved the way for future
use of housing values to measure the impacts of environmental variables. As an increasing
number of studies started to implement the hedonic pricing method, critics claimed that
observed relationships between environmental disamenities and home values could be simply
spurious correlation. Freeman (1979) responded to these criticisms by explicitly defining the
method for estimating the demand for a characteristic of a property as being a two step
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method.10 In this paper, Freeman explicitly draws out the econometric consequences of
developing implicit prices for attributes of a good. Building upon this framework, Roback
(1982) presented an econometric framework that combines hedonic property value and wage
compensations. Prior to this paper, the preceding hedonic approaches to valuing

environmental improvements were viewed as alternative approaches. Since then the
number of papers applying the hedonic framework significantly increased and the scope of
the good being studied broadened considerably.11

In this work, these hedonic pricing methods are used to estimate the implicit prices of
public forest lands by linking them with house prices and wages. For instance, it is
assumed that the price of a house is a function of not only its size and year built but also
of environmental quality such the distance to a natural amenity. The hypothesis is that if
public forest lands provide non-market benefits, individuals would be willing to pay a
higher house price and receive a lower wage the closer the house is located to a public
land.

10

In the first stage, hedonic pricing methods are used to obtain the implicit pride of the

characteristic. In the second stage, the implicit price is used along with the actual
observed quantities and individual characteristics to estimate the demand.
11

Viscusi and Aldy (2003) review sixty studies while Mrozek and Taylor (2032) provide

a meta-analysis of over 40 studies that apply the hedonic method to estimate the value
individuals place on small changes in the probability of death between 1973 and 2002
(e.g., the Value of a Statistical Life).
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1.4 Objectives and Empirical Approaches
This work applies non-market valuation techniques for valuing changes in the
provision of public lands protection and health care coverage in the Southwestern US.
The objective of this dissertation includes investigating the hypotheses that public forest
lands generate service flows that extend beyond input of production and whether there is
public support for expanding health care coverage.
Chapters 2 and 3 apply the hedonic pricing empirical framework to investigate the
role of Inventoried Roadless Areas (IRAs) in the Southwest. Previous studies have shown
that people are willing to pay higher prices to live in proximity to forest amenities.
However, IRAs were intentionally or unintentionally part of a broader definition of open
space such as forest lands. In light of the current legal debate (e.g., see Aaron 2011) over
whether to open IRAs to commercial activities or to maintain them in their pristine status,
a better understanding is needed about the values that protecting these lands in particular
may have within a regional economics context, as observed in housing and labor markets.
Based on this motivation, these chapters distinguish between wilderness areas which are
managed as congressionally-protected lands (e.g., human construction or commercial
activities are prohibited), IRAs which do not yet have legislative protection, and the all
inclusive open space definition of a public land (e.g., forest) in an attempt to estimate offsite benefits of only IRAs (Glicksman 2004). Spatial variations in wage and housing
prices partially due to proximity or percentage of forest amenities would further support
the New West growth story hypothesis presented by other authors. This West growth
story is based on the idea that the preservation of natural amenities is strongly correlated
to the rapid economic growth in the American West during the 1990s (Schmidt and
Courant 2003).
14

Each chapter addresses this open empirical question based on a different scale of
observation, from a representative agent-based analysis (chapter 2), to the observation of
micro-level individual houses and wage earners (chapter 3). Chapter 2 presents a spatial
lag hedonic model based on 456 observations to investigate whether one type of benefit –
off-site benefits accruing to homeowners in proximity to IRAs – is observable as a
hedonic premium paid for in housing prices in New Mexico, using aggregated Census
tract-level data. Scale and zoning effects (e.g., ecological fallacy, Doll et al. 2004) due to
the aggregation of data into predefined administrative boundaries (such as Census tracts)
are addressed in chapter 3 by using micro-level individual data with a sample of matched
wage-earner housing units equaled to 1,014 observations. Following Roback’s (1982)
hedonic framework, this chapter considers interactions between the housing and labor
markets in the state of Arizona, using a seemingly unrelated regression econometric
approach with two spatial processes (e.g., spatial lag and spatial error correlation).
These two chapters report substantial benefits for living in the proximity or in areas
with high percentage of natural public forest areas. However, it is important to note that
these off-site benefits are components of the larger bundle of ecosystem services and
non-market benefits that protected lands may offer (Loomis and Richardson 2000;
Berrens et al. 2006). Thus, these chapters report estimates for a portion of the total
economic value (TEV) of these protected areas. Outside mainstream environmental
economics, an increasing number of papers argue that land use policies, such as
protection of public lands, that promote healthy lifestyles can help curb increasing health
care costs (Wernham 2011, Bhatia and Wernham 2008). Recent health care coverage
simulations show that expanding health insurance and care saves lives, but can increase
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costs, and may work best when done in combination with behavioral and health
interventions that promote healthy life styles (Wernham 2011). This has particularly
impacted New Mexico (NM), which has the second highest uninsured rate in the nation
behind Texas. The expansion of health care coverage is addressed in chapter 4 based on a
contingent valuation survey.
Chapter 4 uses survey-based data to address changes the in provision of a different
good with public attributes: expanding health care coverage to the uninsured in New
Mexico. While national opinion polls show a consensus in the general public for some
type of national health insurance, some studies show that this support significantly
decreases when asked to pay higher taxes to finance such a reform (Kessler and Brady
2009). Given the desire to provide universal health coverage but the reluctance to pay
higher taxes at the national level, would a state-based reform receive a majority support
from New Mexicans? To address this question, Chapter 4 uses data from a statewide
random-digital telephone survey sample. The survey was conducted between October 12
and December 13, 2007, and included 1,076 complete and 182 partial interviews. The
experimental design includes split-sample treatments for evaluating: two alternative
payment vehicles (increases in either state and local taxes or insurance premiums); and
two categorically nested goods (basic health care [the inclusive good] or primary health
care [the subset good]).
Chapter 5 presents the summary, conclusions, and limitations of this work as well as
suggestions for future research.
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Chapter 2
The Economic Value of Protecting Inventoried Roadless Areas: A Spatial Hedonic
Price Study in New Mexico
2.1

Introduction
Undeveloped, open-space lands, such as Inventoried Roadless Areas (IRAs) and

Congressionally-designated Wilderness Areas (WAs) provide a number of non-market
benefits to society, which may not be fully accounted for in land management decisions.
While the status of WAs is relatively certain as congressionally-protected lands, the
status of IRA lands is tied to Federal agency rulemaking and a protracted political and
legal debate, which makes their condition highly uncertain. IRAs are defined as Public
Forest or Grasslands exceeding 5,000 acres that meet the minimum criteria for wilderness
consideration under the Wilderness Act of 1964 (USDA 2001a) but are not categorized or
managed as wilderness areas.12 The 58.5 million acres of IRA lands represent about 7
percent of all forested lands (Berrens et al. 2006), and 30 percent of all National Forest
lands in the U.S.; they are often located on the fringe or buffer of many WAs lands
(USDA 2001a).13 The policy debate over the fate of IRAs centers on whether to manage
them consistent with Wilderness designation. Given the difficulties of measuring the

12

Wilderness Areas (WAs) total 35 million acres and are managed as congressionally

protected areas, representing 18 percent all National Forest land in the U.S. (USDA
2001a)
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benefits of protecting IRA lands, and the changes that the federal regulations governing
IRAs have experienced in the last 15 years, this debate is far from over.
As of this writing, a State Petition Rule allows each state to petition the protection of
these areas to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA 2005).14 In New
Mexico (NM), Governor Bill Richardson filed a petition in May, 2006, to protect all 1.6
million acres of IRAs in NM (and an additional 100,000 acres in the Valle Vidal unit of
the Carson National Forest). This petition and other similar protection-oriented petitions
from other states with IRAs rest on the arguments that these lands provide various
ecosystem and amenity services, recreation values, and cultural significance, both on-site
and off-site on proximal lands, and further that these values would be lost or significantly
degraded if commercial activities were allowed on these lands.
Nationwide, the IRA policy debate involves questions about the relative values of
protection versus development. The state of New Mexico has submitted a petition based
largely on the non-market environmental benefits that IRAs provide in the state. The
main thrust of this paper is to examine whether off-site benefits accruing to homeowners
in proximity to IRAs is observable as a hedonic premium paid for in housing prices in
New Mexico. While an increasing number of papers have shown that people are willing
to pay higher prices to live in proximity to forest amenities (Hand et al. 2008; Schmidt
and Courant 2003), IRAs have not been included as an explanatory variable. In most
cases, IRAs were intentionally or unintentionally part of a broader definition of open
14

These petitions are reviewed by a National Roadless Area Conservation Advisory

Committee (RACAC) that makes recommendations to the USDA as to whether or not the
petitions should be accepted (36 C.F.R. § 294.12).
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space such as forest. In light of the current legal debate over whether to open IRAs to
commercial activities or to maintain them in their pristine status, a better understanding is
needed about the impact that these lands in particular may have on an economy. Based on
this motivation, this paper distinguishes between congressionally-protected lands (e.g.,
WAs), IRAs, and the all inclusive open space definition of a public land (e.g., forest) in
an attempt to estimate off-site benefits of only IRAs. Since there are other potential
benefits (e.g., on-site recreation values, and non-use values) derived from protecting
IRAs and WAs (Morton 1999), the estimated off-site benefits to homeowners may only
represent a small portion of the total economic value of these lands (e.g., see Loomis
1996). As a state that is becoming relatively more dependent on role of natural
landscapes and amenities, including protected forests and grasslands, within the regional
economy (e.g., Berrens et al. 2006; Hand et al. 2008a and b; Rasker et al. 2008), the
importance of the 1.6 million acres of IRAs may plausibly lie in their role as protected
open spaces. If IRAs provide non-market benefits, as argued nationally (Loomis and
Richardson 2000), then NM is a place where they should be observable.
Since the benefits provided by IRAs do not have explicit market prices associated
with them, testing the validity of this argument requires the application of non-market
methods (Champ et al. 2003). This study applies a hedonic pricing framework to NM
residential housing values by combining the 2000 Decennial Census data with available
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) data. Spatial hedonic models are estimated to
determine if the density of IRAs has a positive and statistically significant effect on the
median price of a home in NM. Results indicate that there is a 5.6% gain in the price of a
house from being located in or adjacent to a Census tract with IRAs. In the aggregate, this
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gain represents 3.5 percent of the value of owner-occupied units in New Mexico ($1.9
billion in capitalized value or an annualized value in perpetuity of $95 million, assuming
a 5 percent interest rate).
2.2 Current Policy Debate
The final Roadless Area Conservation Rule, which was designed to protect 58.5
million acres of National Forest land from further road construction and development,
was published in the Federal Register before the Clinton administration left office in
January, 2001 (USDA 2001a). Shortly thereafter, the Bush administration set aside the
rule for further study as part of a White House moratorium on all Federal rules not yet in
effect (USDA 2001b). In 2005, the Bush administration published a rule to replace the
original Roadless Rule of 2001 (USDA 2005). This replacement rule used existing
individual forest plans as the baseline for managing IRAs, with a mechanism for states to
petition the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) for state-specific IRA management.
Several states submitted or prepared petitions for state-specific IRA rule making.15
During the petitioning period a Federal district judge, in a 2006 lawsuit brought by the
states of California, New Mexico, and Oregon, found that the 2005 rule was invalid, thus
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Virginia, South Carolina, and North Carolina submitted petitions that were accepted by

the Secretary of Agriculture (Warner 2005; Sanford 2006; Easley 2006). New Mexico,
California, and Colorado prepared petitions, but they have been either not submitted or
not considered due to legal uncertainty about the original 2001 rule. Idaho prepared a
petition that it planned to submit under the Administrative Procedures Act (Risch 2006).
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reinstating the original 2001 Roadless rule (U.S. District Court Northern District of
California 2006).
On August 12, 2008, Judge Brimmer invalidated the 2001 Roadless Area
Conservation Rule for the second time, without making any reference to the State Petition
rule (U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming 2008). As a result, the Forest
Service has now been directed by Federal courts in different districts to both follow and
also not follow the original 2001 Roadless Area Conservation Rule. A new appeal of this
decision is pending in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (U.S.
District Court Northern District of California 2008). Clearly, the legal debate over the
status of IRAs is far from over.
Aside from the legal debates relating to the Roadless Rule of 2001, there is evidence
of an economic debate about the role of IRAs in local, state, and regional economies. In a
2001 report to Congress, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) concluded that
prohibiting timber harvest and mining on all IRA lands nationally would cost about $184
million compared to just $219,000 in annual benefits, attributed only to the avoided costs
of road building (OMB 2002). Similarly, a study from the U.S. Forest Service reported
that costs from the IRA rule would total about $262 million annually and 4,559 lost jobs,
but no economic benefits were quantified (USFS 2000). As stated in a law review article
(and see discussion in Berrens et al. 2006), Heinzerling and Ackerman (2004, p. 7) note:
“How did a rule protecting 60 million acres of publicly owned lands, containing
fragile and precious sources of water, wildlife, and plant species, come to look so bad
in economic terms? The answer is simple: just ignore most of the good things one
wants to protect forests for – both the good things that could comfortably be stated in
dollar terms (such as the economic value of a forest for tourism) and the good things
that money cannot buy (such as the knowledge that pristine forests are being
protected in perpetuity).”
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The often-contentious debates over public land management in the West are clearly
visible in the history of the Roadless rule. For example, the states’ petitions to the USDA
for state-specific IRA management indicate the differing role that IRAs are perceived to
play in the economies of each state. Idaho, which petitioned to exempt millions of acres
from a prohibition on road building, seeks to strike a “careful balance between all of the
needs of those who depend on and enjoy IRAs,” (Risch 2006, p. 59). This balance
includes classifying a portion of IRAs under a “General Forest” management theme,
which allows road building, timber harvesting, and minerals extraction as appropriate
activities. Under this management theme, “fish, wildlife, and ecosystem restoration are
not necessarily the driving force behind management activities” (Risch 2006, p. 67).
Other states, including New Mexico, make an appeal to the importance of tourism
and recreation in their states’ economies, the importance of unique natural features that
people value, and of the role of IRAs in generating certain ecosystem services. The New
Mexico IRA petition, which seeks to manage the state’s IRA lands consistent with the
2001 rule, notes that IRAs “protect watershed health, increase and conserve biodiversity,
[and] provide opportunities for outdoor recreation and personal renewal,” (Richardson
2006, p. 6). According to New Mexico’s petition, inter alia, the cost of protecting the $1
billion of wildlife-related spending in the economy outweighs the small (if any) negative
impact on the forestry sector (Richardson 2006).
New Mexico’s and other states’ petitions suggest that the states have to some degree
engaged in a kind of rough benefit-cost analysis of IRA protection in their state, and have
taken regulatory and legal action based in part on that analysis. For example, California’s
petition claims that preservation “protects both economic and intrinsic values for current
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and future generations,” (Schwartzenegger 2006, p. 1). Virginia’s petition came down on
the side of IRA preservation with a clear appeal to notions of benefit-cost analysis:
“economic reasons for prohibiting development activities in roadless areas far outweigh
arguments against such a ban,” (Warner 2006, sec. 3.f). Colorado’s petition seeks to
exempt ski areas from IRA protection, indicative of the relatively important role of ski
areas in Colorado’s tourism economy (Owens 2006). And Idaho’s proposed exemption of
6 million acres (of Idaho’s total 9.3 million acres of IRAs) from road-building
prohibitions may reflect a greater dependence on the wood products industry in that state
(Risch 2006). This poses the question of whether these apparent benefit-cost analyses or
trade-off considerations, and thus the conclusions based on them, are accurate
representations of the states’ public preferences.
While a number of studies applying hedonic price models have shown that
proximity to open-space amenities is capitalized in the real estate market (e.g., Hand et al.
2008a; Schmidt and Courant 2006; Kim and Wells 2005; Phillips 2004; Kim and Johnson
2002; Shultz and King 2001; Phillips 1999; Doss and Taff 1996), little is known about
the economic benefits of protecting IRA lands, aside from some “back of the envelope”
estimates of the non-market values of IRAs (Loomis and Richardson 2000; and Berrens
et al. 2006). Both of these studies apply a benefit transfer technique based on Phillips’
(1999) findings to estimate the impact of IRAs on housing values at a national level
(Loomis and Richardson 2000) and in NM (Berrens et al. 2006) 16. Loomis and
16

In Phillips (1999), a hedonic price analysis was applied to over 6,148 land sales to

isolate the value of parcels near designated Wilderness areas in Vermont. Results indicate
that proximal parcels sold at prices 13 percent higher than otherwise, with a price
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Richardson (2000) estimated that the gain in real local property values is 13 percent
compared to 6 percent for NM (Berrens et al. 2006).
To provide background for the case of New Mexico, Table 2.1 presents selected
measures of economic performance for New Mexico counties with significant IRAs, and
counties with little or no IRAs. High-IRA counties appear to be doing well economically,
keeping up with and in some cases surpassing non-IRA counties. Growth in real income
per capita, non-farm employment, and real earnings per job was faster in IRA counties as
compared to non-IRA counties. And while natural resource extraction is relatively more
important in IRA counties, growth in employment in service industries was faster in IRA
counties.

decrease of 0.8 percent per acre for each kilometer of distance from the wilderness area
(Phillips 1999; Loomis and Richardson 2000; and Berrens et al. 2006). To estimate the
off-site benefits of IRAs on a national level, Loomis and Richardson (2000) used the
Phillips (1999) findings by assuming that the 13 percent estimated for designated
Wilderness areas can be applied to other natural areas, such as IRA lands. Berrens et al.
(2006) adjust this estimate to a 6 percent gain in local ranch properties for NM based on
the relative scarcity of protected areas in the Eastern U.S. compared to the Western
region. More recently, Phillips (2004) updated his original study to cover all property
sales in the area from 1987-2002, covering more than 12,000 transactions and 82 towns
across southern and central Vermont within 14 kilometers of the NF boundary. A key
finding is that towns with adjacency -- designated Wilderness Area acreage within their
borders – had a 19 percent higher per acre price than those without.
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Roadless areas may also play a role in the larger regional economy if the economic
performance of one county influences nearby counties (see Khan et al. 2001; Wheeler
2001). In New Mexico, counties with large tracts of roadless land, which are
predominately rural and sparsely populated, appear to be increasingly tied to the
economy and labor markets of nearby urban areas (Hand et al. 2008a). Earnings flows
measure the amount of wages and salaries that are earned in a county that is different
from where a worker resides. As shown in Table 2.1, net earnings flows in IRA counties
are positive, about $511 million in 2005, and have increased by about 27 percent since
2001. This suggests that New Mexicans increasingly live in more rural, IRA-dominated
counties and commute to proximal urban areas for access to employment opportunities.
These descriptive data support a prima facie case that New Mexico’s petition is based
on a plausible accounting of the benefits and costs of developing IRAs. However, it
remains unclear whether people value IRA-derived benefits to the degree that some
Western governors suggest, or whether we can observe any empirical signals of those
values.17 The remainder of this paper focuses on a piece of this larger benefit-cost
analysis question and a particular category of benefit, by investigating whether off-site
17

Rather than reflecting solely an accounting of public preferences, it is possible that the

petitions represent some other kind of safety perspective, such as a Safe Minimum
Standard (SMS) approach to conservation. Randall and Farmer’s (1995, pp 3)
“circumstantial” case for conservation suggests that conservation policy be made “on the
basis of benefits and costs, but subject always to the constraint that actions we fear we (or
future generations of people we care about) will regret are forbidden,”. In this policy
framework, benefit-cost analysis plays a role, but not necessarily a decisive role.
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benefits accruing to homeowners in proximity of IRAs are being capitalized in the New
Mexico housing market. By distinguishing between IRAs and WAs, this paper intends to
inform the current debate on whether managing IRAs as WAs generates benefits that are
not explicitly capture in the market.
2.3

Hedonic Empirical Framework
In this section, the hedonic framework and a theoretical discussion on spatial-

dependence relationships are presented to inform the empirical approach. In hedonic
price studies, the hypothesis is that visual or proximal access to some set of
environmental amenity and disamenity characteristics gets capitalized into the sales price
of the property. The hedonic pricing method decomposes the statistical variation in prices
for a heterogeneous good (e.g., residential real estate) to isolate the contribution of
individual attributes or characteristics of the good (Taylor 2003).
An important feature of the empirical framework pursued here is that the hedonic
analysis is carried out on observations of representative households. Due to housing price
disclosure limitations in New Mexico (see Berrens and McKee 2004), the median
characteristics of each Census tract are assumed to be representative of the housing stock
in that location.18 It is important to note that while it is a common practice in hedonic
studies to assume participants have full information, it may not be realistic to extend this
assumption to the relevant natural resource characteristics. It may be the case that an
18

See Chay and Greenstone (2004) and Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) for examples

using median housing values at the census tract level and relying on a “natural
experiment” framework to estimate the benefits of environmental regulations and
policies.
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owner of a house is aware that a forest is located in close proximity but does not know
the type of open space in question. However, we adopt two other conventional
assumptions for hedonic models: that the housing market is in equilibrium (Blomquist
2008) and that the state of New Mexico represents a single composite housing market.
It should be noted that market equilibrium is based on the assumption that utility
differences between locations have already been eliminated.19
Following Freeman’s (2003) theoretical hedonic price framework and using a vector
notation, a household’s utility function depends on goods consumed C, housing
characteristics S, neighborhood characteristics N and location-specific environmental
amenities Q. In particular, the purpose of this paper is to econometrically estimate the
housing price function, which is derived from the utility maximization problem (Freeman
2003):
Phj = p(Shj, Nj, Qj),

(2.1)

where h represents an individual house with location j.
In the context of this study, the environmental amenity vector Q includes the
percentage of IRAs and Wilderness Areas within a Census tract. In this setting, it is
assumed that a household in location j faces tradeoffs when choosing the level of, for
instance, IRA lands as given by the first order condition:
19

This is also referred to as spatial equilibrium. This assumption is widely used in urban

economics and states that total utility or level of well-being across regions should be the
same if the market is at equilibrium (Blomquist 2006). This implies that there is no gain
by moving from one market to another since combinations of local amenity bundles,
wages, and housing prices are equally attractive.
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∂u

∂p j
∂QIRAs
=
∂u
∂Q IRAs , j
∂C

(2.2)

In this study, location j corresponds to a Census tract j and since each observation
corresponds to a Census tract with a representative house, the h subscript is dropped. The
econometric equivalent of equation (2.1), assuming a log-linear specification,20 is:
ln P = α 0 + β S j + φN j + ηQ j + ε ,

(2.3)

where ε ~N(0,Ω), and β, φ, and η are the coefficients to be estimated.
2.31 Spatial Econometrics
The model specification in equation (2.3) is perhaps still the most common in applied
hedonic studies. However, equation (2.3) does not address spatially-dependent
relationships that emerge when using geographic data (Anselin 1988). The econometric
model in equation (2.3) implicitly assumes that there is no interdependence of
homeowner’s home pricing decisions. In this case, interdependence refers to a situation in
which the asking price that a homeowner chooses may affect the prices asked by
neighboring proprietor. This spatial relationship can be interpreted as a measure of the
degree of product substitution in the real estate market and assumes that houses in closer
proximity are closer substitutes than those more distant. Spatial dependence may also be
observed if similar behavioral responses arise due to a common neighborhood effect. For
instance, opening an IRAs for development in Census tract j may affect home prices in
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Other model specifications were tested but due to high degree of multicollinearity (e.g.,

a condition number > 30), they are not reported in this paper.
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that location which in turn affects home values in neighboring census tracts. In the
context of this paper, spatial dependence arises when the value of a house located in
Census tract j is determined by both its own housing and environmental characteristics
and the values and characteristics of homes located in neighboring Census tracts. In many
instances, this arises due to random specifications of geographic units, such as census
tracts or county boundaries, which may not accurately reflect the extent to which the
phenomenon in question behaves in space (Anselin 1988). Another reason is that
regardless of whether data corresponds to individual spatial units or aggregated units,
diffusion processes (e.g., spillover effects) result in spatial autocorrelation between
different spatial units depending on location and distance. For instance, in Hand et al.
(2008) the approach used to control for spatial dependence was to include an independent
variable that measures average forest and wilderness areas in contiguous Public Use
Microdata Areas (PUMAs). Since the data used was the 2000 Public Use Microdata
Series (PUMs), the effect of forest lands or wilderness areas had to be aggregated to
geographic areas called PUMAs.21 The hypothesis was that the natural characteristics of
nearby places also affect housing prices and wages in a particular PUMA.22
21

While PUMs provides individual-level data, each individual is identified to a PUMAs

with a population of at least 100,000. In Hand et al. (2008), PUMAs were used as the
level of observation to calculate the percentage of forest or wilderness lands. Therefore,
the same percentage of forest area was assigned to individual locations that belong to the
same PUMA. In total there are 36 PUMAs in Arizona and 15 in New Mexico.
22

In Hand et al. (2008), results show that the average percentage of wilderness areas in

contiguous PUMAs has a much stronger and statistically significant effect on both the
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A shortcoming of this approach is that the coefficient of an independent variable may
be accounting not only for direct marginal effects but also for spillover effects. For
instance, it implicitly assumes that a change in the price of a neighboring home due to a
change in the percentage of forest lands does not affect housing prices in a particular
PUMA. If there is spatial autocorrelation in the data, the coefficients of the explanatory
variables would be biased upwards as they would fail to separate the marginal effects
from the spillover effects of the explanatory variable on housing prices. In this case,
E [P|X] = XβOLS and βOLS > β, where X is a vector of independent variables and β is a
column vector of parameters.
Building upon this hypothesis, this paper implements an econometric model that
accounts for these spatial interactions as described below. The simultaneity and nonlinearity of these spillovers is captured in the spatial lag model specification and
estimation.
At present, a small but growing number of empirical papers applying the hedonic
pricing framework have tested for the presence of spatial-autocorrelation (Kim et al.
2003; Pace and Gilley 1997; Anselin and Lozano-Garcia 2008; Huang et al. 2006; and
Brasington and Hite 2005). As one example, Kim et al. (2003) apply spatial hedonic
models (e.g. equations 2.4 and 2.6, presented below) to estimate the benefits of air quality
improvement in Seoul, South Korea and to test for the presence of spatial-autocorrelation.
The authors find that the OLS coefficient on nitrogen oxides overestimated the effect of
housing labor market of a particular PUMA than the percentage of wilderness areas in the
PUMA in question. These findings suggest that omitting spatial dependence would
deliver biased results.
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this pollutant on the housing value in the presence of spatial dependence. Moreover, Kim
et al. (2003) show that the model that accounts for spatial autocorrelation is preferred to
the OLS specification.23
As a second example, Pace and Gilley (1997) draw upon Harrison and Rubinfeld’s
(1978) applied-hedonic study for the housing market in Boston to empirically
demonstrate the implications of ignoring spatial autocorrelation. Based on a spatial
autorregresive model, Pace and Gilley (1997) find that the estimated sum-of-squares
errors fall by 44 percent compared to the OLS results estimated in Harrison and
Rubinfeld (1978). Moreover, the effect of nitrogen oxides (NOx) levels on housing prices,
the variable of interest in the paper, decreases by 38 percent when using a spatial
autorregresive model as opposed to a log-linear model. These two papers empirically
show that accounting for spatial autocorrelation improves the estimated coefficients and
overall results of the respective study.
In this paper, spatial dependence is addressed by estimating two different models: a
spatial lag model, and a mixed spatial lag model. The first model is estimated using both
a Maximum Likelihood (ML) and a 2-SLS robust approach. The mixed spatial lag model
is estimated using the ML technique. In the first spatial model, a vector of house prices
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Kim et al. (2003) estimate that the marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for a 4 percent

reduction in SO2 concentration is $2,333 or 1.4 percent of the mean housing price, using
a 2-SLS Robust approach to estimate the spatial hedonic model.
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observed at other locations is included on the right hand side of the hedonic model,
according to (Anselin 1988)24
ln P = α 0 + ρ priceW ln P + Sβ + Nφ + Qη + ε ,

(2.4)

where and W is an nxn matrix that describes the contiguity relationship between spatial
units and has non-zero elements wji in each row j for those columns i that are neighbors
of location j. For a particular location, this model is represented by the following
expression: ln p1 = ρ (w11 p1+w12 p2+w13 p3...+w1n pn)+X1β+ε1, where w11 = 0 and ρprice
є[-1,1] is the spatial autoreggresive coefficient to be estimated and represents the effect of
housing prices in neighboring Census tracts on the median price in location j. This spatial
lag model specification explicitly distinguishes between direct or marginal effects and
spillover effects. For instance, the effect of changing the status of WAs to unprotected
lands would change the price of a house in the same Census tract (e.g., coefficient η in
equation 2.4) as well as prices on neighboring Census tracts (e.g., spillover effects
captured by the ρprice coefficient). Therefore, the OLS coefficients in equation (2.3) would
be inconsistent as they would incorrectly include both the marginal effect and the
spillover effects.
In other words, equation (2.4) is the analogue of equation (2.3) but ρprice is not assumed to
be equal to zero.

24

While use of a more flexible functional form such as a Box-Cox transformation may be

more appropriate, estimation in the presence of spatial dependence raises a number of
methodological issues, which we leave to future research and investigation.
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In (2.4), the direct effects that structural, neighborhood and environmental
characteristics in neighboring Census tract i may have on the price of a house in Census
tract j are assumed to be zero. A more general model that introduces these types of spatial
correlations is (Anselin 1988):
ln P = α 0 + ρ priceW ln P + Sβ + Nφ + Qη + ρ S WS + ρ N WN + ρ QWQ + ε ,

(2.5)

where ρi (for i = S, N, and Q) is the autoregressive coefficient that corresponds to each
explanatory variable and represents the effect of, for instance, housing characteristics (S)
in neighboring Census tracts on the median price in location j. The presence of significant
spatial lagged coefficients (e.g., ρprice) means that the estimated OLS coefficients in
equation (2.3) would be biased and inefficient due to correlation or endogeneity problems
between the lagged dependent variable (WP) and the error term (Anselin 1988), which
underlines the importance of testing spatial lag dependence.
To correct for this problem, a common solution is to implement an ML or a 2-SLS
approach. An important assumption made when using the ML method to estimate
equations (2.4) and (2.5) is that the error term is normally distributed. A plausible
alternative that addresses this potential issue is a 2-SLS method. Since a 2-SLS approach
uses an OLS estimation technique, the probability distribution function of the error term
is not required, which suggests that the distribution of the error term is not an issue.
Moreover, the existence of endogeneity is solved by finding the instruments for the
vector of prices on the right hand side of equations (2.4) and (2.5). In the empirical
literature, it is common practice to use the spatially lagged explanatory variables (e.g.,
WX), as instruments (Anselin 1988). Given the specific empirical application of this
paper, equation (2.4) can be written in the following way:
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^

ln P = α 0 + ρ price W ln P + Sβ + Nφ + Qη + v,

(2.6)

^

In this equation, W ln P is obtained by using WX as instruments for W lnP, where WX =
[WS WN WQ] (Anselin 1988). As a result, including the spatial lags of the explanatory
variables on the right hand side of equation (2.6) would result in a misspecification of the
2-SLS model.25 Based on these models, two marginal effects of interest are estimated: the
marginal effect of a 1 percent change in IRAs and a 1 percent change in WAs on housing
prices. These effects can be mathematically expressed as:

25

Log-linear:

∂P
= QIRAs , j P ,
∂QIRAs , j

(2.7)

Spatial lag:

1
∂P
] P,
= QIRAs, j [
1 − ρ PRICE
∂QIRAs, j

(2.8)

In the 2-SLS approach, the instruments used to correct the endogeneity problem are the

spatially lagged explanatory variables. In this case, the econometric estimation is divided
into two stages. In the first stage, WP is regressed using the instruments mentioned above
^

^

to obtain WP . In this second stage, equation (4) is estimated after substituting WP for
WP to solve the endogeneity problem arising from housing price effects. Mathematically
this can be represented as follow:
1st Stage: WP = ρsWS + ρNWN + ρQWQ + ε.
^

2nd Stage: P = α 0 + ρ price WP+ βS + φN + ηQ + v.
^

From the 1st stage estimation, WP = WP + ε . After substituting this right hand side
expression for WP in equation (4) and simplifying notation, the equation estimated in the
2nd stage is equivalent to equation (6).
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Mixed Spatial lag:

∂P
1
1
]P + [
]ρ Q IRAS , j .
= Q IRAs, j [
1 − ρ price
1 − ρ price
∂Q IRAs, j

(2.9)

Equation (2.7) estimates the direct-contemporaneous effect (QIRAs,j) of a 1 percent change
in IRAs located in Census tract j on house prices located in census tract j. This marginal
change affects prices of houses located in Census tract j, assuming that housing prices in
the other Census tracts remain constant. In equation (2.8), this assumption is relaxed and
two types of effects are estimated: the direct-contemporaneous effect and indirect effects.
The latter represents the effect on home prices in Census tract j of a 1 percent change
IRAs in neighboring Census tracts through an intermediate channel such as neighboring
Census tract home prices (represented by ρprice). In this hedonic framework, the marginal
or contemporaneous impact is the change in own home prices holding all others’ prices
constant. The total derivative would be the combined effect of all housing price changing
simultaneously. In this case, this total change is given by the spatial multiplier process
(1/(1-ρ)) which measures how the average effect of a change in QIRAs is multiplied by the
spillovers in the spatial system (Anselin 2003). This process captures both the directcontemporaneous and indirect (spillover) effects of neighborhood’s IRAs lands on
housing prices. A shock in the explanatory variable QIRAs in census tract i (e.g., an
increase in the percentage of IRAs opened to development) would simultaneously affect
home values in neighboring Census tracts. This spillover effect is a function of the spatial
process (e.g., in this case is the spatial lag), the specification of the weight matrix (e.g.,
weighted average effect of housing prices in neighboring units) and the value of the
spatial autoregressive coefficient. Thus, the full effect of a change in QIRAs on housing
prices can be interpreted as a multiple of the marginal direct effect (represented by the
coefficient ηIRAS) of a change in QIRAs given (Anselin 2003).
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In equation (2.9) three effects are estimated: the direct-contemporaneous, the indirect,
and direct spatial-spillover effects (ρQIRAS,j). A direct spatial-spillover represents the
effect on home prices in Census tract j of a 1 percent change in IRAs in neighboring
Census tracts on own-tract home prices; the effect is direct in the sense that the nearby
IRAs are directly affecting home prices, but it is a spatial spillover (i.e., it is not spatially
contemporaneous). A positive and statistically significant QIRAs,j would mean that
houses in Census tracts with a higher density of undeveloped IRAs would have a higher
market value as compared to houses with lower or no IRAs, ceteris paribus. The ρprice
coefficient is estimated in equations (2.4)-(2.6), and signifies spatial autocorrelation.
The results obtained in the log-linear model (equation 2.3) that ignores any type of
spatial autocorrelation are compared to those of the three spatial-lag model specifications
presented above. The spatial weight matrix, W, is constructed using a five-closest
neighbors criterion. The five Census tracts nearest to location j are defined as neighbors,
for which the average distance is 2.64 miles.26

26

The weight matrix was constructed using the X-Y coordinates of each Census tract.

The distance between the different Census tracts was calculated using GeoDa software.
Other specifications of the weight matrix were computed (i.e. 3, 4, and 6-nearest
neighbors) but the estimated coefficients were not significantly different from the spatial
lag model based on the 5-nearest neighbors criterion. Other alternatives for constructing a
weight matrix includes rook criterion (locations sharing a boundary), queen criterion
(locations sharing a vertex), and threshold distance. A k-nearest neighbor’s criterion has
the advantage of ensuring that each Census tract has an equal number of neighbors.
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2.4

Data and Hypotheses
In order to estimate equations (2.3), (2.4), (2.5), and (2.6) we use the 2000 U.S.

Census of Population and Housing Information for the state of New Mexico at the Census
tract level for the structural and neighborhood variables. A Census tract is a relatively
permanent statistical subdivision of a county delineated by a local committee of Census
data users. Census tracts average about 4,000 inhabitants and are designed to be relatively
homogeneous units with respect to population characteristics, economic status, and living
conditions at the time of establishment (U.S. Department of Commerce 2000).
The data provides median values for various variables for each Census tract, based on
responses that individuals gave to the 2000 Decennial Census. For each Census tract the
median value for income, number of rooms, house age, number of houses, and house
value is reported. In the 2000 Decennial Census a house value is obtained by asking the
house owner to state his perceived price at which the house would be sold if it were in the
market (Freeman 2003).27 In all, there are 456 Census tracts in New Mexico, which is our
number of observations since each location j corresponds to a representative house and a
Census tract.
The reason for using U.S. Census data relates to New Mexico’s housing sales
disclosure laws. New Mexico is one of the few states that do not publicly disclose actual
housing market price transactions. Despite a 2004 a law requiring real estate transactions
27

Kiel and Zabel (1999) tested the accuracy of this methodology by comparing the actual

market sale price of a house with the price estimated by the owner of that house. The
study shows that using Census data to estimate hedonic price functions yield unbiased
coefficients.
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to be filed with the county assessor’s office, this information has yet to be publicly
accessible (Berrens and McKee 2004, p. 510). Given this restriction, the U.S. Census is
the best publicly available source to estimate the effects of open-space amenities on NM
housing values. A possible shortcoming of using data aggregated at the Census tract level
is that the variables represent a broad description of the stock of housing in the Census
tract, rather than individual homes and market transactions.
The dependent variable is LNHVALUE, which is the natural logarithm of the median
price of owner-occupied homes in each Census tract .The open-space variables, IRAs and
WAs, were constructed using GIS and represent the percentage of such lands in a Census
tract. For each Census tract, the number of acres of IRAs and WAs are separately divided
by the total size of the Census tract to obtain the percentage of inventoried roadless areas
(IRAs) and wilderness areas (WAs) within a Census tract. The size of IRA lands in a
Census tract ranges from 2 to 423,100 acres and that of WAs ranges from 2 to 498,600
acres. In percentage terms, IRA values ranges from 58 percent to 0.0033 percent, and
WA values from 68 percent to 0.003 percent for a given Census tract.28
28

For both IRAs and WAs, the lands in question were identified several years before the

Census data was collected in 2000. In the case of IRAs, the land identified in the GIS
data is based on an evaluation dating from 1979 (RARE II, see below). Almost all WAs
in NM were designated prior to 1987. The use of RARE II as the basis of the current
IRAs is mentioned in the 2001 Roadles Rule: Federal Register, January 12, 2001, Vol.
66, No. 9, pg. 3246 (http://roadless.fs.fed.us/documents/rule/index.shtml). A listing of all
WAs designations through 1999 is published at:
http://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs/rmrs_gtr018.html.
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The distribution of IRAs and WAs values in the data indicate a high degree of
heterogeneity across Census tracts (Figure 1). However, there are also underlying
differences in Census tract size and area of IRAs and WAs. For example, the largest
percentage value of IRAs is located in a Census tract in Santa Fe county (58 percent), but
contains only 4,727 acres of IRA land. In contrast, a Census tract located in Eddy county
has an IRAs percentage value of 2, but its total IRA area is 32,232 acres. To address this
issue, an independent variable representing census size in acres (DCENSIZE) is included
in the models.
In terms of the geographical distribution of IRAs and WAs in New Mexico, fourtythree of the 456 Census tracts have IRAs, representing 2 percent of the total land and 17
percent of the national forest land in the state (USDA 2000).29 Figure 2.1 shows the
spatial distribution of the areas in NM. The largest portion of both IRAs and WAs lands
is located in the southwest of NW and is part of the Gila National Forest (north of Silver
city). This National Forest accounts for almost 50 percent of IRAs and WAs in New
Mexico. Census tracts that contain IRAs tend to be more rural and larger than other
Census tracts; the average size of census tracts with IRAs is 778,143 acres compared to
110,653 acres for those without IRAs.
An advantage of measuring IRAs and WAs as a percentage of a Census tract’s total
size is that it can be interpreted as a relative measure of open-space access. For instance,
while the size of IRA lands in acres in Census tract j is much smaller than that of Census
29

New Mexico counties with IRA lands are Catron, Cibola, Eddy, Grant, Harding,

Hidalgo, Lincoln, Los Alamos, McKinley, Mora, Otero, Rio Arriba, Sandoval, San
Miguel, Santa Fe, Sierra, Socorro, and Taos (USDA 2000).
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tract i, its size as a percentage of the Census tract’s total size may be larger which implies
that the access to such lands would require, on average, lower traveled distance compared
to Census tract i. A disadvantage of these measures is that a small tract may have the
same percentage value as a large tract, even though the accessible amount of IRAs may
be different in absolute terms.
Table 2.2 lists the summary statistics and descriptions of the dependent and
independent variables used to estimate the models presented above. The open-space
variables included in the models are IRA lands and Wilderness Areas (WAs). The
structural variable S is a vector that includes number of rooms coded as a dummy
variable (coded 1 for houses that have number of rooms greater than the average number
of rooms in the sample; and 0 otherwise), and age of a house (2000-year a house was
built); N is a vector that represents median income level coded as a dummy variable
(coded 1 for houses that are located in Census tracts that have income levels higher than
the average income level in the sample; and 0 otherwise), number of houses per acre, and
size of a Census tract in acres also coded as a dummy variable (coded 1 for Census tracts
whose sizes in acres are higher than the average Census size in the sample; and 0
otherwise); and Q is a vector that includes percentage of IRAs and percentage of WAs
within a Census tract.
We use the empirical models to test several hypotheses about the impact of open
space and spatial relationships on housing prices. These hypotheses can formally be
expressed as:
H1: H0: ηIRAs = 0 and HA: ηIRAs > 0.
H2: H0: ηWAs = 0 and HA: ηWAs > 0.
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H3: H0: ηWAs ≥ ηIRA and HA: ηWAs ≤ ηIRA
H4: H0: ρPRICE = 0 and HA: ρPRICE ≠ 0.
H5: H0: ρIRA = 0 and HA: ρIRA ≠ 0.
H6: H0: ρWAs = 0 and HA: ρWAs ≠ 0.
The hypotheses in H1 and H2 pertain to the effect that IRAs and WAs in Census tract j
have on the price of houses located in the same Census tract. In particular, the alternative
hypotheses in H1 and H2 suggest that IRAs and WAs in Census tract j have a positive and
statistically significant effect on the median price of a home located within the same
Census tract. Failing to reject these alternative hypotheses would mean that benefits from
IRAs and WAs are being capitalized in the price of houses in NM. This finding would
provide a measure of support for efforts in New Mexico to manage these lands consistent
with wilderness designation and counter arguments that the value of such benefits are
near zero (e.g. OMB 2002 report and USFS 2000 report). Hypothesis H3 relates to the
geographic location of IRAs relative to WAs. IRA lands are often located on the
periphery of WAs (e.g., a prominent example of this is in the Gila National Forest located
in the Southwest of NM). This suggests that IRA lands are commonly the more
immediate open-space that a house faces. As a consequence, the ex-ante expectation is
for the magnitude of the coefficient on the IRA variable to be larger than that of the
wilderness variable. This means that the effect that IRAs have on the housing value is
expected to be higher than that of WAs.
Hypotheses H4-H6 relate to the effect that changes in housing prices, IRAs, and WAs
lands in neighboring Census tracts have on the price of houses located in Census tract j.
For instance, failing to reject the alternative hypothesis in H4 would mean that the price
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of a house located in a Census tract j is affected by changes in prices of houses located in
neighboring Census tracts.
It is important to note that the first three hypotheses are empirically tested based on
one-tailed tests while the last three are based on two-tailed tests. The significance level of
the one-tailed tests is calculated by dividing the p-value of the two-tailed test by 2 (Green
2000).
Since in these models IRAs and WAs areas are two different explanatory variables,
the impact of IRAs on the housing market can be isolated. Furthermore, since these
coefficients allow us to monetarily quantify the additional price that the representative
homeowner pays for being close to IRAs and WAs, this study estimates the value that
these areas provide to the local communities, separately.

2.5

Empirical Results
The estimates of equations (2.3) – (2.6) tend to support the general hypothesis that

open space measures (IRA and WAs) represent amenities that have a positive impact on
median housing prices. Table 2.3 reports the results for the log-linear and the spatial lag
models estimated to test the hypotheses H1 through H5.
The coefficients for IRA and WAs are positive and significant at the 1 percent level
in all models, suggesting that the null hypotheses in H1 and H2 can be rejected. It is worth
noting that the significance levels of these coefficients in Table 2.3 are based on twotailed test. Thus, the p-values for hypotheses H1 and H2 are obtained by dividing the pvalues of the two-tailed tests by 2. For the IRAs and WAs coefficients, the p-values for
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the one-tailed tests are lower than 1 percent for all four models.30 For hypothesis H3 the
estimated IRAs and WAs coefficients from the spatial-lag (2-SLS) robust model were
used to determine if these coefficients are statistically different from each other (βIRAs =
1.58 and βWAs = 0.72). In this case, the t-value is 1.67 corresponding to a p-value of 0.17
for a one-tailed test and one degree of freedom (e.g., the only restriction in this case is
that the two coefficients are not statistically different). This test indicates that the two
coefficients are not statistically different from each other.31
The ρprice coefficient, which measures the marginal effect of changes in neighboring
house prices on the median house price in a given Census tract, is positive and significant
(models 2 – 4). This result indicates that a change in one of the explanatory variables not
only affect prices of houses located in the same Census tract (e.g., marginal or direct
effects) but also housing prices located in neighboring Census tracts. In this case, the
intermediate channel is neighboring Census tract home prices (represented by ρprice). For
instance, a change in housing prices in Census tract j due to a change in the percentage of

30

The degrees of freedom (DF) used to test hypotheses H1 and H2 is calculated as

follows: DF = n – (p + 1), where n is the number of observations, p is the number of
parameters to be estimated plus the constant term. For the OLS model the DF is 448
(456 – (7+1)), spatial lag model (ML) is 447 (456 – (8+1)), mixed spatial lag is 440
(456 – (15+1)), and spatial lag model (2-SLS) is 447 (456 – (8+1)).
31

Since neither a likelihood ratio test nor a Wald test is feasible with a least squares

approach, the formula used to calculate the t-value for hypothesis H3 is:

t=

( β IRAs − β WAs )
.
( SE IRAs − SEWAs )
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protected IRAs would also affect home values in neighboring Census tracts. Thus, the
OLS coefficients are picking up not only the contemporaneous effect but also the indirect
or spillover effects. This is the reason why the coefficients of the log-linear model are
higher than the other three spatial models. In the empirical results given in Table 2.3, the
magnitude of this bias (on average, 1/(1-ρ)) is illustrated by comparing the OLS and
spatial lag models’ estimates. This indicates that spatial dependence is an important
characteristic of the housing market in New Mexico, thus rejecting the null hypothesis;
the evidence supports H4.
For the log-linear model, the benchmark case, the estimated coefficients for the IRAs
and WAs variables are 2.27 and 1.19, respectively. In the spatial-lag models, these
estimated coefficients are also positive but their effect on median house price is much
smaller compared to the log-linear results. This is due to the inclusion of lag variables,
such as ρprice, ρIRA and ρWAs, which represent the effect of changes in prices, IRAs, and
WAs in neighboring Census tracts on the value of houses in a given Census tract.
Calculating marginal effects of changes in IRA and WAs sheds some light on the
magnitude of the coefficients estimated in the models. Table 2.4 displays the marginal
WTP for a 1 percent change in the value of IRA and WAs in the log-linear model and the
spatial-lag models. The marginal WTP for a 1 percent change in the value of IRAs ranges
between $2,194 and $2,943, evaluated at the mean house value, which is equivalent to an
annualized WTP of $109.7 and $147.15, respectively (assuming a 5 percent interest rate).
Another important result that relates to the difference between the log-linear model
and the spatial models is the overall effect that changes in IRAs and WAs lands have on
housing values. In model 2, housing values in a given Census tract can be affected by a

44

change in its own IRAs and by housing values in neighboring Census tracts (via the ρprice
coefficient). In model 3, a given Census tract is affected by the value of IRAs in
neighboring Census tracts (via the ρIRA coefficient) and the median housing price in
neighboring Census tracts (via the ρprice coefficient). The estimated coefficients in the
log-linear model may be upwardly biased because own-tract IRAs and WAs are probably
correlated with nearby-tract IRAs and WAs, but may still ignore some of the impact of
IRAs and WAs in nearby tracts. In the case of hypotheses H5 and H6, estimates of ρIRA
and ρWAs are not significantly different from zero, which suggests that we cannot reject
the null hypotheses; the evidence does not support H5 and H6. Results indicate that while
marginal changes in neighboring house prices affect the price of the median house in a
given Census tract (i.e., null hypothesis is rejected in H4), marginal changes in IRA and
WAs in neighboring Census tracts have no direct-spillover effects on house prices.
In terms of model specification, four statistical tests suggest that the spatial-lag
models (models 2 and 3) are preferred to the log-linear model in which it is assumed that
there is no spatial autocorrelation. The presence of spatial dependency is statistically
significant as evidenced by the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests (LM-lag, and LM-error
values) and the z-score of the ρprice coefficient (i.e. null hypothesis in H3 is rejected). The
LM-lag test has a χ2 distribution and tests for the presence of spatial lag dependence in
the hedonic OLS model in which the null hypothesis is that ρprice = 0 (i.e. there is no
spatial lag dependence) and the alternative hypothesis is ρprice ≠ 0 (Anselin 1988).
Another type of spatial autocorrelation is spatial error dependence. In this case the model
is: P = Xβ + ε , where ε = λW + μ . However, based on the spatial diagnostics tests
reported in Table 2.3, the estimation of the spatial error model is not necessary. While the
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LM-error test is significant in the hedonic OLS model, the spatial error dependence is no
longer statistically significant after introducing the spatial effect (e.g., ρprice). A spatialerror model would suggest that there are other unobserved variables that are related in
space (across Census tracts) and captured in the error structure. But the LM-error test
result, after estimating the spatial-lag model (e.g., LM-error = 0.54), suggests that this is
not the case, or at least that the spatially lagged independent variables adequately capture
the spatial relationship between Census tracts.32
The log-likelihood values reported for each model also suggest that models 2 and 3
are superior specifications to the log-linear model. A likelihood ratio test between models
1 and 2 and models 1 and 3 indicates that the coefficients of the restricted model (e.g,
model 1) are significantly different from those of the spatial lag or mixed spatial
models.33 While these two spatial lag models are superior specifications to the OLS
32

There may be theoretical arguments for estimating a spatial-lag model instead of a

spatial-error model. The error dependence between housing transactions is likely to occur
on a small scale, e.g., within neighborhood or at least within Census tracts (Anselin
2002). In the representative household framework, any within-tract error dependence is
likely hidden behind the median values obtained for each Census tract.
33

The formula used to calculate the value of likelihood ratio test (LR) is:

LR = 2*(log-likelihoodunrestricted - log-likelihoodrestricted). In this case, R2 would not be a
valid goodness of fit measure to compare the models, given that for the spatial-lag
models a pseudo R2 measure is reported. Based on this formula, the LR value between
models 1 and 2 is 138 and between models 1 and 3 is 156. Both of these values follow a
χ2 distribution and are statistically significant at a 1 percent level.
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model, two issues need to still be addressed. Regression diagnostics for
heteroskedasticity (e.g., the Breusch-Pagan (BP) test) in the first three models indicate
the presence of non-constant variance. Moreover, since the estimates for models 2 and 3
are based on the maximum likelihood approach, it is assumed that the error terms are
normally distributed. As an alternative and to address these issues, a robust 2-SLS
approach is used to estimate the spatial-lag model. Based on the z-values reported for the
2-SLS coefficients, the evidence supports hypotheses H1-H4. In this approach spatial lags
of the explanatory variables are used as instruments to achieve robust to non-normality
and consistent estimates. As a result, including spatially lagged independent variables on
the right hand side of the 2nd stage equation would result in a model misspecification
since the instruments would be used twice, first in the estimation of WP (1st stage) and
then in the 2nd stage (Anselin 1988). This is the preferred model and its coefficients are
used in the following thought experiment.
2.51 Aggregate Benefits of IRA Lands in New Mexico
In order to understand the policy implications of the results found in this paper, it is
necessary to estimate the total capitalized benefits of IRA lands in the New Mexico
housing market. Using the results reported in the 2-SLS robust model (equation 2.6), a
thought experiment is proposed where the effect on total housing value of eliminating all
IRA lands in NM is estimated. Estimating the impact of such a change allows calculation
of the total value of IRAs in their current status of roadless lands.34 Following the

34

A back-of-the-envelope calculation would be to use the average level of IRAs (0.008

percent), the implicit price in the 2-SLS model ($2,654) and the average housing value
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framework in Kim et al. (2000), an aggregate value of IRAs is estimated. The first step is
to write equation (2.4) in its reduced form as follows:

P = [ I − ρ priceW ] −1 Xβ + [ I − ρ priceW ] −1 ε ,

(2.4’)

where, for ease of presentation, the logged price is dropped and the different explanatory
variables included in this model are represented by the vector X. Letting

v = [ I − ρ priceW ]−1 ε and A = [ I − ρ priceW ]−1 , equation (2.4’) becomes:
P = AXβ + v

(2.4’’)

In matrix form, equation (2.4’’) can be written as follows:

P1

a11, a12,

, a1n

x11, x12,

, x1k

ß1

v1

P2

a21, a22,

, a2n

x21, x22,

, x2k

ß2

v2

=
Pn

*
an1,

, ann

xn1,

, xnk

(2.10)

+

*
ßk

vn

'
be a column vector (n x 1) that represents the density of IRAs in the
Letting X IRAs

'
is defined as follows:
different Census tracts, the derivate of P with respect to X IRAs

($111,461) to calculate the aggregate value that IRA lands have in the housing market in
NM. However, this approach would not take account of differences in the percentage of
IRAs, Census tract size, density of housing units, and differences in median home values.
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∂P1/ ∂x1,IRAs, ∂P1 / ∂x2,IRAs,

, ∂P1/ ∂x456,IRAs

∂P2 / ∂x1,IRAs, ∂P2 / ∂x2,IRAs,

, ∂P2 / ∂x456,IRAs

(2.11)

∂P
=
'
∂X IRAs

, ∂P456 / ∂x456,IRAs

∂P456 / ∂x1,IRAs, ∂P456 /∂x2,IRAs,

In this matrix, row j shows the impact that a marginal change in IRAs density in Census
tract j (direct-contemporaneous effect) and neighboring Census tracts (indirect effect) has
on the housing price with location j. This means that the price of a house in Census tract j
is not only affected by changes of IRAs density in Census j but also affected by changes
of IRAs density in neighboring Census tracts (due to spatial autocorrelation). For
instance, the first row shows the direct-contemporaneous effect on housing prices located
in Census tract 1 (∂P1/∂x1,IRAs) and the indirect effects on housing prices located in
Census tract 1 (∂P1/∂x2,IRAs, …, ∂P1/∂x456,IRAs). Based on equation (2.11), the marginal
effect of a change in IRAs density can be expressed as:

∂P
=
'
∂X IRAs

ßIRAsa11, ßIRAsa12,

, ßIRAsa1n

ßIRAsa21, ßIRAsa22,

, ßIRAsa2n
= β IRAs [ I − ρ W ] −1 (2.11’)

ßIRAsan1,

, ßIRAsann
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where W is a row-standardized weight matrix, [ I − ρ priceW ] −1 =

1
1 − ρ price

(Kim et al.

2003), βIRA = 1.58, and ρprice= 0.429 (from the 2-SLS model). In the context of this
thought experiment, the direct contemporaneous effect of eliminating IRAs on the value
of houses located in Census tract 1 is given by βIRAsa11, and the aggregate indirect effect
is

456

∑β
i =2

IRAs

ai , IRAs .

Note that Census tracts that do not currently have IRAs will have no direct effect on
house prices because IRAs are already zero in these locations.
As an example meant to illustrate how we calculate aggregate benefits for the entire
state, Table 2.5 shows the effect of eliminating IRAs on houses located in Census tract
360. This Census tract is located in Sierra County in the southwest of NM. Its size is 2.7
million acres, which represents 98 percent of Sierra County’s total size. The total number
of owner-occupied housing units is 2,014 with a median house value of $108,400. The
total number of IRA lands is 128,654 acres, which represents almost 5 percent of the total
size of the tract, and they are part of the Gila National Forest.
The direct contemporaneous effect or the marginal direct effect per home in Census
tract 360, which assumes that the prices of houses located in neighboring tracts remain
constant, is $8,237. This number is the first term in the Jacobian matrix given in (3.12):
∂P360/∂IRAs360. In this example, Census tract 360 has 3 neighbors (376, 391, and 375)
that would also be affected if the IRAs in Census tract 360 are completely opened to
development. These are the indirect or spillover effects which are given by the following
expressions: ∂P375/∂IRAs360 (second term in the first column of the Jacobian matrix),
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P376/∂IRAs360 (third term in the first column of the Jacobian matrix), and P391/∂IRAs360
(fourth term in the first column of the Jacobian matrix). In Table 2.5, these numbers are
$895, $5,919, and $2,620. In terms of coefficient, there are three ways IRAs can affect
home prices in a Census tract: direct-contemporaneous (i.e., IRAs = 1.58); direct spatialspillover (the ρIRAs coefficient, which is not significantly different from zero in the
mixed-spatial model); and indirect effects (i.e., ρprice = 0.429). Since only decreases in
IRAs are evaluated in this example, the dollar amounts that appear in Table 2.5 can be
interpreted as the marginal willingness to accept (MWTA) to eliminate IRAs in Census
tracts 360 and in its neighboring Census tracts.
The marginal direct and indirect effects are aggregated by multiplying these per unit
changes by the total number of homes in each Census tract. These aggregated numbers
are shown on the fifth column: the aggregated direct-contemporaneous effect is $16.9
million compared to $18.9 million for aggregated indirect effects. In the aggregate, such a
change would translate into a 16 percent loss in the value of housing in Census tract 360
given that their current total housing value is $218.3 million (($16.9+$18.9)/$218.3 =
16.3 percent). The importance of estimating models that account for spatial
autocorrelation is supported by these results since indirect effects represent 53 percent of
the total effect on house values in Census tract 360, which would have been otherwise
ignored.
Table 2.6 shows the aggregate MWTA of eliminating all IRAs in NM. Based on the
numbers reported in this table, the aggregate loss in housing value in NM of such a
change would represent 3.5 percent of the aggregate value of owner-occupied units.
Thirty-four percent of this loss is explained by indirect effects, which highlights the
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importance of estimating spatial-lag models as opposed to the traditional non-spatial
models.35 This estimated effect of IRAs on the housing market in NM is about one-fourth
(27 percent) of the impact that wilderness proximity has on housing values in Vermont in
Phillip (1999).36
2.6

Conclusions

This paper represents the first attempt to econometrically estimate the value of IRA
lands in NM. In light of the ongoing national debate about the future of nearly 60 million
acres of IRA lands, this paper provides evidence of the importance of better
understanding the monetary benefits of IRAs as they currently exist. Previous studies
have shown that people are willing to pay higher prices to live in proximity to forest
amenities. However, IRAs were intentionally or unintentionally part of a broader
definition of open space such as forest. In light of the current legal debate over whether to
open IRAs to commercial activities or to maintain them in their pristine status, a better
understanding is needed about the impact that these lands in particular may have on an
economy. Based on this motivation, this paper distinguishes between congressionally35

The estimated models indicate that both direct-contemporaneous and indirect effects

are statistically significant, but the direct-spillover effect is insignificant.
36

This is also roughly consistent with the Loomis and Richardson’s (2000) summary

findings that various estimates of recreation use values per acre in the Western U.S are
typically only about one-fourth of comparable Eastern U.S. value estimates, and that
estimated passive use values per acre in the West are only about two-thirds the magnitude
of comparable Eastern values.

52

protected lands (e.g., WAs), IRAs, and the all inclusive open space definition of a public
land (e.g., forest) in an attempt to estimate off-site benefits of only IRAs.
After controlling for median housing and neighborhood characteristics, and the
separate effect of Wilderness Areas, the percent of IRA lands in a Census tract has a
positive and statistically significant effect on median home values in all estimated
models. These 1.6 million acres of protected IRA lands provide about 3.5 percent of the
total housing value in NM. This result is consistent with recent evidence in the
Southwestern U.S of strong amenity effects in the regional economy including inmigration, property value, and labor market outcomes (e.g., Kim 2002, Hand et al. 2008a,
2008b;). In Hand et al. (2008a), the empirical framework developed by Roback (1982) is
used to examine the possibility of compensating differentials in the labor and housing
markets in Arizona and NM.37 The forest characteristics used in this paper include U.S.
forest Service (USFS) and wilderness areas (WAs). Spatially-dependent relationships are
accounted by introducing the average proportion of forest areas in neighboring PUMAs
as an independent variable.38 Results indicate that the percentage of USFS and WAs have
a positive marginal implicit values.39 For the USFS this value ranges between $27 and
37

As discussed in Chapter 3, compensating differentials refers to the hypothesis that

individuals are willing to earn lower wages and pay higher housing prices for living in
proximity to forest amenities.
38

The authors point out that specifying a spatially-autocorrelated model would not be

feasible given the high number of observations used in this study (42,000).
39

These results are based on a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model and data

from the 2000 Public Use Microdata Series (PUMs).
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$36 per square mile compared to $75-$80 for WAs. Forest areas in contiguous PUMAs
are found to have a higher implicit value. The authors reason that it is possible that
because both states in question have most of their population concentrated in urban areas
surrounded by nearby forested areas, it may be more amenable to live nearby an area with
high proportion of forested lands than to actually live in the forested area in this case.
However, the implicit price of forest areas in contiguous PUMAs may be picking up the
effect that changes in price of homes located in the contiguous PUMAs have on prices in
a particular PUMAs. The higher the proportion of forest areas in PUMA i the higher the
value of homes located PUMAs i. As a result, home values in neighboring PUMA j may
be higher due to both a higher proportion of forest areas in PUMA i and due to higher
home values in PUMA i. As discussed above, these spatial relationships among home
values may arise due to random specifications of geographic units, such as census tracts
or county boundaries or PUMs, which may not accurately reflect the extent to which the
phenomenon in question behaves in space (Anselin 1988). In light of this, the results of
this paper provide further evidence on the importance of spatial considerations in nonmarket valuation techniques such as hedonic price functions. Based on the empirical
framework of Anselin (1988), this paper finds that indirect effects represent 34 percent of
the total impact, which in the traditional log-linear regression are assumed to be zero.
One important issue that is of importance is the assumption that open spaces are
homogenous across space. As it is the case in many papers, in this study it is implicitly
assumed that the value that the public has for an acre of IRAs or WAs is the same. This
would apply if the characteristics of an open space were the same across the region.
However, this may not be always accurate. Strictly concerned with hedonic housing price

54

markets, Kim (2002) examines not only the effects of proximity but also forest
management practices. In addition to distance to forest land, the authors also included
stand level characteristics from the forest stand closest to the home site, and the visibility
of clear-cut areas.40 This paper concludes that forest management schemes do matter and
that individuals do care about how forests are managed, as evidenced by housing values.
This suggests that future research should account for this and treat forest areas as
heterogeneous open spaces.
Non-market benefit estimates for IRAs, as part of a more comprehensive benefit-cost
analysis, can be an important informational input in any major regulatory action (e.g.,
Arrow et al. 1996), including public lands management (Loomis 2002). As such, these
results suggest that not accounting for such benefits (e.g., off-site benefits) would
significantly underestimate the value society places on these lands. Off-site benefits are
components of the larger bundle of ecosystem services and non-market benefits that
protected lands may offer (Loomis and Richardson 2000; Berrens et al. 2006). Thus, this
paper reports estimates for a portion of the total economic value (TEV) of these protected
areas. For instance, there may also be on-site recreation values, and passive use values
that are not captured in house prices. Loomis (1996) reviews evidence from various
contingent valuation studies that passive use values may represent a significant
percentage, and sometimes a majority proportion, of the TEV associated with protected
forest areas in the U.S. This suggests that off-site amenity values to residents, as
measured here, might represent just one of several significant components of the TEV.

40

The study area is McDonald-Dunn Research Forest, Corvallis, Oregon.
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Table 2.1: Selected Economic Performance Measures for IRA and non-IRA counties
in New Mexico

Percent growth, 1990-2005
Real income per capita2
Non-farm employment
Real earnings per job2,3
Service industry employment
Percent of non-farm employment in services, 20004
Growth in service employment, 1990-20004
Earnings flows
Net earnings flows, 2005
(thousands of $)5
Change in real net earnings
flows, 2001-2005 (thousands
of $)2,5

NM IRA
counties1

NM Non-IRA
counties

New Mexico,
all counties

U.S.

29.7
29.8
21.4

23.3
26.3
13.2

25.1
27.3
17.5

18.4
20.1
20.4

29.9

31.5

31

32.8

44.1

41.4

42.1

37

511,793

-240,785

–

–

110,229

-115,693

–

–

Source: Calculations from Bureau of Economic Analysis, Local Area Personal Income data.
Available at http://www.bea.gov/bea/regional/reis/, accessed March 21, 2008.
1
IRA counties are those with at least 1% of land and 10,000 acres in IRA. Includes Catron,
Eddy, Grant, Hidalgo, Lincoln, Otero, Rio Arriba, San Juan, San Miguel, Santa Fe, Sierra,
Socorro, and Taos counties.
2
Real figures are calculated as 2005 constant dollars using the annual CPI for all urban
consumers (all items). Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
3
Real earnings per job calculated as real earnings divided by total wage and salary employment.
4
Most industry-level data is undisclosed for each county due to the change from SIC to
NAICS industry classifications. The old SIC industries used a higher level of aggregation
and are reportable by county for the last year data are available, 2000.
5
Net earnings flows are calculated as the earnings of out-commuters minus the earnings of
in-commuters for each county. See notes for BEA table CA91 for a detailed description.

56

Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics
Variable
HVALUE*

Description
Owner-occupied median property value, $

Mean
111,461

Std. Dev.
62,126

ROOM**

Owner-occupied median number of rooms

5.53

0.787

INCOME**

Median income, $

35,500

14,879

HAGE

Structure age, (2000-year built)

25.88

12.94

HPERACRE

Number of houses per acre in a census tract

1.19

1.55

CENSIZE**

Census tract size, acres

170,669

458,407

IRA

Percent IRA lands in a census tract (GIS), 0.0079
%

0.0446

WILD

Percent wilderness lands in a census tract 0.0133
(GIS), %

0.0637

W 5 (miles)

Closest 5 neighboring houses from a home 2.64
1.61
in location j
*In the models estimated in this chapter, this variable is transformed to its log values.
**In the models estimated in this chapter, these variables are dummy variables (0 or 1)
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Table 2.3: Estimation Results

Variables

Log-linear
model

Spatial-lag
(ML)

Mixed
Spatial-lag
(ML)

Spatial-lag
(2-SLS)

DROOMS

0.185 ***
(3.43)a

0.155 ***
(3.43)b

0.158 ***
(3.53)b

0.131 ***
(3.55)b

DINCOME

0.409 ***
(6.96)

0.300 ***
(6.05)

0.289 ***
(5.74)

0.324 ***
(7.93)

HPERACRE

0.049
(2.99)

0.008
(0.58)

-0.007
(0.37)

0.011
(1.00)

DCENSIZE

-0.345***
(5.90)

-0.253 ***
(5.15)

-0.252 ***
(4.99)

-0.298 ***
(4.99)

HAGE

-0.007***
(3.45)

-0.004 ***
(2.66)

-0.008 ***
(4.18)

-0.004 ***
(2.81)

IRAS

2.270 ***
(4.87)

1.420 ***
(3.64)

1.040 ***
(2.59)

1.580 ***
(5.10)

WILD

1.190 ***
(3.64)

0.641 **
(2.32)

0.640 **
(2.29)

0.720 ***
(3.39)

0.513 ***
(12.14)

0.545 ***
(10.77)

0.429 ***
(7.14)

ρHV ALU E

ρDROOM S

-0.017
(0.18)

ρDIN COM E

-0.051
(0.49)

ρHP ERACRE

0.008
(0.29)

ρDCEN SIZE

-0.073
(0.70)
0.009 ***

ρHAGE
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Table 2.3: Estimation Results (continued)

Variables

Log-linear
model

Spatial-lag
(ML)

Mixed
Spatial-lag
(ML)

Spatial-lag
(2-SLS)

(2.77)
ρIRAS

0.355
(0.49)

ρW ILD

0.071
(0.13)

INTERCEPT
R2
Likelihood value
Likelihood Ratio-Test
BP-test
LM-lag
LM-error

11.38
0.456
-263.4
(138***)c
49.4 ***
197.1 ***
175.5 ***

5.52
-194.4
(17.8**)d
86.2 ***

5.04
-185.8
(152***)e
146.0 ***

0.54
N = 456

*, **, and *** denote 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels, respectively.
( )a : t-value
( )b : z-value
( )c : LR test between Log-linear and spatial-lag models
( )d : LR test between spatial-lag and mixed spatial-lag models
( )e : LR test between Log-linear and mixed spatial-lag models
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0.16

6.49

Table 2.4: Implicit Prices ($), WTP for a 1% Change in IRA or WAs
WTP (for a 1% change)

% of median
housing price
WAs

IRA

WAs

IRA

Log-linear

$2173
(1727, 2619)

$1147
(832, 1463)

2%
(1.8%, 2.7%)

1%
(0.9%, 1.5%)

Spatial-lag (ML)

$2787
(2010, 3290)

$1260
(660, 1975)

3%
(2.1%, 3.4%)

1%
(0.7%, 2.1%)

Mixed spatial-lag (ML)

$2943
(2120, 3567)

$1495
(727, 2215)

3%
(2.2%, 3.7%)

2%
(0.8%, 2.3%)

2-SLS

$2654
(1930, 3548)

$1194
(761, 1728)

3%
(2.0%, 3.7%)

1%
(0.8%, 1.8%)

Notes: Implicit prices are calculated for each model using equations (7) through (9). Given
that a one unit change in IRAs is equal to 100% of the average census tracts land area
for the sample (the average IRA value is about 0.008) this change would bring the value
of IRA in the average census tract to 1.008, which is not realistic. To make this analysis
reasonable in the context of this paper, the calcualted marginal WTP is divided by 100. As
a result, the marginal effect of a 1 percentage point increase in IRAs in the average census
tract (which means that average IRAs would increase to 0.018) would be, for instance,
$2,654 for the 2-SLS robust approach. The same methodology is applied to the marginal
effect for wilderness lands.
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Table 2.5: The Impact of Eliminating IRAs in Houses Located in Census Tract 360
($)

Census
Tract

360
375
376
391

Direct
Effect

Inderect
Effect

Total Effect, per
housing unit

Direct Effect
Aggregated

8,237
0
0
0

0
895
5,919
2,620

8,237
895
5,919
2,620

16,590,089
0
0
0
16,590,089

Indirect Effect
Aggregated
1,802,543
11,920,082
5,275,958
18,998,583

Notes: The aggregate monetary effect of this empirical exercise are calculated
i
using equations (2.8) and (2.9) as follows: IRAj ∗ HV ALU Ei ∗ ∂X∂P
∗ unitsi ,
j,IRA
where i represents census tract 360 and j represents census tracts 376, 391, and
375. HVALUEi and unitsi are the the median value house and the total number
of owner-occupied units in census tract 360, respectively.
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Table 2.6: Aggregate Benefits of IRAs for the Real Estate Market in the State of New Mexico
(thousands of $)

Bernalillo
Catron
Chaves
Cibola
Colfax
Curry
De Baca
Dona Ana
Eddy
Grant
Guadalupe
Harding
Hidalgo
Lea
Lincoln
Los Alamos
Los Lunas
McKinley
Mora
Otero
Quay
Rio Arriba
Roosevelt
San Juan
San Miguel
Sandoval
Santa Fe
Sierra
Socorro
Taos
Torrance
Union
Valencia
Total Effect

Direct Effect,
Aggregated

Indirect Effect,
Aggregated

Total Effect,
Aggregated

15,785
650
6,290
50,990
37
2,152
5,848
182,893
13
1,776
30,214
79,903
22,164
6,904
710,016
16,590
6,202
102,636
1,241,063

255
1,929
3
555
10,337
852
2,616
60,660
814
436
423
41
3,456
84,597
270
7,931
14,878
58,649
112
58,914
23,229
209,982
22,670
6,497
75,266
2,006
985
648,362

255
17,714
3
1,206
10,337
852
8,906
111,650
814
473
2,575
41
9,305
267,490
282
9,707
45,092
138,551
112
81,078
30,133
919,998
39,260
12,699
177,902
2,006
985
1,889,425
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Agg. Effect as
% of Total
Housing Value
0.00%
16.93%
0.00%
0.31%
3.12%
0.02%
0.88%
12.86%
1.28%
6.21%
2.18%
0.01%
1.30%
20.05%
0.04%
7.69%
3.54%
10.20%
0.00%
10.49%
0.89%
11.95%
10.14%
3.27%
12.65%
0.46%
1.56%
3.51%

Figure 2.1: Spatial Distribution of Inventoried Roadless Areas and Wilderness Areas in
NM
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Figure 2.2: Percentage of Land in Census Tracts Covered by IRAs and WAs
30
IRAs

Frequency

25

WAs

20
15
10
5
0
0%-4%

5%-8%

8%-12% 13%-16% 17%-20% 21%-24% 25%-29% 30%-38%
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Chapter 3
The Role of Forests as Natural Amenities: A Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model
with Two Spatial Processes
3.1

Introduction
The classical urban economics model has traditionally explained a household’s

location decisions based on a tradeoff between residential and commuting costs (Wu and
Gopinath, 2008). However, this model has fallen short in explaining the rapid economic
expansion some areas, such as in the American West region (Schmidt and Courant,
2006). This shortcoming has given rise to the consideration of new variables to help
better understand regional growth. For example, a growing number of papers have looked
at natural or environmental amenities to account for persistent differences in wages and
housing prices, suggesting that the protection of natural amenities may partially explain
the positive economic development in the Southwestern US (Loomis and Richardson,
2000; Schmidt and Courant, 2006; Hand et al., 2008; Izon et al., 2010). These findings
suggest that that the traditional view of public lands as inputs in a production process
may significantly underestimate the benefits they generate in their pristine status.
Based on the idea of a “second paycheck” derived from the natural landscape (Niemi
et al. 1999), Hand et al. (2008) empirically show that congressionally-protected
wilderness area (WAs) and US National Forest lands carry implicit prices in the housing
and labor markets that range between $27 and $85 per square mile annually in the
Southwest United States (Arizona and New Mexico). However, and as it is common in
many studies that look at the role of forest amenities (e.g., Schmidt and Courant 2006;
Hand et al. 2008; Izon et al. 2010), the aggregated nature of the data raises some
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methodological issues. Since the geographic data used in these studies pertain to
aggregated administrative census boundaries (such as Census tracts and Public Use
Microdata Areas, PUMAs), a pressing issue is the possibility of measurement errors due
to geographic aggregation bias. This bias refers to differences in empirical results
depending on the spatial arrangement of zones or the scale used to estimate the
econometric models (Doll et al. 2004).41 The scale effect arises when the results found
using the same data vary as the aggregation level of observation changes (Wrigley et al.,
1996). The zone effect occurs when the administrative boundaries are arranged in a
different way or zone boundaries are changed. The consequence of these effects is that
results based on a particular aggregated administrative boundary may not be generalized
to different spatial resolutions or scales. This is also known as ecological fallacy (Cao
and Lam, 1997). To address this issue, this study uses micro-level data by matching a
sample of wage-earner housing units at the household level.
The objective of this study is examine the role of IRAs on wages and housing prices
at the state level in rural and urban areas, selected in Arizona. The major question
addresses is whether the findings from the regional study will hold when local data is
examined. For this purpose, spatial econometrics in a hedonic empirical framework is
applied to investigate spatial variations in wage and housing prices in the presence of
IRAs lands. Specifically, the purpose of this paper is to examine whether IRAs generate
wage and housing-price differentials in the State of Arizona by estimating a seemingly
unrelated model . The 1.1 million acres of IRA lands represent about 10 percent of all
41

The zone and scale effects are also referred to as the Modifiable Areal Unit problem

(MAUP) (Openshaw 1984).
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forested lands in the State of Arizona. As it is the case nationwide the policy debate over
the fate of these areas centers on whether to manage them consistent with Wilderness
designation (Loomis and Richardson 2000; Izon et al. 2010). Assuming that individuals
select residential location partially based on proximity to natural amenities, this study
follows Rosen (1997) and Roback (1988) general equilibrium framework, looking at
wage and housing prices differentials (off-site benefits). Thus, this paper reports
estimates for a portion of the total economic value (TEV) of these amenities. For
instance, they may also be on-site recreation values and passive values that are not
captured in wage or housing prices. In particular, two types of natural amenities are of
interest: Wilderness Areas (WAs) and Inventoried Roadless Areas (IRAs). While the
status of WAs as congressionally protected areas is relatively certain, the status of IRAs
lands is tied to federal agency rulemaking and a protracted and legal debate, making their
condition highly uncertain (Aarons 2010; Sanford 2006; Easley 2006; Warner 2005).
Since natural amenities generate multiple beneficial end uses, there have been
competing allocation schemes for these resources. This has clearly been the case in the
policy debate about WAs and IRAs that centers on the question of how these public lands
should be managed and allocated. Since the enactment of the 1964 Wilderness Act
(USDA 1964), many input-output models predicted that prohibiting commercial activities
(e.g., logging) would have prolonged negative impact on the economies of the affected
areas (Schmidt and Courant, 2006). However, the economic performance of this region
has been anything but negative.
The policy debate about IRAs centers on whether to manage these lands as wilderness
areas. As of today, a State petition rule allows each State to file IRAs petitions for
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wilderness consideration. While many of the protection-oriented petitions based their
argument on the existence of both on-site and off-site benefits, the absence of explicit
market prices poses a challenge. Hedonic regressions of housing prices and wages
indicate that the average total implicit price for USFS is $1,901 per mile compared to
$1,309 for WAs and $694 for IRAs, annually.
3.2

Hedonic Empirical Framework
In order to address the empirical question of whether forest characteristics, such as

wilderness lands and inventoried roadless areas are in fact amenities that significantly
affect housing-price and wage differentials in Arizona, this paper uses hedonic theory. In
this section, hedonic frameworks to analyze households’ location decisions in the
presence of natural amenities and a theoretical discussion on spatial-dependence
relationships are presented to inform the empirical approach. In hedonic price studies, the
hypothesis is that visual or proximal access to some set of environmental amenity and
disamenity characteristics gets capitalized into the housing and labor markets. The
hedonic pricing method decomposes the statistical variation in prices for a heterogeneous
good (e.g., home values or wages) to isolate the contribution of individual attributes or
characteristics of the good (Taylor 2003).
The underlying model used in this paper for the empirical analysis follows that in
Roback (1982). In the context of regional forest, it is assumed that households derive
utility over a bundle of characteristics composed of goods consumed (C, a numeraire
good), land space (L, sold at price p), and location-specific environmental amenities Q.
Such a bundle varies across the region depending on where the household lives and
works, which gives rise to the hypothesis of compensating differentials in housing and
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labor markets. Households supply labor to firms in exchange for a wage w. In particular,
a household in location j maximizes utility by choosing Cj and Lj, conditional on natural
amenities qj and subject to the budge constraint, such that:
_

V = V ( p j , w j ; Q j ) for j = 1,…,J

(3.1)
_

where V is the indirect utility function for household in location j and V is the utility
level for the whole region (in this case Arizona) when the labor and housing markets are
in equilibrium. Since forest amenities are assumed to be fixed for a particular location,
_

land prices and wages must adjust to equalize utility at V in all locations. Since isoutility curves are upward sloping in the (w, p)-plane, this suggests that for a given level of
amenities, a location with higher house prices must also have higher wages to achieve
regional equilibrium (Wu and Gopinath 2008).
Firms, the suppliers and producers of good C, are assumed to operate in a perfectly
competitive market with a unit cost function that depends on the price of land, wages, and
forest characteristics, such that in equilibrium:

C ( p j , w j ; Q j ) = 1 for j = 1,…,J

(3.2)

The household equilibrium condition (equation 3.1) and the firms’ production cost
equality condition (equation 3.2) determine the general equilibrium level of wage and
housing prices. Since at equilibrium ∂C = ∂V = 0 , differentiating equations (3.1) and
(3.2) with respect to Q and solving for ∂w / ∂Q and ∂p / ∂Q yields the following implicit
price expressions:
∂p WW C Q − VQ CW
=
∂Q
Δ

(3.3)
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∂w VQ C P − V P C Q
=
∂Q
Δ

(3.4)

where Δ = −VW C P + V P CW < 0
Equations (3.3) and (3.4) represent the effect of forest amenities on wages (labor market)
and housing prices, respectively, and their sign depends on how this natural amenity
affects firms’ productivity, CQ (Roback 1982). Let’s say that two locations share the same
characteristics but one is located closer to forest areas. For a given wage rate and
assuming that forest amenities do not affect firms’ productivity (e.g., CQ = 0), the utility
level is higher for individuals living in the location closer to amenable forest areas (e.g.,
VQ > 0), and therefore, housing prices in this location should be higher for equation (3.1)
_

to hold (e.g., same utility level ( V )across all locations).42 In equilibrium, individuals
trade proximity to forest areas for lower wages and firms substitute labor for capital, due
to lower wages and higher cost of capital (Wu and Gopinath 2008). If firms’ costs
decrease with proximity to forest areas (e.g., amenity is productive and CQ < 0),
∂p
∂w <
> 0 and
0 . In equilibrium while the housing prices are higher in the location
∂Q
∂Q >
closer to forest amenities, the wage level can be higher or lower depending on the
absolute value of the effects proximity to a forest amenity has on individuals’ utility level
and firms’ costs (Wu and Gopinath 2008). On the other hand, if firms’ costs increase with

42

In this analysis, it is assumed that the level of capital accumulation is constant across the

state (e.g., differences in wages and housing prices are not a function of accumulated
capital).
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proximity to forest areas (e.g., amenity is unproductive and CQ > 0), then

∂p <
0 and
∂Q >

∂w
< 0 . In particular, the empirical framework pursued in this paper adopts conventional
∂Q
assumptions for hedonic models: participants in the real estate and labor markets have
full information about the relevant natural resource characteristics (Freeman 2003);
housing and labor markets are in equilibrium; and the state of Arizona represents a single
composite housing market. Since in this study reported household income (defined as
HHINC) is used as a proxy for earned wages, HHINC instead of w is used throughout.
A plausible approach to estimate the left hand side of equation (3.3), the implicit
marginal housing price of natural amenities, is to apply a hedonic approach. This method
decomposes the statistical variation in prices for a heterogeneous good (e.g., residential
real estate) to isolate the contribution of individual attributes or characteristics of the
good (Taylor 2003). Following Freeman’s (2003) theoretical hedonic price framework
and using a vector notation, the price of a house depends on housing characteristics S (lot
size, number of rooms, year built), neighborhood characteristics N (school quality,
income level) and location-specific amenities Q (distance to forest views), such that for a
house i in location j:

Pij = Pij ( S i , N j , Q f , j )

(3.5)

where the subscript f denotes the type of forest included in the model (IRAs, WILD, or
FOREST). The vector Q includes linear distance to three types of forests: inventoried
roadless areas (IRAs), wilderness (WILD), and national forest (FOREST). The
coefficient of interest θ 'f represents the effect of, for instance distance to IRAs on

71

housing prices (e.g., θ IRAs =

∂Pij
∂Q IRAs , j

). In this analysis, a different model is estimated for

each forest as opposed to include all three in the same model (e.g., avoids
multicollinearity issues between these variables). Without assuming any particular form,
such as a Box-Cox transformation or log-linear specification, the econometric equivalent
of equation (3.5) is:
Pij = α 0 + β ′S i + ϕ ′N j + θ ′Q f , j + ε i ,

(3.6)

where ε i ~ N (0, Ω) , and β, φ, and θ are the coefficient vectors to be estimated. In this
setting, while the disturbance εi is assumed to be normally distributed, its covariance
matrix is of the general form Ω to account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
(e.g., off-diagonals are nonzero).
The partial derivative of Equation (3.4) is estimated in a similar manner. Building
upon Mincer’s (1974) wage equation, annual household income is a function of the
household’s human capital characteristics HC (education level, race, employment status),
neighborhood characteristics N, and location-specific amenities Q, such that:
HHINC ij = γ 0 + η ′HC i + π ′N j + δ ′f Q f , j + μ i ,

(3.7)

where HHINCij is the annual income for household i in location j. It is important to note
that since the main focus of this study is the effect of forest amenities on households’
income, the i subscript represents household income and characteristics as opposed to a
particular type of job (e.g., working conditions).
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3.21 Spatial Econometrics

The model specification in equations (3.6) and (3.7) has been widely used in applied
hedonic studies. However, these equations do not address spatially-dependent
relationships that emerge when using randomly distributed geographic data (Anselin
1988). In general, spatial dependence (or spatial autocorrelation) refers to the notion that
what happens in one point in space relates to what occurs in other locations.43 In many
instances, this arises due to random specifications of geographic units, such as census
tracts or county boundaries, which may not accurately reflect the extent to which the
phenomenon in question behaves in space (Anselin 1988). Another reason is that
regardless of whether data corresponds to individual spatial units or aggregated units,
diffusion processes (e.g., spillover effects) result in spatial autocorrelation between
different spatial units depending on location and distance. As stated in Tobler’s (1970)
first law of geography: “everything is related to everything else, but near things are more
related than distant things” (Tobler 1970 pp. 236). In this sense, the presence of spatial
autocorrelation is not limited to cases with data collected at an aggregate level but also to
point data or individual-level observations, which is the case of this study (Anselin 1988).
Econometrically, spatial dependence can result in non-spherical disturbances (e.g.,
off-diagonal terms in the variance-covariance matrix of the disturbance vector are not all
zero). In the context of this paper and the housing price market, this could be driven by
housing prices being spatially correlated (e.g., price of house i is a function of changes in
43

A second type of spatial effect that is not addressed in this model is spatial

heterogeneity. This refers to spatial relationships for which the functional form requires
parameters to vary with locations.
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the price of house k) or due to a general correlation of error terms. Two different
approaches can be implemented to address this issue: spatial lag and spatial error models.
In the first approach, the hypothesis is that housing prices are spatially related and
therefore, a vector of house prices observed at other locations is included on the right
hand side of the hedonic model and specified as:
Pij = α 0 + ρW1 Pk + β ′S i + ϕ ′N j + θ ′Q f , j + ε i , ∀ i ≠ k,

(3.8)

where ρ is the spatial lag autoregressive coefficient, εi is a vector of spherical disturbance
that are normally distributed, and W1 is an nxn weight matrix that indicates how housing
prices are related in space (e.g., the effect that a change in the price of house k has on the
price of house i). This weight matrix represents a weighted average effect of housing
prices in neighboring units and has non-zero elements wik when observations i and k are
defined as neighbors. For house i in location j, this model is represented by the following
expression:
Pij = ρ ( wi1 p1 + wi 2 p 2 + wi 3 p 3 ... + win p n ) + ψ ′X + ν i , where wii = 0 and ρ ∈ [−1,1],

ψ = [ β , ϕ , θ f ] and X = [ S , N , θ f ] . Theoretically, a spatial lag model specification
addresses the presence of biased outcomes stemming from spillovers across spatial units
that vary with distance and location (Anselin 2001). If spatial dependence arises due to
the omission of variables that are related in space, a spatial error model is appropriate
(Anselin and Bera 1998). In this case spatial dependence is introduced in the functional
form of the error term and the specification of the housing price and wage equations are
as follow:

Pij = α 0 + β ′S i + ϕ ′N j + θ ′Q f , j + μ i ,house ,
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(3.9)

with μ i , house

= λ houseW2 μ k , house + ξ house ,
HHINCij = γ 0 + η ′HCi + π ′N j + δ ′f Q f , j + μ i , hhinc

(3.10)

with μ i , hhinc = λ hhincW2 μ k , hhinc + ξ hhinc ,
where λhouse and λhhinc are the spatial error autoregressive coefficients for the housing
price and wage equations, respectively, and ξhouse and ξhhinc are vectors of spherical
disturbance with zero mean.
Combining both types of lag processes in a single equation results in a more flexible
specification to represent spatial relationships and could be appropriate when there is
little or no theoretic support as to which spatial process should be introduced to address
spatial autocorrelation. In this case, the general specification to represent the housing
market is:

Pij = α 0 + ρW1 Pk + β ' S i + ϕ ' N j + θ ' Q f , j + μ i , house ,

(3.11)

with μ i , house = λ houseW2 μ k , house + ξ house ,
where two different weight matrices are specified to address the identification problem
that may arise if the same weight matrix is used to represent both spatial processes
(Anselin 1980). In this analysis, the implicit marginal housing price ( θ f ) and wage ( δ f )
are estimated for each type of forest based on equations (3.11) and (3.10), respectively.
A recurring issue in these types of spatial models is the specification of the weight
matrix (W). In the majority of the cases, this matrix is not endogenous to the model but
pre-defined and arbitrary. The lack of consensus and evidence regarding a suitable weight
matrix resulted in a large number of specifications across hedonic spatial studies (Anselin
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1988). In light of this, four different row-standardized weight matrices are considered in
this study44:
1) wik = 1 if distance between spatial units ≤ 3km, 0 else (defined as 3KM);
2) wik = 1 if distance between spatial units ≤ 4km, 0 else (defined as 4KM);
3) wik = 1 if inverse of Euclidean distance, 0 else (defined as IWD);
4) wik = 1 if inverse of Euclidean distance to the power of 1.5, 0 else (defined as
IWD1.5).
3.22 Empirical Estimation Process

Two plausible approaches can be used to estimate equations (3.10) and (3.11). One is
a fully-simultaneous model in which the structural equations of housing demand,
equation (3.11), and labor supply, equation (3.10), are estimated assuming error
independence between equations. This restriction may not be appropriate if the error
terms are correlated across equations. In this case, using a seemingly unrelated regression
(SUR) approach that accounts for unobserved factors that affect the error terms in both
equations would be suitable (Greene 2003). This is the approach this paper follows to
estimate equations (3.10) and (3.11).
The SUR model with spatial error and lagged autocorrelation in the housing price
equation and with a spatial error structure in the wage equation is estimated by
applying a spatial Cochrane-Orcutt procedure analogous to that develop for the case
with serial correlation in time series (Greene 2003). In the first step an Ordinary Least
Square (OLS) and a 2-SLS regression are estimated for equations (3.10) and (3.11),

44

These weight matrices were created using RGui software.
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respectively, without accounting for spatial error dependence.45 In the second step,
the residuals from the OLS regression ( μˆ 1, hhinc , μˆ 2, hhinc ,..., μˆ n, hhinc ) are used to
estimate λhhinc (the spatial error autoregressive coefficient of the wage equation) and
2
the variance of the error term (σ ξ ,hhinc ) using a GMM process outlined in Kelejian

and Prucha (1999). In a similar fashion, the residuals from the 2-SLS regression

( μˆ 1,house , μˆ 2,house ,..., μˆ n,house ) are used to estimate λhouse and the variance of the
error term (σ ξ ,house ) following Kelejian and Prucha (2004).46 Using a general
2

45

The presence of a spatial lagged coefficient (e.g., ρ) means that the estimated OLS

coefficients in equation (3.11) would be biased and inefficient due to correlation or
endogeneity problems between the lagged dependent variable (W1P) and the error term
(Anselin 1988). For this reason a 2-SLS approach is used with a vector of lagged
)
independent variables (e.g., [WS WN WQ]) as instruments to obtain WP in the first

stage.
46

Since a simultaneous system of equations was used in Kelejian and Prucha (2004), the

following adjustments were made to estimate the SUR model: there is no direct
dependency between housing prices and wages (e.g., a vector of housing prices is not
included on the right hand side of the wage equation and vice versa) and that housing
prices are not a function of the spatial lag of the independent variables included in
equation (3.11) (e.g., only the spatial lag of other housing prices appears in equation
3.11).
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notation, λwage,

σ ξ2,hhinc , λhouse, and σ ξ2,house are estimated based on the following

system of three equations:

ˆ 1,m
( μˆ n ,m − λ mW2 μˆ n ,m )′( μˆ n ,m − λ mW2 μˆ n ,m ) − σ ξ2,m = Φ
(W2 μˆ n ,m − λ mW2W2 μˆ n, m ) ′(W2 μˆ n,m − λ mW2W2 μˆ n,m )
n

(W2 μˆ n ,m − λ mW2W2 μˆ n ,m ) ′( μˆ n,m − λmW2 μˆ n ,m )
n

(3.12)
1
ˆ
− σ ξ2,m Tr (W2′W2 ) = Φ
2, m
n

ˆ 3, m
=Φ

where the subscript m refers to “hhinc” for equation (3.10) and “house” for equation
(3.11), and Φ̂ 1, m , Φ̂ 2, m , Φ̂ 3, m are regression residuals. In this setting, the GMM estimators
)
)
of λm and σ ξ2, m (λ m and σ ξ2,m ) are obtained from the minimization of the sum of the

squared residuals or:

min ( Φˆ 1 , m + Φˆ

λ m ,σ 12, m

2 ,m

+ Φˆ

3,m

)

(3.13)

)
In the third step, λ m allows for the estimation of the coefficients in equations (3.10) and

(3.11) to account for spatial error autocorrelation.47 This is achieved using the following
spatial Cochrane-Orcutt transformed regression model48:
47

In the first step, OLS and 2SLS approaches yield unbiased estimators. However, spatial

error correlation within each equation was not taken into account, resulting in a loss of
efficiency (Anselin 1988).
48

Analogous to the case of time series with serial correlation, it can be shown that for this

spatial Cochrane-Orcutt procedure the following equalities hold:
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HHINCij* = γ 0t + η ′ t HCi* + π ′ t N *j + δ ′ t Q *f , j + μ i*,hhinc ,

(3.14)

Pij = α 0t + ρW1 Pk* + β ′ t S i* + ϕ ′ t N *j + θ ′ t Q *f , j + μ i*,house ,

(3.15)

)
)
where HHINC ij* = HHINC ij − λ hhincW 2 HHINC ij , Pij* = Pij − λ houseW2 Pij , and

)
Z ij*, m = Z ij ,m − λ mW2 Z ij , m for Z ij , m = [ HC i N j , m Q j , m ] . Based on this transformation,
a SUR model was estimated using the feasible generalized least squares method (Greene
2003). This 3-step process was implemented separately for each type of forest (IRAs,
WILD, and FOREST) using different combinations of the weight matrices for spatial lag
and error dependencies (since there are four weight matrix specifications, there were
twelve possible combinations). The different SUR models for a particular type of forest
were compared based on McElroy’s (1977) goodness-of-fit measure (McElroy R2). The
pair of weight matrices that yielded the highest McElroy R2 value was 4KM (spatial lag)
and IWD (spatial error).49 For this reason, results reported in this paper have this weight
matrix specification.
3.3

Data

In order to estimate the proposed spatial SUR model a matched sample of wageearner housing units is used at the household level. In this sample, each observation

η ′ t = η ′, π ′ t = π ′, δ ′ t = δ ′ η ′ t = η ′, π ′ t = π ′, δ ′ t = δ ′, β ′ t = β ′, ϕ ′ t = ϕ ′, and θ ′ t = θ ′
(Greene 2003).
49

For this specification, McElroy R2 was 0.51 compared to 0.32 through 0.50 for the

other 11 cases.
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includes reported household income (2006$), household characteristics (e.g., race,
employment status), home value, and housing characteristics. In particular, the data for
the housing and wage equations come from two different sources: 2007 survey for the
Southwest Region in the United States titled “Attitudes, Beliefs, and Values towards
National Forests and National Forest Management”, referred hereafter as the 2007
Region 3 Survey (McCollum 2008) and housing characteristics purchased from a
commercial marketing vendor, PrimeraSource. This housing data was pursued after the
final round of the 2007 Region 3 Survey was completed, since the objective was to obtain
housing data for those who responded this survey. Thus, a matched sample of wageearner housing units is used at the household level.
The sample for the wage equation is restricted to wage-earning households between
the ages of 18 and 64. The characteristics for these households (e.g., income, education,
race, employment status) were obtained from standard demographic questions included in
the 2007 Region 3 Survey conducted by the University of New Mexico in conjunction
with USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station. Building upon the 19992000 USDA Forest Service National Survey on Recreation and the Environment, the
2007 Region 3 Survey was designed to provide input on individuals’ values and
objectives regarding land management of large public lands in the Southwestern Region
(Arizona (AZ), New Mexico (NM), and small parts of Texas (TX) and Oklahoma, OK).
The sampling includes a geographically stratified, random sample (with rural oversampling for statistical purposes), which allows analysis at both the regional level, and
for various sub-regional dis-aggregations (McCollum 2008). This sample is comprised of
6,835 usable responses out of 7,626 received, from a sample frame of 37,804 (31,746)
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contacts, implying a response rate of 21.53 percent.50 For the purpose of this paper, this
data was subsequently matched with housing data obtained from PrimeraSource. Since
only few responses were received from the states of TX and OK and the housing
information for NM had significant gaps (NM is a non-disclosure state, Berrens et al.
2006), this paper focuses on the state of AZ.51 While 3,347 (2,998) usable survey
responses were received from AZ, the following three issues did not allow the inclusion
of all of them in this study: incomplete household demographic information, lack of
housing information, household age higher than 64, household unemployed or
homemaker, and no neighboring houses for the weight matrix defined as 3KM (e.g.,
closest home from house i is located further than the 3 kilometer threshold).52 As a result,
the estimates reported in this study are based on 1,014 observations.
50

This project involved a large general population sample, multi-mode survey (mail

survey mode with a web-based survey mode option), with multiple language options
(versions in both English and Spanish). The target population included all households in
the Southwest Region (AZ, NM, and small parts of TX and OK). Survey instrument
constructed based on five focus groups held in the Economics Department at the
University of New Mexico.
51

The breakdown of total responses received by state is: 3,509 for NM, 2,998 for AZ, 56

for OK, and 272 for TX.
52

For Arizona, the number of non responses for the demographic section by

characteristics are: 55 for gender, 30 for ethnicity (e.g., Hispanic/non-Hispanic), and 35
for years of education, 309 households were at least 65 years of age, and 40 were either
unemployed or homemaker. Lack of housing information includes: 268 observations
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A key issue in any study that uses survey data is the representativeness of the sample
or subsample being used and the ability to weight the responses by known external data
or variables to better represent target populations, if any biases are shown to exist
(Champ, 2003). To address this issue, this study closely follows the sample weight
methodology implemented for the 2007 Region 3 survey.53 Given the nature of the
sample, initial and post-stratification weights are used to ensure estimates that are
representative of the population. The initial or survey weights are meant to ensure
consistent estimates by reducing imbalances in the data (Dorofeev and Grant 2008). This
initial weight is the product of two initial adjustments: a base weight and a non-response
adjustment. The base weight is the inverse of the inclusion or selection probability, which
is used to adjust survey estimates to reflect the population in the sample frame based on
the sample design (Kneipp and Yarandi, 2002). The nonresponse adjustment, can be
defined as, the number of responses divided by the sample, and controls for unit
nonresponse or failure to achieve a 100% response rate (Lehtonen and Pahkinen, 2004).
Therefore, initial weights compensate for unequal sampling rates and unit non-response.
without any type of housing information, 289 without home values, 14 without year built,
612 without lot size, and 613 without total number of rooms. In addition, 68 observations
without neighboring houses as defined by the 3KM weight matrix criterion had to be
dropped.
53

In the 2007 Region 3 survey, weights were constructed at the regional level (sample

data was divided in 12 regions) and at the county level. Since the market area studied in
this paper is comprised by one state, Arizona, county sample weights are used to adjust
the data.
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Certain personal or demographic characteristics of the sample are not known until
after data is collected, but if known in advance could have led respondent to be further
stratified in the sample plan. Post-stratification allows for stratification of the sample
after data has been gathered (Cochran, 1977). These demographic characteristics are
known after data has been collected. As reported in Table 3.1, both men and high income
households tend to be overrepresented in this sample. The mean household age is 54
compared to 43 for the true population. In terms of race, it has a greater proportion of
whites than indicated for the population. Based on these comparisons, post-stratification
weights were estimated based on four demographic factors: age, race, income and
educational attainment. The final weights are the product of initial and post-stratification
weights. They control for unequal sampling probabilities and non-response (initial
weights) and adjust the data for uneven proportions between sample and population
(post-stratification weights). As can be seen in Table 3.1, when using weights, the
difference between the sample and the population is significantly reduced. For instance,
the weighted proportion of males and whites is 52 percent and 78 percent compared to 50
percent and 82 percent for the population, respectively.
The dependent variables are LNINC, the natural log of annual household income as
indicated by respondents in the 2007 Region 3 survey, and LNHVALUE, the natural log
of home values. As reported in Table 3.2, the weighted mean household income is
$54,621 and the mean home value is $166,019 in 2006$.54 It is important to note that
54

The weighted mean value for home values is $177,308. Since the year home values

were assessed was in 2008, the price in 2006 dollars is $166,019 given a Consumer Price
Index conversion factor of 1.068.
83

home prices are estimated market values as opposed to values obtained from actual
market transactions (e.g., from selling a house). The main reason is that housing data was
purchased based on whether the particular household responded the 2007 Region 3
Survey and not on whether the house was sold in 2007.
In terms of the independent variables, the primary interest in the empirical estimates
is measures of natural characteristics, and specifically those measures that relate to forest
resources. For the purpose of this paper, the site-specific characteristics that have been
gathered include linear distance to different measures of forest area, water features,
Superfund sites, campground area, and urban characteristics.
The variables that measure forest characteristics are logged distance from house i to
its closest U.S. Forest Service (USFS) area (LNFOREST, includes the other two open
space measures), Congressionally-designated wilderness area (LNWILD), and
Inventoried Roadless Area (LNIRAS). All these areas are expected to be an amenity
(e.g., θf < 0 in the housing equation and δf > 0 in the wage equation) but the designation
of LNFOREST areas for multiple uses (including recreation and extractive uses)
distinguishes USFS area from wilderness and IRAs lands. While Wilderness areas are
congressionally protected from any type of human intrusion, such as road construction,
IRAs meet the minimum criteria for wilderness consideration under the Wilderness Act
of 1964 but do not yet have legislative protection (Aarons 2011). However, all these areas
are expected to carry a positive implicit price reflective of recreation, ecosystem services,
and passive use values (Phillips 2004). Similarly, the other site-specific natural amenities
used in estimation include closest logged distance to lakes (LNLAKES), campgrounds
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(LNCAMP), and protected watershed (LNWATERSHED) and logged distance to a
Superfund site (LNSPFUND).
The independent variables for the housing-price equation include number of room
(ROOMS), structure age (AGE), and property acreage (LOTSIZE). In terms of urban
characteristics, the variables included are distance to highway (LNHIGHWAY), distance
to school (LNSCHOOL), distance to a railroad (LNRAILROAD), and distance to a golf
course (LNGOLF). The wage equation independent variables include categorical
variables for employment status, race indicators, gender (MALE) and whether the
household’s primary wage earners´ job depends directly on natural resources
(LIVINGNRE). Table 3.3 describes these variables, and provides descriptive statistics.

3.4

Empirical Results

The presence of both spatial lag and error processes in the housing market as
specified in equation (11) may have a number of reasons. Housing prices may not only be
determined by its particular characteristics (such as lot size or year built) but also by
prices in neighboring houses, resulting in spatial spillover effects that require the
inclusion of a spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. Moreover, it is realist to
assume that not all the factors affecting housing prices are quantifiable or included in this
model. For this reason a spatial error structure may also be needed to obtain reliable
results.
Econometrically, these prior beliefs about the nature of spatial dependence can be
tested using a series of diagnostics tests. A well known and commonly used test statistic
is the Moran’s I, which indicates whether or not there is spatial autocorrelation after
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estimating an OLS regression but does not identify the cause of spatial dependence (Cliff
and Ord 1972). An alternative is the Lagrange Multiplier test (LM) derived by Anselin
(1988) that allows for testing residual spatial error autocorrelation in the presence of a
spatially lagged dependent variable ( LM λ / ρ ) and vice versa ( LM ρ / λ ). In the first case, a
spatial lag model for the housing equation is estimated via a maximum likelihood
approach (ML) and the LM test is calculated with the null hypothesis being λhouse = 0 as
outlined in Anselin (1998). In a similar manner, the LM test for spatial lag
autocorrelation in the presence of spatial error autocorrelation is derived by first
estimating a spatial error model (Anselin et al. 1996; Zhou and Kockelman 2009). In this
case, the null hypothesis is ρ = 0. The LM tests have a chi-squared (χ2) distribution with
one degree of freedom (e.g., the restriction that λ = 0 or ρ = 0).
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 report the LM λ / ρ and LM ρ / λ values by national forest (IRAS,
WILD, and forest). In almost all cases, the χ2 values are significant at a 99 percent
confidence level. For instance, when the pair of weight matrices is IWD (spatial lag) and
IWD1.5 (spatial error), spatial error autocorrelation is statistically significant after
controlling for spatial lag dependence (28.11 for IRAS, 28.78 for WILD, and 30.34 for
forest). This is also true for spatial lag autocorrelation after estimating an error model
(40.00 for IRAS, 34.98 for WILD, and 35.00 for forest). These findings suggest that in
order to obtain reliable estimates, the general specification of spatial dependence defined
in equation (3.11) for the housing equation is required.
3.41 SUR Results

To determine the functional form of the dependent and independent variables in the
housing equation, a Box-Cox specification was tested and the coefficients by which the
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variables would have to be transformed were close to zero and statistically insignificant
BoxCox
( λBoxCox
= 0.07, λWILD
= 0.06, and λBoxCox
IRAS
FOREST = 0.09 ). For this reason, a log form was chosen for

both the dependent variables (housing prices) and for the natural amenity distance
variables. In the case of the wage equation, since many of the independent variables are
categorical (e.g., zero or one value), a log form is specified for the dependent variable
(household income).
The spatial SUR models for equations (3.10) and (3.11) are estimated and reported in
Table 3.6. The residual correlation of 0.12 for IRAS, 0.13 for WILD, and 0.14 for Forest
are all statistically significant at a 99 percent confidence level, supporting the use of a
SUR approach.
The estimates for the structural characteristics and the household’s human
characteristics for the housing and wage equations are all statistically significant and have
the expected signs. For instance, home values increase with lot size, number of rooms,
and year built (e.g., the more recent the house was built the higher its value). Household
wages vary significantly depending on years of education, gender (household males tend
to earn higher wages compared to females), and race (Whites, the base case, earn
significantly higher wages than Blacks and households with two races).
The spatial lag autocorrelation coefficient (ρ) ranges between 0.47 and 0.52 and is
statistically significant at across all level models, indicating that home values are
positively related. This result underscores the importance of accounting for spatial
dependence. However, in this spatial SUR approach, inferences about the significance of
the error autocorrelation coefficients (λwage or λhouse) are not possible. Since these
coefficients are estimated in step 2 of this 3-step process using GMM, their t-values from
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the SUR regression (the last step) are not identifiable. While it is not possible to make
any conclusions about the joint significance of a spatial lag and error processes in this
SUR model, the LM tests reported in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 suggest the need to include both
types of spatial dependences.
The coefficients for IRAs, WILD, and FOREST support the hypothesis that these
different types of forest areas are amenable to individuals. The negative signs in the
housing equation suggest that the closer a home is located to one of these areas the higher
its value. In the labor market, individuals are trading wages for forest area as indicated by
the positive coefficients for these variables (e.g., the closer a household lives from a
forest area, the lower his annual wage). A similar relationship is found for the other
natural amenities included in the model. For instance, households are willing to earn a
lower wage for living closer to lake areas or protected watersheds and home values
increase the closer a house is located from these amenities. The positive sign for
RAILROAD indicates that railroads are a disamenity (home prices increase with
increasing distant from railroad), possibly due to noise inconvenience. In the case of the
other geographic features, mixed results are found for the statistical significance of the
estimated coefficients. While LNURBAN (distance to closest urbanized area, defined as
a territory with 50,000 or more individuals) has the expected sign for the housing and
labor markets, only in the housing equation, LNURBAN is statistically significant,
indicating that the closer a house is located from an urbanized area the higher its value.
Superfund sites (LNSPFUND) have a statistically significant effect across all the models
(negative for housing prices and positive for wages) except for the equation in which the
type of forest included is national forest. It is worth noting that conclusions about the
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effect of each geographic feature on home values and household income based on simply
comparing coefficients across equations may lead to inaccurate conclusions. While the
absolute values of these coefficients are in most cases higher for the wage equation, the
presence of spatial processes requires calculations of total implicit prices to have a proper
understanding of their magnitude.55 By means of this empirical exercise, it is possible to
estimate in monetary terms, for instance, how much of the value that individuals have for
living in the proximity to forest areas is capitalized in the housing and labor markets (e.g.,
implicitly paying a higher house price and earning a lower wage). The variables of
interest in this analysis are forest areas.
The first step to calculate total implicit prices is to derive the marginal effects for
each market separately. Following Freeman’s (2003) theoretical hedonic framework,
applying total differentiation to the indirect utility function or equation (3.1) gives the
following expression, which represents the individuals preference for access to forest
areas at the margin:

VQ f
V HHINC

=−

Vp
V HHINC

dp
dHHINC
−
dQ f
dQ f

(3.16)

where HHINC is used instead of w to reflect the level of income data used in this
analysis. In this equation, it is assumed that the market is in equilibrium or dV = 0 (e.g.,
same utility level ( V ) across all locations). Since at equilibrium individuals trade

55

It is also important to note that the housing equation is specified with both spatial

processes (spatial lag and error) while only spatial error dependence is included in the
wage equation.
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proximity to forest areas for wages,

VQ f
VHHINC

represents the marginal rate of substitution

between the forest variable (Qf) and the numeraire good (e.g., income spent in all market
goods consumed). Assuming that the same individual does not own more than one house
and using Roy’s identity yield the following total implicit price expression for the Qf:

PQ f =

where

dp
dHHINC
−
dQ f
dQ f

(3.17)

dp
dHHINC
and
are the partial derivates of equations (3.14) and (3.15) that
dQ f
dQ f

indicate how home prices and household income change with changing proximity to
forest areas. Based on the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation in step 3 for estimating the
spatial SUR model, equations (3.14) and (3.15) can be rewritten as:

( I − λ houseW2 )( I − ρW1 ) Pij = ( I − λ houseW2 ) β ′ t S j + ( I − λ houseW2 )ϕ ′ t N j +

(3.18)

+ ( I − λhouseW2 )θ ′ t Q f , j + ξ i*,house

( I − λ houseW2 ) HHINCij = ( I − λ hhincW2 )η ′ t HC j + ( I − λ hhincW2 )π ′ t N j +

(3.19)

+ ( I − λhhincW2 )δ ′ t Q f , j + ξ i*,hhinc
Assuming a log form for both dependent variables ,and for the natural amenity distance
variables, the right hand side expressions in equation (3.17) are found by taking the
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partial derivate in the above equations with respect to Qf,j (forest characteristic): IRAs,
WILD, or FOREST56:

Qf ,j
dp
= ( I − ρ ) −1θ ′ t
dQ f
Pij

(3.20)

Qf ,j
dp
= δ ′t
dQ f
HHINC ij

(3.21)

In equation (3.20), two types of effects are estimated: the direct-contemporaneous effect
and indirect effects. The first effect refers to how the price of home i changes with
proximity to a given forest characteristic. Indirect effects represent the impact on home
price i of changes in the price of neighboring home j due to its distance to, for instance,
IRA lands (represented by ρ).
The annualized marginal effect estimates using the above equations are reported in
Table 3.6 for the presence of different forest characteristics, lakes and watersheds.
Evaluated at the mean house price of $167,651 and mean household income of $46,642,
the average home price increases by $620 and the average household income decreases
by $74 for moving one mile closer to IRAS, given an initial distance of 38 miles (the
mean for the sample). The resulting total implicit price is $694 per mile. When measured
by proximity to wilderness areas (WILD) and public forest (FOREST), total implicit
prices increase to $1039 and $1901 per mile, respectively.
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Since the spatial weight matrices are row-standardized (e.g., each row adds up to one),

the partial derivative in equation (3.20) assumes the following equality:
( I − ρW1 ) −1 = ( I − ρ ) −1 .
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Total implicit prices for lakes range between $9,075 and $10,537 per mile and for
watershed between $880 and $900 depending on the type of forest area included in the
model. While these features appear to be more “more expensive” on the margin, it is
important to note that for a house the average closest distance from a lake or protected
watershed is 2.8 and 15.9 miles, respectively, compared to 28.7 through 38.2 for the
forest areas. This may partially explain the significant difference in total implicit prices
between these geographic features. For instance, assuming a mean house price of
$167,651, household income of $46,642, and closest distance to a lake of 38 miles, the
total implicit value rages between $670 and $830. Figure 1 shows how total implicit
prices decrease the further away a home is located from these amenities, assuming a
constant house price of $167,651 and household income of $46,642.
3.5

Conclusion

This study has examined the role of public forest lands as determinants of spatial
variations in housing prices and wages for the State of Arizona. The presence of off-site
benefits, one type of the total economic value of public forest lands, suggest that
invididuals’ preferences for housing and labor is partially based on the proximity to these
areas and other environmental amenities. These findings are in line with previous studies
that have shown that forest amenities cannot longer be tied to only an input good in the
production process. However, most of these papers have relied on relatively large
geographic scales, such as counties and census tracts, to determine whether people are
willing to pay through the housing and labor markets to live close by these areas. These
findings can be significant inputs to any management decision process involving public
lands to achieve a comprehensive accounting of both market and non-market benefits.
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After controlling for housing, neighborhood, household’s human capital
characteristics and location specific amenities, results show that the average total implicit
price for USFS is $1,901 per mile compared to $1,309 for WAs and $694 for IRAs per
mile, annually. These findings further evidence that Non-market benefit estimates, as part
of a more comprehensive benefit-cost analysis, can be an important informational input
in any major regulatory action (e.g., Arrow et al. 1996), including public lands
management (Loomis 2002).
The underlying spatial relationships among observations were determined by
applying Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests for the co-existence of spatial lag and spatial
error processes. The econometric approach applied in this study follows Kelejian and
Prucha (2004) to test the empirical question of whether there are strong amenity effects in
the housing and labor markets. The SUR model with spatial error and lagged
autocorrelation in the housing price equation and with a spatial error structure in the wage
equation is estimated by applying a spatial Cochrane-Orcutt procedure analogous to that
develop for the case with serial correlation in time series (Greene 2003). As expected, all
spatial lag autocorrelation coefficients are statistically significant and positive,
confirming the existence of spatial lag effects. However, while LM tests indicate that
spatial error autocorrelation is present after controlling for spatial lag dependence, the
significance of the spatial error coefficients (e.g., λhouse and λhhinc) is identifiable in the
SUR estimation process.
Using micro-data where households are identified to points on a map allows
calculating more precise distances to specific natural amenities and testing for
aggregation bias. A possible extension of this study is to test the effect of this bias by
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estimating a hedonic model where locations are aggregated to match census tract areas
and compare the results with those found here. Future studies can relax the assumption
that the estimated coefficients are constant in space by introducing spatial heterogeneity.
It is important to note that the estimation of the hedonic models assumes spatial
equilibrium for the housing and labor markets. Since the presence of natural amenities
may in part explain net migration patterns, such an assumption could be too restrictive.
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Table 3.1: Weighted and Census Data Comparison
Survey (unweighted)

Survey (weighted)

US Census

HH Mean
Income

$83,799

$46,642

$53,591

Mean Age

51

34

Gender

Male (72%)
Female (28%)

Male (52%)
Female (48%)

Male (50%)
Female (50%)

Race

White (95%)
Asian (1%)
Black (1%)
American Indian (1%)
Native Hawaiian (0.2%)
Two or more races(2%)

White (78%)
Asian (5%)
Black (4%)
American Indian (3%)
Native Hawaiian (0.2%)
Two or more races(3%)

White (82%)
Asian (2%)
Black (3%)
American Indian (4%)
Native Hawaiian (0.1%)
Two or more races(2%)

Education

High School or Less (11%)
High School or Less (61%) High School or Less (43%)
Some College (33%)
Some College (23%)
Some College (33%)
Bachelor Degree (28%)
Bachelor Degree (12%)
Bachelor Degree (15%)
Grad or Prof. Degree (28%) Grad or Prof. Degree (4%) Grad or Prof. Degree (8%)
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Table 3.2: Definitions and Weighted Descriptive Statistics of Geographic Variables
Variable
LNHIGHWAY

LNSHCOOL

LNRAILROAD
LNGOLF

LNIRAS

LNWILD

LNFOREST
LNSPFUND
LNURBAN

LNLAKES
LNCAMP

LNWATERSHED

Definition (source)
Natural log of distance to nearest highway, meters (GIS, US Department of
Commerce)
Natural log of distance to nearest
schoool, meters (GIS, US Bureau of the
Census)
Natural log of distance to nearest railroad, meters
Natural log of distance to nearest golf
course, meters (GIS, U.S. Bureau of the
Census)
Natural log of distance to nearest Inventoried Roadless Area, meters (GIS,
USFS)
Natural log of distance to nearest Congresionally-designated wilderness area, meters (GIS, USFS)
Natural log of distance to nearest National forest, meters (GIS, USFS)
Natural log of distance to nearest superfund site, meters (GIS, ADEQ)
Natural log of distance to nearest urbanized area, meters (GIS, US Bureau
of the Census)
Natural log of distance to nearest lake,
meters (GIS, ADEQ)
Natural log of distance to nearest campground, meters (GIS, U.S. Bureau of the
Census)
Natural log of distance to nearest watershed, meters (GIS, ADEQ)

Mean
8.82

Std. Dev.
0.78

6.69

0.79

8.71

1.13

8.66

0.78

10.74

0.45

10.95

0.44

10.57

0.59

8.80

0.83

8.80

0.63

8.22

0.69

10.07

0.55

9.37

1.71

Sources:
USFS:
United
States
Forest
Service
Southwestern
Region,
http://www.fs.fed.us/r3/gis/datasets.shtml and http://roadless.fs.fed.us.
ADEQ: Arizona Department of Environmental Quality, US Bureau of the Census, and US
Department of Commerce, http://agic.az.gov/portal/dataList.do?sort=theme&dataset=54.
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Table 3.3: Definitions and Weighted Descriptive Statistics of Housing and Wage Variables
Variable
Definition
Housing variables
LNHVALUE
House sale value (2007 $)
ROOMS
Total number of rooms
HAGE
Age of a house (2007 - year built)
LOTSIZE
Size of a house (acres)
Wage variables
LNINC

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

11.91
5.63
32.58
0.20

0.47
1.28
17.50
0.30

10.69
1.00
3.00
0.00

13.94
14.00
92.00
20.00

Natural log of Annual Household in- 10.55
0.64
9.50
12.25
come (2007 $)
EDUC
Years of education
5.40
1.69
2
9
WORKPT
Employment status: work part-time, bi- 0.11
0.31
0
1
nary
RETIRED
Employment status: retired, binary
0.25
0.43
0
1
HOMEMAKER
Employment status: homemaker, bi- 0.20
0.40
0
1
nary
STUDENTFT
Employment status: full-time student, 0.03
0.18
0
1
binary
STUDENTPT
Employment status: part-time student, 0.001
0.04
0
1
binary
ACTIVEMIL
Employment status: Active duty U S 0.002
0.00
0
1
Armed Forces, binary
RESMIL
Employment status: Military Reserve 0.003
0.01
0
1
or National Guard, binary
UNEMPL
Employment status: Unemployed look- 0.03
0.17
0
1
ing for a job, binary
TWORACES
Race: Two or more races, binary
0.05
0.22
0
1
ASIAN
Race: Asian/Pacific islander, binary
0.01
0.10
0
1
BLACK
Race: Black, binary
0.001
0.06
0
1
AMERINDIAN
Race: Native American/Alaska Native, 0.01
0.10
0
1
binary
HAWAIIAN
Race: Hawaiian, binary
0.002
0.04
0
1
MALE
Gender: Male, binary
0.52
0.50
0
1
Make a living from a job that depends
directly on natural resources (e.g.,
LIVINGNRE
0.05
0.22
0
1
ranching, mining, guiding hunters or
recreation users, working in a saw mill),
binary
Note: LNHVALUE and LNINC are the dependent variables. The unlog values for the mean housing
value and household income are $167,651 and $46,642, respectively.
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Table 3.4: Lagrange Multiplier Diagnostics For Housing Equation
Spatial error autocorrelation in the presence of spatial lag
Weight Matrix
Spatial lag
IWDdist1.5
Spatial error
IWDdist1.0
Open Space Variable
IRAS
28.11∗∗∗
WILD
28.78∗∗∗
Forest
30.34∗∗∗

IWDdist1.5
4KM

IWDdist1.5
3KM

IWDdist1.0
IWDdist1.5

IWDdist1.0
4KM

IWDdist1.0
3KM

34.10∗∗∗
34.77∗∗∗
34.80∗∗∗

22.56∗∗∗
22.57∗∗∗
22.58∗∗∗

27.57∗∗∗
28.57∗∗∗
27.73∗∗∗

33.12∗∗∗
33.76∗∗∗
33.77∗∗∗

21.81∗∗∗
21.83∗∗∗
21.68∗∗∗

Spatial error autocorrelation in the presence of spatial lag
Weight Matrix
Spatial lag
4KM
Spatial error
IWDdist1.5
Open Space Variable
IRAS
9.70∗∗∗
WILD
28.34∗∗∗
Forest
31.33∗∗∗

4KM
IWDdist1.0

4KM
3KM

3KM
IWDdist1.5

3KM
IWDdist1.0

3KM
4KM

36.34∗∗∗
41.52∗∗∗
26.49∗∗∗

13.68∗∗∗
18.71∗∗∗
15.17∗∗∗

25.70∗∗∗
10.81∗∗∗
14.75∗∗∗

30.77∗∗∗
21.90∗∗∗
35.83∗∗∗

3.92∗∗
4.56∗∗
4.19∗∗

*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 3.5: Lagrange Multiplier Diagnostics For Housing Equation (cont’d)
Spatial lag autocorrelation in the presence of spatial error
Weight Matrix
Spatial lag
IWDdist1.5
Spatial error
IWDdist1.0
Open Space Variable
IRAS
40.00∗∗∗
WILD
34.98∗∗∗
Forest
35.00∗∗∗

IWDdist1.5
4KM

IWDdist1.5
3KM

IWDdist1.0
IWDdist1.5

IWDdist1.0
4KM

IWDdist1.0
3KM

4.12∗∗∗
3.31∗∗∗
9.60∗∗∗

3.67∗∗
4.82∗∗
3.80∗∗

14.68∗∗∗
11.45∗∗∗
18.36∗∗∗

18.92∗∗∗
4.04∗∗
10.86∗∗∗

9.12∗∗∗
6.88∗∗∗
4.50∗∗

Spatial lag autocorrelation in the presence of spatial error
Weight Matrix
Spatial lag
4KM
Spatial error
IWDdist1.5
Open Space Variable
IRAS
9.73∗∗∗
WILD
3.34∗
Forest
12.33∗∗∗

4KM
IWDdist1.0

4KM
3KM

3KM
IWDdist1.5

3KM
IWDdist1.0

3KM
4KM

8.67∗∗∗
72.57∗∗∗
12.61∗∗∗

10.04∗∗∗
23.15∗∗∗
12.33∗∗∗

9.38∗∗∗
4.27∗∗
14.71∗∗∗

3.09∗
123.77∗∗∗
2.16

10.96∗∗∗
13.93∗∗∗
12.75∗∗∗

*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 3.6: Estimation Results, Weighted SUR Models
Housing Equation
0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13***
-0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***
0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22***
-0.01
-0.01
-0.02
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
0.04*** 0.03*** 0.01***
-0.01
-0.01
0.01

ROOMS
HAGE
LOTSIZE
LNHIGHWAY
LNSHCOOL
LNRAILROAD
LNGOLF
EDUC
WORKPT
RETIRED
HOMEMAKER
STUDENTFT
STUDENTPT
ACTIVEMIL
RESMIL
UNEMPL
TWORACES
ASIAN
BLACK
AMERINDIAN
HAWAIIAN
MALE
LIVINGNRE
GROUPMEM
LNIRAS
-0.06**
LNWILD
-0.09***
LNFOREST
LNSPFUND
-0.03*
-0.02*
LNURBAN
-0.10*** -0.10***
LNLAKES
-0.07*** -0.07***
LNCAMP
-0.04** -0.05***
LNWATERSHED -0.02*** -0.02***
ρ
0.52*** 0.51***
λ
0.36
0.36
2
McElroy R
0.51
0.51
Residu. Corr
0.12**
0.13**
N

HHINC Equation

0.09*** 0.09*** 0.08***
-0.79*** -0.76*** -0.79***
-0.30*** -0.29*** -0.29***
0.11*
0.13**
0.09
-0.16*
-0.13
-0.17*
-0.15
-0.19
-0.08
-0.29
-2.26
0.46
0.34
0.36
0.44
-0.70*** -0.67*** -0.69***
-0.41** -0.37** -0.39**
0.47*** 0.47*** 0.47***
-0.48*** -0.38** -0.39**
0.40*** 0.38*** 0.39***
0.19
0.11
0.15
0.08*
0.07*
0.07*
-0.17*** -0.15** -0.18**
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.05***
0.21***
0.20***
0.03*
0.04
0.02*
0.01
-0.01
-0.02
0.16*** 0.16*** 0.15***
-0.03
-0.07
-0.07
0.13*** 0.15*** 0.11***

-0.14
-0.01
-0.10
-0.06
-0.05
-0.03
0.47***
0.40
0.37
0.51
0.14**
1,885,059

0.39

*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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0.39

Table 3.7: Total Implicit Values ($)

IRAs
WILD
FOREST
IRAS Model
LAKES
WILD Model
FOREST Model
IRAS Model
WATERSHED WILD Model
FOREST Model

∂P/∂Q

∂HHIN C/∂Q

-620
-777
-1,579
-8,020
-8,719
-6,508
-502
-456
-557

74
261
322
2,517
2,652
2,567
396
444
323
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Total Implicit
Price (PQ )
-694
-1,039
-1,901
-10,537
-11,371
9,075
-896
-900
-880

Figure 3.1: Change in Total Implicit Prices per Mile
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Chapter 4
Public Support for Expanding Health Care Coverage in New Mexico
4.1

Introduction
With the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), states will be tasked with

implementing the Act at a time in which their resources have been severely hurt by the
current global recession. Consequently, state may need to generate revenue to effectively
expand access to health insurance in their borders. This paper examines whether the
payment vehicle (e.g., increase in state tax or increase in premiums) for generating
revenue from the public has an effect on people´s willingness to pay to expand health
care coverage to the uninsured in New Mexico.
The increasing number of individuals lacking health insurance has been one of the
most challenging issues facing health policymakers in the United States (U.S.). A
growing number of studies have linked the lack of health insurance with negative health
outcomes. These studies reveal two general themes: a strong correlation between
uninsured status and mortality rates (Wilper et al. 2009), and high rate of communitylevel uninsurance with negative spillover effects on health care access and unmet medical
needs for the insured population (Pauly and Pagan 2007). While the American public
shows considerable support to the idea that the first step to overcoming this negative
trend is a significant overhaul of the current health care system, the majority of
Americans oppose higher taxes or premiums to finance it (The Kaiser Family Foundation
2009a; Kessler and Brady 2009). Not surprisingly, one of the most discussed issues of the
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current (and past) health care reform debates has been its financial aspects (The Kaiser
Family Foundation 2009b; Berenson et al. 2009).
The recent debate that concluded with President Obama signing into law the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) has shown the difficulty to come up with a viable strategy
for funding comprehensive coverage that achieves majority support.57 This Act is
estimated to provide coverage to an additional 32 million uninsured individuals by 2019
(The Kaiser Family Foundation 2011). Two of the most salient aspects of the reform are
the requirement that individuals either maintain minimum health insurance coverage or
pay a penalty in the form of a tax (e.g., individual mandate) and the expansion of
Medicaid to individuals that were previously not eligible. One year after ACA became
law public support for such a reform is still significantly divided (42% in favor and 46%
against, The Kaiser Family Foundation, 2011). Nationwide, the debate over the ACA
involves questions about the constitutional validity of the act as well as the additional
costs that such a reform will impose on states’ budgets.
At the forefront is the fiscal impact that ACA may have on state budgets given their
current level of deficit. The rapid increase in health care costs in the U.S. in the last thirty

57

The Affordable Care Act consists of three pieces of legislation that include the Health

Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (H.R. 4872), the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010.
Together, these laws are commonly known as the Affordable Care Act (ACA).
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years has been cited as one of the main reasons for the need to reform the health system.58
In 2008, total health care expenditure per capita was $7,538, the highest among
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations.59 Yet,
recent estimates show that the impact of ACA on a state’s ability to realize health care
savings significantly varies (The Kaiser Family Foundation 2011).60 One of the main
reasons that explain this variation is the size of a states’ uninsured gap.61 While nationally
this gap is on average 7.7 percent, it varies widely across states (The Kaiser Family
Foundation 2011). At the national level, five different reports show mixed results as to
whether the ACA will generate net savings. Two reports show new costs between $20
billion (The Congressional Budget Office (CBO)) and $21.2 billion (Holahan and
Headen, Urban Institute) and the other three reports project net savings ranging from $33
58

As of 2008, health care spending represented 16 percent of gross domestic product

(GDP) or $2.2 trillion compared to 9 percent in 1980 (The Kaiser Family Foundation,
2011).
59

This number is $2,535 dollars, or 51%, higher than Norway, the next largest per capita

spender. The average health care expenditure per capita for the 15 OECD nations is
$3,944.
60

The ACA follows in many aspects the Massachusetts (MA) health care reform law

enacted in 2006. Since then, the insured rate in MA has increased to 98 percent.
However, this reform has not been able to curb the rise in health care costs in this state,
for which it is closely monitored at the national level (SOURCE).
61

The uninsured gap refers to the percentage of individuals under 65 years old that are

uninsured and income eligible under the ACA.
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billion (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to $106.8 (Lewis Group). As
a result, the current economic recession has brought numerous concerns about the
feasibility of such a plan as well as lawsuits across the nation.
While the lack of health insurance is a major national issue in the U.S., affecting
nearly one-fifth of the adult population, it is not uniformly distributed across the states
(Pagan and Pauly 2007). New Mexico (NM) is a “majority minority” state that has
relatively low household income and a high rate of health uninsurance.62 In this state, the
uninsured gap is approximately 12.1 percent compared to 7.7 percent for the entire
nation.63 As a result, NM may experience little or no net savings once the ACA is fully
implemented.64 Reductions in necessary payments for uncompensated care may partially
offset some of these costs (Dorn and Buettgens 2010). Yet, states like New Mexico may
need to find other sources of revenue to cover the costs of increasing enrollment in
Medicaid, given its high uninsured gap.
62

In 2008, Governor Bill Richardson, unsuccessfully try to secure a majority support in

the legislature for his “Health Solutions New Mexico” plan to expand insurance coverage
to all New Mexicans, largely due to the estimated costs associated with such a reform
(Baker 2008). As a result, whether voters would financially support a universal health
plan in New Mexico has yet to be determined.
63

In 2010, the total number of individuals under 65 earning up to 138% of FPL is

238,200. Based on a total population of 1.97 million, this represents 12.1 percent.
64

Texas, the state with the highest uninsured rate in the nation, has an uninsured gap of

11.4 percent. Given this high gap, this state is estimated to incur new costs of 27 billion
(The Kaiser Family Foundation 2011).
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In light of this, this study seeks to inform the ongoing health care debate by
investigating whether a health care reform to provide health care coverage to all New
Mexicans financed with higher taxes or premiums is politically viable in New Mexico.
Given the desire to provide universal health coverage but the reluctance to pay higher
taxes at the national level, would a state-based reform receive a majority support from
New Mexicans?
To address this question, a survey-based stated preference approach, known as the
contingent valuation (CV) method, is implemented. This survey-based, stated preference
study uses a hypothetical public referendum format for eliciting household voting
responses, and estimating willingness to pay (WTP) for expanding health care coverage
in NM. The experimental design includes split-sample treatments for evaluating: (i) two
alternative payment vehicles (increases in either state and local taxes or insurance
premiums); and two categorically nested goods (basic health care [the inclusive good] or
primary health care [the subset good]). Basic health care is defined to cover prescription
drug coverage, and preventive care including access to the services of a primary care
provider, while primary health care is defined to only cover access to the services of a
primary care provider. The reason for choosing a health care reform plan in which
individuals would get insurance from either the employer or an insurance company as
opposed to a government option (e.g., a public option), is to reflect what has been
proposed by Governor Richardson (New Mexico Human Services Department, 2007).
With respect to the split-sample treatments, results show: (i) evidence of scope
sensitivity (Carson and Mitchell 1995), as a measure of validity; (ii) that the type of
payment vehicle matters in this health policy context, as increases in state and local taxes
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are preferred to higher insurance premiums; (iii) consistent with the accumulating body
of evidence from CV meta-analysis (Little and Berrens 2004), WTP results are also
shown to be highly sensitive to how response uncertainty is handled; (iv) while results
provide evidence that households are willing to pay an important amount for the
expansion and provision of health care to the uninsured in NM (annual household
median WTP for basic care is $169 and $126 for primary care), a state “universal” health
care plan would not achieve majority support among New Mexicans, once response
(un)certainty and costs for such a reform are taking into account. These results are
broadly consistent with those found at a national level in Kessler and Brady (2009) and
The Kaiser Family Foundation Health Tracking Poll.
4.2

Background and Current Policy Debate
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Affordable Care Act, one

of the most significant health care reform legislation of the last twenty years. There are
two main vehicles through which this reform is expected to reduce the number of
individuals lacking health insurance: individual mandates and expansion of public
programs such as Medicaid. Under this act, the individual mandate clause is termed
“minimum essential coverage” and requires U.S. citizens and legal residents to obtain
health coverage or pay a tax penalty starting in 2014.65 In addition, Medicaid eligibility

65

The tax penalty is scheduled to be $95 in 2014, $325 in 2015, and $695 in 2016. After

2016, this penalty will be increased annually by the cost-of-living adjustment (The Kaiser
Family Foundation 2011).
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will be expanded to individuals under the age of 65 (including adults without dependent
children) with incomes up to 138 percent of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL).66
An intense legal debate has followed the enactment of ACA. A number of states have
filed lawsuits mainly focusing on two issues: the constitutional validity of the minimum
essential coverage clause and the burden of expanding Medicaid coverage on the states’
budgets. As of this writing, twenty separate legal challenges have been filed but in only
two cases judges concluded that the individual mandate exceeds constitutional
authority.67 In terms of Medicaid expansion, legal litigations cited that this clause violates
the U.S. Spending Clause as the Act “significantly expands and alters the Medicaid
program to such an extent [states] cannot afford the newly-imposed costs and burdens”
(U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida 2011). It is worth noting that
under the ACA the costs that the states will incur to enroll newly eligible individuals to
the Medicaid program will be 100 percent funded by the federal government from 2014
and 2016. This number will decrease to 95 percent in 2017 and 90 percent in 2020. Both
of these reforms will become effective in January 2014.
66

While most of the changes will take effect in January 2014, a number of significant

provisions have taken place during 2010. These include the prohibition to drop customer
with chronic conditions and the requirement to offer coverage to dependents under the
age of 26.
67

On December 13, 2010, Judge Henry E. Hudson of the Eastern District of Virginia

ruled that Congress exceeded its powers when it enacted the mandate clause. On January
31, 2011, Judge Roger Vinson of the District Court for the Northern District of Florida
also concluded that this requirement is unconstitutional.
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While this new federal funding for expanding Medicaid is significant, states may still
face high costs after 2020. Based on a 10 year study for the state of Texas (TX) that goes
from 2014 to 2023, Bovbjerg et al. (2011) project that this state may not actually
experience net savings but additional costs of $27 billion. One of the main reasons is the
high uninsured gap that TX will be required to close under the ACA (11.4 percent).
Given that the uninsured gap for NM is 12.1 percent, the costs of expanding Medicaid
may outweigh the savings.
At 22.8 percent, the state of NM has the second highest uninsured rate in the nation
for 2007, lower only than Texas (U.S. Census Bureau 2007). As in other states, in NM
health insurance (which does not refer to insurance in the classical sense but a
prepayment mechanism) is heavily dependent on salary employment. Of all the New
Mexicans with insurance, 54 percent have private health insurance (split as 47.9 percent
employer-based and 6.1 percent individual insurance) and 30 percent have public
insurance (split as 15.9 Medicaid, 14.1 Medicare and 16 percent other) (NMHPC 2009).
However, in a state that has one of the lowest income per capita levels in the nation
($32,091 in 2008) only 51 percent of the firms offer health care benefits (AHRQ 2008;
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 2008). As a result, among the adult population
(between 19 and 64 years of age) the number of individuals lacking health insurance
totaled 346,800 or 29.9 percent in NM compared to 19.7 percent for the U.S. in 2007
(Current Population Survey 2007). In this context, uninsured New Mexicans have relied
primarily on private community clinics and public health offices for medical services.
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The major source of publicly-financed health care for the uninsured in NM is the County
Indigent Funds (CIF) (NMHPC 2009).68
In an attempt to address the growing number of uninsured New Mexicans, Governor
Bill Richardson made health care reform a continuing priority, including the primary
initiative of his 2008 legislative agenda (before the more recent economic downturn). The
Health Coverage for New Mexicans Committee (HCNMC), appointed by the Governor,
issued a report that highlighted three strategies to achieve health care coverage for all
New Mexicans that are a mix of market-based reforms and mandates (New Mexico
Human Services Department, 2007).69 However, his health care reform never achieved
majority support in the Democratic-controlled New Mexico Legislature in 2008. Among
many reasons, the financial costs for such a reform have been a major obstacle for
gaining support (Baker 2008). Consequently, despite being a major focus of the 2008 NM
legislative session - health care reform was essentially absent from the 2009 legislative
session, even though some changes were made to Medicaid and SCHIP and other public
health services programs as a result of this session (Childress 2009). The new health care
68

In 2009, total CIF revenues were $91 million (primarily from gross receipt taxes) and

expenditures were 86 million (NMHPC 2009).
69

These comprehensive plans, along with other recommendations by the HCNMC, were

presented by Governor Richardson during the 2008 legislative session. Several states
have created Health Reform Commissions, appointed by their Governors, that are in
charge of evaluating and creating reports on possible coverage expansion plans, including
Illinois, Colorado, Louisiana, Maine, North Carolina, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont,
Virginia, and Wisconsin.
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federal reform represents a significant boost towards comprehensive coverage. However,
there is still a high degree of uncertainty about the final version of the health care law and
its impact on states’ budgets.
Against this backdrop, improved understanding of the support that an expansion of
basic or primary health care would receive from New Mexicans can provide important
input to health policymakers in this state, and may offer insights for policy debates in
other states.
4.3

Survey Design
There remains ongoing debate over whether stated preference surveys should be

applied to inform policymakers on health-related issues (and for other applications to
public good provision), and persistent concern over minimizing potential hypothetical
bias (Champ et al 2009; Little and Berrens, 2004). Yet, continued exploration and
applications of stated preference approaches can help us better understand and
systematically elicit patients’ and the public’s health care preferences (Birch and
Donaldson 2001; Smith 2000; Mataria et al. 2004; Weimer et al. 2009). A rapid and
growing number of empirical papers have applied survey-based, stated preference
approaches, such as the CV method, to estimate willingness to pay (or be paid) measures
for changes in health- related goods or policy programs (e.g., Luchini et al. 2003; Olsen
and Smith 2001; Smith 2003). While many of these studies have focused on estimating
WTP for a specific set of medical treatments or programs (Whynes et al. 2003;
Greenberg 2004; Pinto-Prades et al. 2007; Weimer et al. 2009), only a few have
attempted to assess WTP for providing extended health care coverage, either in the U.S.
and elsewhere. For instance, Kessler and David (2009) in the U.S., Berrens et al. (1999)
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in the U.S. (New Mexico), Dror et al. (2007) in India, and Lofgren (2008) in Vietnam
provide examples of recent CV studies that assess WTP for health care coverage. Taken
generally, these studies provide evidence that households are willing to pay significant
amounts for the expansion and provision of health care to the uninsured.
To assess the public’s support for expanding health care coverage in NM, the survey
included a number of questions that capture the respondent’s views on the current state of
the health care system in NM and the importance of developing programs to cover unmet
needs for health care. The first part of the survey contains attitudinal and general
knowledge questions that focus on the problems currently facing the U.S., the role of the
government, and the current state of the health care system. The second part focuses on
specifics aspects of the health care policy debate and on the valuation component of the
survey that addresses the expansion of either basic health care or primary care coverage.
This part presents the valuation scenario, the actual advisory referendum question to
estimate the respondent support for expanding heath care coverage and a follow up
question to address valuation response uncertainty. The final section of the survey
included follow up health and demographic questions.
In the valuation component of the survey, a split-sample treatment was used to
assess public preferences for health care expansion. Half of the randomly selected
respondents were presented with an advisory referendum question and randomly assigned
payment amount for expanding basic health care; while the other half were presented
with an advisory referendum and randomly assigned payment amount for expanding
primary health care. The payment vehicle to fund access to health care coverage in NM
was also randomly assigned and took the form of either (i) increased state and local taxes,
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or (ii) increased insurance premiums. The split-sample design alleviates potential
ordering effects (Bateman 2004; Randall et al. 1981).
The valuation section began with these following instructions to the respondent:
Regardless of your position on health care reform, I would like to know how
much money your family would be willing to pay to cover some of the unmet
needs for basic health care in New Mexico. Remember, I am not asking you
for money and am not trying to sell you anything. I am only trying to find out
whether different households place different values on health care. There are
no right or wrong answers to these questions. Your opinions are important
and can help set state priorities. Please keep this in mind as you answer the
following questions.
Also, as you answer the questions, please keep in mind that any dollars your
household contributes for expanding public programs to cover some unmet
needs for basic health care in New Mexico would not be available to spend on
other things that you or your family might otherwise choose, such as charities,
environmental programs, groceries, or car payments.
Then, each respondent was asked the following advisory referendum question (VOTE):
If it would cost your household <$PAY> dollars per year <PAYMENT
VECHICLE>, would you vote Yes or No on a state referendum for a program that
guaranteed <HEALTH CARE COVERAGE> for all New Mexicans?
YES________
NO________
Payment vehicle (PAYMENT VEHICLE) refers to an increase in either state and local
taxes or increase in premiums while health care coverage (HEALTH CARE
COVERAGE) takes the form of either basic health care (inclusive good) or primary care
(subset good).70 Hereafter, the basic care and primary care treatment levels are denoted as
BASICARE and PRIMCARE, respectively, for the health care coverage (HCC) good
offered. The dollar payment amounts (PAY) were randomly assigned to each respondent
70

To review, basic health care is defined to cover prescription drug coverage, and

preventive care including access to the services of a primary care provider, while primary
health care is defined to only cover access to the services of a primary care provider.
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from the following set of values: $PAY Є {10, 25, 50, 75, 100, 150, 200, 250, 500, 750,
900, and 1000}.
After this question, additional follow-up questions were included to assess the certainty
level of responses to the valuation question. In particular, survey participants were asked
about their level of certainty to the voting response given on the referendum question
using a scale from zero to 100, where zero meant that an individual would not vote as
stated on the hypothetical referendum and 100 completely certain that the individual
would vote as stated on the hypothetical referendum (Berrens et al. 2002). The follow-up
(un)certainty question asked was:
Suppose that next week a state referendum actually would take place on implementing
a program that guaranteed <HEALTH CARE COVERAGE> for all New Mexicans
at a cost of <$PAY> dollars more per year < PAYMENT VECHICLE > On a scale
from 0 to 100, where 0 means that you are certain that you would not vote <YES
(NO)> and 100 means you are certain that you would vote <YES (NO)>, how
certain are you that you would actually vote <YES (NO)>?
Although sometimes scaled differently (e.g., Loomis and Ekstrand 1998), similar
questions have been used in a variety of uncertainty response-calibration approaches in a
number of recent CV studies (e.g., Berrens et al. 2002; Li et al. 2009; Vasquez et al.
2009; Norwood et al. 2008).
A number of comparisons of hypothetical responses versus real economic behavior
provide evidence and support for including a simple follow-up question to assess
response (un)certainty (Blumenschein et al. 2008; Blumenschein et al. 2001; Johannesson
et. al 1999). Moreover, although there remains uncertainty on the exact threshold level,
given a scale from zero to 10, recoding Yes responses based on the condition of at least
an eight has been shown to mitigate hypothetical bias (Vossler et al. 2003; Champ et al.
2009).
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While there is still much we don’t know about controlling for hypothetical bias, in a
recent meta-analysis of hypothetical-versus-real comparisons, Little and Berrens (2004)
show that use of a public good referendum elicitation format, and controlling for response
uncertainty can both significantly reduce potential upward hypothetical bias.
4.4

Theoretical and Empirical Framework
In this section, a utility-theoretic framework is presented for consumer responses to

health care coverage expansion in NM. Assuming that V(P, W, HCC, Y) is the indirect
utility function, the household’s maximum WTP for a change in health care coverage,
HCC in NM (e.g., either BASICARE or PRIMCARE) can be shown implicitly as the
income adjustments that hold household utility constant at some reference level (e.g.,
V0):
V0(P, W, HCC0, Y) = V0(P, W, HCCBASICARE, Y-WTPBASICARE)
= V0(P, W, HCCPRIMCARE, Y-WTPPRIMCARE)

(4.1)

where P is a vector of prices for other goods, W represents household characteristics,
HCC0 represents the status quo health care coverage, HCCBASICARE represents increased
health care coverage by expanding basic health care, HCPRIMCARE represents increased
health care coverage by expanding primary health care, and Y is household income.
Therefore, WTPBASICARE and WTPPRIMCARE represent the income adjustment (a decrement
in this case) that leaves a household just as well off after the change as before it, for an
increment in basic and primary health care, respectively.
In order to obtain the empirical estimates of WTP for expanding health care coverage
in New Mexico (e.g., WTPBASICARE and WTPPRIMCARE), this study applies Cameron’s
(1988) censored logistic regression approach. This technique allows for directly
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estimating WTP models based on referendum voting data. While an individual’s vote to a
proposed health care expansion plan is not directly observed in the referendum format, it
is expected that a YES vote to the referendum question will be given as long as the
LNWTPBASICARE or LNWTPPRIMCARE amount is greater or equal to the payment amount
in its logarithmic form (LNPAY) presented to the survey participant. If this is not the
case, a NO vote is expected to be given (e.g., does not support the proposed health care
expansion plan). The individual’s voting response can be inferred though a discrete
variable Z, such that:

Z = 1 if LNWTPBASICARE or LNWTPPRIMCARE ≥ LNPAY; 0 otherwise,

(4.2)

where PAY is the randomly assigned payment amount, or censoring threshold, that varies
across the different respondents. In this context, referendum data are used to estimate the
probability that LNWTPBASICARE or LNWTPPRIMCARE is greater than LNPAY or
equivalently, P(Z = 1) = P ( LNWTPBASICARE or LNWTPPRIMCARE ≥ LNPAY) (Cameron
1988). Assuming a standard logistic distribution, equation (4.2) can be rewritten in terms
of probability of a YES vote as follows:
P(Z = 1) = P ( LNWTPBASICARE or LNWTPPRIMCARE ≥ LNPAY) =
P(Xβ + ε ≥ LNPAY) = P(ε/K ≥ LNPAY/K – Xβ/K)

(4.3)

where K is a scaling factor of the logistic function, given by K = (b 3 ) / π and b the
standard error. The log-likelihood function used to estimate this probability is:

log L = Σ(1 − Z )[( LNPAY − Xβ ) / K ] − log{(1 + exp[(LNPAY − Xβ ) / K )]
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(4.4)

A significant advantage of working with referendum data is that a researcher can estimate
the β and the K coefficients separately (Cameron 1988).
Alternatively, to account for response uncertainty, the follow-up (un)certainty
question included in the survey can also be used to recode the responses to the
referendum question (Berrens et al. 2002; Li et al. 2008; Vasquez et al. 2009). In the
context of this survey, a respondent had to indicate a certainty level (CERT) to the
response given in the referendum question based on a numerical scale that goes from zero
to 100, where zero meant that an individual would not vote as stated on the hypothetical
referendum and 100 completely certain that the individual would vote as stated on the
hypothetical referendum. In particular, if the respondent’s certainty level is less than a
threshold value of certainty (CERT*), where CERT* Є {70, 75, 80, 85}, then his
response is re-coded from a YES vote to a NO vote. Therefore, a variant of equation (4.2)
is as follows:
Z´ = 1 if Z = 1 AND CERT ≥ CERT*; Z´ = 0 otherwise.

(4.5)

With this re-coded data, the log-likelihood function in equation (4.4) can be applied to
equation (4.6) by assuming that the error term follows a logistic distribution.
Finally, for the estimation results for the WTP models with and without certainty
correction, this paper relies on calculation of a median WTP measure. In addition to its
majority rule interpretation in a referendum context, this measure is typically a
conservative estimator and more robust than mean WTP estimates, which can be highly
sensitive to outliers and the distribution of YES responses (Imber et al. 1993; Harrison
and Kristrom 1996).

118

4.5

Sample Data and Hypotheses
Building from the original survey design used in Berrens et al. (1999), this study uses

data from a statewide random-digital telephone survey sample. The survey was
conducted between October 12 and December 13, 2007, and included 1,076 complete and
182 partial interviews. The overall survey response rate was 53 percent and the
cooperation rate was 63 percent.71 The University of New Mexico Institute for Public
Policy (IPP) Survey Research Center used a computer assisted telephone interview
(CATI) system to conduct the telephone surveys.72 Standard protocols included 10 call
attempts per random-digit dialing (RDD) number, respondent appointment tracking and
follow-up, and reluctant respondent persuasion where necessary.
Table 4.1 presents definitions and weighted descriptive statistics of the dependent and
independent variables used to estimate the WTP model outlined in equations (4.2) and
(4.5), for the referendum with no certainty correction and referendum with certainty
corrections.73 The dummy variables CERT70, CERT75, CERT80, and CERT85 are used
71 Cooperation rate is the number of completed interviews divided by the number of

contacted eligible respondents. In this case, an eligible household was an individual who
was 18 years of age or older. Final disposition rates were calculated using the American
Association for Public Opinion Response Rate calculator (AAPOR 2003) using Response
and Cooperation Rate 3.
72

The IPP is fully compliant with federal requirements pertaining to human subjects

research protections protocols.
73

To account for the presence of potential sample bias in this telephone survey, where

only households with phone lines could potentially be selected while the information
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to estimate the effect of response (un)certainty on WTP. The effect that a change in the
scope of health care expansion has on individuals’ WTP is measured by the dummy
variable BASICARE (e.g., basic health care [inclusive good] vs primary health care
[subset good] proposals). The dummy variable TAXES captures the effect that the
payment vehicle through which a health care expansion plan is financed has on WTP
(e.g., increase in state and local taxes vs. increase in insurance premiums).
The variables PROGIMP and PROVISION are included to measure the effects of
households’ perception about the importance of affordable health care programs, and
health care provision on WTP for expanding health care. The respondents’ characteristics
include AGE, AGESQ, INCOME, ethnicity (WHITE, HISP, OTHERACE), employment
status (EMPSTAT), political ideology (IDEO), and voting registration status
(REGVOTE). To capture the effect that a respondent’s health status has on WTP, two
variables are included: BMI, PERCEHEALTH. The former (BMI) is used as a proxy for
a respondent’s actual health condition as opposed to a respondent’s perceived health

from those without phone lines is not gathered, two types of weights are used: adult
weight and demographic weights. The adult weight applied to the survey data is:
7

Adult weight = (Number of adults 18 and over in home i)/ (number of phone lines in

home i)
In addition, four different demographic weights are employed to better reflect the
population distribution in New Mexico: Ethnicity/race, income, gender, and age.
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status (PERCHEALTH) based on a scale ranging from 1 (poor) to 4 (excellent). The
dummy variable COVERAGE estimates the effect of having health insurance on WTP.74
In addition to estimating WTP of a representative household to expand health care
coverage in NM, this paper is structured around four specific hypotheses regarding the
household support for such a program. The first hypothesis pertains to the notion that
support for expanding health care coverage is conditioned on the dollar amount
individuals are faced with paying. In particular, ex-ante the expectation is that the greater
the dollar amount the lower the probability of a YES vote, which translates to a positive
scale parameter (since K is the negative inverse of the payment amount (PAY) coefficient
in a logit model). Against the null hypothesis of no effect, the test is:
H1: K > 0.
The expectation is that the alternative hypothesis (H1) would be accepted and therefore,
that the variable PAY would have a negative effect on the probability of voting YES on
the referendum question. This also represents a basic construct validity test for DC or
referendum data (Cameron 1988).
The second hypothesis is based on the premise that the type of payment vehicle
utilized to expand health care coverage will have a significant effect on the respondents’
WTP. In particular, two payment vehicles are considered in the survey: raise state and/or
local taxes or increase insurance premiums. In the estimated model, this enters as a
dummy variable (TAXES = 1 if increase in state and local taxes; 0 = increase in

74

A series of t-tests suggest that there are no statistically significant differences between

the independent variables’ means for both the basic care and primary care samples.
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insurance premiums). The expectation is that WTP amounts under a state and/or local tax
increase would be higher than that under an insurance premium increase as evidenced by
a recent Health Tracking Poll (The Kaiser Family Foundation 2009a). Against the null
hypothesis of no difference between these two payment vehicles, the test is:
H2: βTAXES > 0
To further inform the current health care reform debate, this study presents a test of
scope sensitivity. Following Bateman et al. (2008), the non-parametric Wilcoxon-MannWhitney test is used to assess whether median WTP for the inclusive good (basic health
care) is at least equal to that of the subset good (primary care). Standard economic theory
suggests that the WTP for the inclusive good (basic care) should be no less (e.g., not
necessarily higher) than that of the subset good (primary care) (Bateman et al. 2008).
Therefore, the expectation is that respondents are sensitive to the different dimensions of
health care expansion being valued:
H3: WTPBASICARE ≥ WTPPRIMCARE
A rejection of H3 would indicate that the WTP values derived by the CV method are
inconsistent with economic theory and thus exhibit anomalous preferences (Bateman et
al. 2008).
This paper also evaluates the effect that response (un)certainty has on WTP estimates
based on the voting response re-coding using the follow-up uncertainty question. In
particular, it is expected that the following ordering of the median WTP estimates will
hold:
H4: WTPNo Certainty Correction > WTPCERT70 > WTPCERT75 >WTPCERT80 > WTPCERT85
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Since the percentage of YES votes decreases with higher certainty threshold levels, WTP
is expected to be lower as we move from WTPNo Certainty Correction to WTPCERT85. In this
case, we are examining not only whether this ordering holds but also the whether the
differences in WTP among these certainty-corrected WTP estimates are statistically
significant (Li et al. 2009).
4.6

Empirical Results
Table 4.2 provides a summary profile of the characteristics of the survey respondents,

appropriately weighted to account for sample bias that may arise in part due to the survey
being conducted via the telephone. Despite the exclusion of households without a
telephone, the survey profile corresponds quite well when compared to the 2007
American Community Survey (ACS). The majority of the respondents had an associate
or higher degree with a reported median annual household income of $45,000 compared
to $42,102 reported in the 2007 ACS, respectively. The majority of the respondents with
health insurance were satisfied with their coverage (43 percent “Excellent,” and 42
percent “Good”), which corresponds generally with how most Americans feel about their
insurance coverage at a national level (The Kaiser Family Foundation 2009d).
Econometric results for a set of referendum models, with varying levels of
(un)certainty recoding are presented in Table 4.3. The five separate WTP models are:
referendum WTP with no certainty correction (Model 1); referendum WTP with CERT
higher or equal to 70 percent (Model 2); referendum WTP with CERT higher or equal to
75 percent (Model 3); referendum WTP with CERT higher or equal to 80 percent (Model
4); referendum WTP with CERT higher or equal to 85 percent (Model 5). As an indicator
of the overall goodness of fit and the validity of the fitted WTP models, the McFadden R2
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values ranges between 0.23 and 0.34. Further, across the set of models, the estimated
coefficients on all the significant variables have the expected signs. While the results in
Table 4.3 show an important degree of robustness across these models, there are
considerable differences in WTP estimates.
A number of significant statistical determinants of WTP can be identified. In terms of
explanatory variables, the estimated coefficient on the scale parameter (K) is statistically
significant (0.01 level) across the different re-coding levels, implying that respondents
are sensitive to the price (Cameron 1988; Whitehead 1995). The positive sign indicates
that the support from New Mexican households for expanding heath care services
decreases as the payment amount they are required to pay to accomplish this goal
increases; thus, the evidence supports hypothesis H1. The payment vehicle (TAXES) is
positive and statistically significant across all the recoding levels. This suggests that the
median WTP levels associate with a tax increase is higher than that of an insurance
premium increase (e.g., the base case in these models); thus, the evidence supports
hypothesis H2.
A number of other explanatory variables that represent socio-economic status also
influence median WTP. The estimated coefficient on the attitudinal variable PROGIMP
(respondent’s perceived importance that affordable programs be provided to cover unmet
needs for health care), is positive and statistically significant (0.01 level). The more
important a respondent’s belief that affordable programs need to be provided to cover
unmet health care needs, the higher the WTP. In particular, results suggest that the top
priority includes those individuals with preexisting conditions (COVERPREX) and
uninsured children (COVERKIDS). The estimated coefficient on INC, household income
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level, is positive and statistically significant (0.01 level). This indicates that the
expansions in health care coverage evaluated here are normal goods (e.g., the median
WTP for both services increases as income increases) (Whitehead, 1995). The AGE
variable indicates that the older the individual the lower the dollar amount willing to pay
to expand health care coverage. Age squared (AGESQR) shows that the relationship
between age and WTP is linear, implying that the decrease in WTP is constant with
respect to age.
Further, the political variables have the expected sign: the coefficient on voter
registration (VOTEREG) is positive, but only significant in Model 1 (no certainty
correction) and Models 2 and 3 (CERT 70 and CERT75). The variable IDEO is negative
and significant across the different re-coding levels. Thus, as expected, the more liberal a
respondent is the greater the median WTP for a given increment of basic health care or
primary care. The effect of race/ethnicity on median WTP is statistically insignificant
across all the (un)certainty assumptions. That is, in this “majority minority” state, we
observe no race/ethnicity effects for expansion of health care coverage.
The estimated coefficient on CVPOLICY is positive and significant (0.01 level). This
indicates that respondents who believe that a CV survey method is a good way for policy
makers to inform choices about health care coverage in NM, the higher the annual
median WTP for the given increment in basic and primary health care. A strong majority
of the sample indicated that asking WTP questions is a suitable instrument to inform NM
health care policy (mean value for CVPOLICY is 78 percent). This provides some
modicum of support that the hypothetical referendum satisfies Carson et al. (2000)
validity criterion of being a “consequential” CV survey question. Thus, respondents are
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likely to perceive the hypothetical referendum question as a unique opportunity to reveal
their preferences, minimizing the probability of strategic behavior.
Using primary health care coverage expansion (e.g., BASICARE = 0) as the base
case, the estimated coefficient for BASICARE is positive across all models and
statistically significant in Models 3, 4, and 5 (CERT70, CERT80, and CERT85,
respectively). This provides evidence for the scope test that WTPBASICARE is higher than
WTPPRIMCARE (e.g., hypothesis H3).
Based on these estimated coefficients, the annual median WTP values for each health
care coverage expansion with the corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals are
reported in Table 4.4. The median WTP values decrease as the (un)certainty threshold
level (CERT*) increases, thus evidencing that re-coding provides increasingly
conservative estimates of the median WTP for both health care expansions. The highest
median WTP estimates, $942 for BASICARE and $819 for PRIMCARE, is observed in
Model 1, which does not take account of any preference uncertainty. For the (un)certainty
re-coded models, median WTP values for BASICARE ranges from $447 (CERT70) to
$128 (CERT85) compared to $320 (CERT70) to $71 (CERT85) for PRIMCARE.75
75

In the study most closely related to our own (and upon which the current survey

builds), Berrens et al. (1999) used a statewide telephone survey in NM (n = 3,179), and a
public good referendum format to estimate households’ annual WTP to provide increased
coverage for basic health care. In particular, nine different health service increments that
compose basic health care are evaluated: eye exams, dental services, prescription drug,
primary care provider, medical specialists, hospitalization, behavioral health, alternative
practitioner, and home health care. Using a CV format and a split-sample design, this
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Tables 4.5 and 4.6 present formal tests of hypotheses H3 (e.g., WTPBASICARE ≥
WTPPRIMCARE)
and H4 (e.g., WTP decreases as (un)certainty threshold level increases from WTPNo
CertaintyCorrection

to WTPCERT85) based on Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum test. A number

of recent studies (Bateman et al. 2008; Plott and Zeiler 2005; Olsen et al. 2004; Lee et al.
2005) have tested the statistical significance of difference across distributions using the
rank-sum test. In particular, this test shows that not only WTPBASICARE is higher than
WTPPRIMCARE but this difference is statistically significant across all models; thus, the
evidence supports hypothesis H3 (Table 4.5).
As other CV studies have found (Vossler et al. 2003; Little and Berrens 2004;
Vazquez et al. 2009), the rank-sum test also indicates that higher (un)certainty correction
criteria corresponds with lower median WTP values and that these values are statistically

paper provides relative rankings for these nine increments based on estimated household
WTP. The results show that primary care services is ranked the highest with a mean WTP
of $279 (in 2007 $) followed by services of medical specialists ($270), based on an 80
percent certainty correction (e.g., CERT ≥ 80). Based on Model 3 (CERT80), the
estimated mean WTP for expanding primary care services is $406, which represents a
45.5 percent increase in the public’s valuation for such an expansion ($406/$279). This
suggests that not only are households willing to pay for decreasing the number of New
Mexicans without primary care coverage, but also that support may have increased in
2007 relative to1999. More cautiously, since there are some differences in specifications,
we have no evidence that support for expansion of primary care coverage has declined
since 1999 in New Mexico.
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different from each other. As Table 4.6 shows, the differences in median WTP
corresponds with the order outlined in hypothesis H4. Thus, the median WTP values
reported for each (un)certainty correction criteria comes from different distributions, and
the ordering evidence supports hypothesis H4. Uncertainty corrections clearly matter in
understanding this stated preference data.
4.61 Political Viability of Universal Health Care in New Mexico
To better understand the policy implications of the case study results, it is useful to
assess whether providing basic health care coverage to the adult, non-elderly uninsured
population (between 18 and 64 years old) financed with a state tax increase in New
Mexico is politically viable (i.e., would it obtain majority support). As Table 4.2 shows,
the percentage of YES responses significantly decreases as the (un)certainty threshold
level (CERT*) increases. In particular, both health care coverage expansion plans would
not achieve a majority support for (un)certainty levels 80 and 85 percent (e.g., CERT80
and CERT85). Using the results reported in Table 4.5 for BASICARE = 1 (e.g., basic
care coverage expansion), a thought experiment is proposed where the percentage of YES
responses is estimated under three different scenarios: insuring all uninsured New
Mexicans, insuring half of the uninsured New Mexicans, and insuring one-quarter of the
uninsured New Mexicans. Estimating the percentage of YES votes allows evaluation of
whether a majority of New Mexicans (e.g. 50 percent or above) would support such a
reform. In this setting, predicted WTP amounts based on equation (4.2) is compared to
the tax increase that each respondent would have to sustain to achieve each of the
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coverage scenarios mentioned above.76 Conditional on a YES response to the specific
amount asked in the survey, a predicted YES vote for individual i and scenario j can be
expressed as follow:
Predicted (VOTE)ij = 1 if VOTEi = 1 AND TAXINCi ≤ WTPˆi ; else 0,

(4.6)

where a YES response to the contingent valuation question is recoded to 1 under the
different (un)certainty correction criteria, j = insuring all uninsured, insuring half
uninsured, and insuring quarter uninsured; TAXINC is the amount that individual i would
have to pay (in increase taxes) to fully cover the costs under scenario j; and WTPˆi
amounts are estimated based on the coefficients reported in Table 4.3. While VOTEi and
WTPˆi are known from the survey’s reported responses and the estimated models,

respectively, TAXINC i has yet to be estimated. Following the methodology in Kessler
and Brady (2009), the tax increase for individual i is estimated as follows:
Tax _ increaseij =

cost of reducing uninsuredj
Personalincome tax revenues(2006)

* average tax ratei (2006) * household incomei (2006)

where personal income tax revenues represent total income taxes collected from
individuals in 2006, the average tax ratei is the state income average tax rate that
individual i has to pay according to the State of New Mexico Taxation and Revenue
department and household income levels are those reported by each survey respondent.77

76

We can also predict YES votes by plugging in the estimated WTP in equation (5) and

estimating the percentage of YES responses. However, this would not take into account
the “true” tax increase that would be required to achieve such a reform.
77

In 2006, NM average tax rates by income brackets were:
0.018 if household incomei < 10,000
0.033 if 10,000 ≤ household incomei ≤ 25,000
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While the costs required for extending coverage to the uninsured population in New
Mexico are still unclear, this thought experiment uses the New Mexico Human Services
Secretary figures presented at the 2008 NM State Legislature session: $30 million in
fiscal year 2010 and additional costs of $72 million over the next five years under the
Governor’s plan.78 The total costs based on these estimates are $390 million.79 Figure 1
shows the predicted YES responses based on equation (4.7). As expected, within each
coverage scenario, the percentage of YES responses decreases as the (un)certainty
response-recoding threshold increases. Moreover, as the expansion coverage plan
decreases from 100 percent to 25 percent of uninsured adult New Mexicans, the
percentage of YES responses increases significantly. However, a slight majority support
(50.7 percent) for providing coverage to all the uninsured adult population is achieved
only when no vote recoding is implemented. These results suggest that public support for
expanding health care coverage financed with an increase in state taxes is sensitive to

0.046 if 26,000 ≤ household incomei ≤ 96,000
0.053 if 96,000 ≤ household incomei.
Source: http://www.tax.state.nm.us/forms/year06/2006RATETABLES.pdf. In 2006,
personal income tax revenues totaled $1.5 billion (U.S. Census Bureau 2006).
78

These figures were based on a cost analysis prepared by the Mathematica Policy

Research Group. However, earlier in November 2008 significantly higher estimates of
$75 million in FY2010 and $333 million over the next five years were presented to the
legislature.
79

In 2006, there were 346,800 individuals between the ages of 18 and 64 without

insurance in NM (Current Population Survey 2007).
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both the total cost assumed for such a reform and assumption made about response
certainty (i.e., threshold for vote recoding). As other studies have found at a national level
(Kessler and Brady 2009)80, this thought experiment suggests that while New Mexicans
widely support a health care reform, they appear to lack sufficient political will to
support financing it with higher taxes (even if they tend to prefer increased taxes to
increased insurance premiums).
However, two important aspects of this analysis may underestimate the public’s
support for such a reform. First, while in this study the cost of expanding either basic or
primary health care coverage falls entirely on the tax payers, there is the possibility that
reform can be financed in part through cost savings resulted from the reform (e.g., see
Chernow et al. 2009). This may actually lower the estimated cost used in this thought
experiment, which would increase the support for such a reform. Second, in the
contingent valuation question, respondents are asked WTP amounts to cover all
uninsured individuals as opposed to certain groups. While a majority support is not
achieved to cover all uninsured New Mexicans, it may be the case that a majority could
be achieved if expansion of health care only included individuals with preexisting or
chronic conditions. While the aggregate WTP estimate is lower than total costs for
expanding coverage to all uninsured individuals, results indicate that top priorities for
respondents include broadening coverage for children and for individuals with
preexisting conditions. This suggests that a reasonable first step that may achieve

80

Kessler and David (2009) also found that while Americans support some type of health

care reform, they are reluctant to pay higher taxes to finance it.
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majority support and reduce the number of uninsured would be to expand health coverage
to people with preexisting conditions.
4.7

Conclusions
Beyond just charity motivations, because health care delivery systems may be

negatively affected by high uninsurance rates (Pauly and Pagan 2007), it may be in the
self interest of all households to be concerned about the most vulnerable populations.
This study applied the survey-based CV method to empirically estimate the median WTP
per year for expanding health care coverage to the uninsured population in New Mexico.
An RDD telephone survey sample with a hypothetical referendum format for asking
valuation questions, and an increase in either state and local taxes or insurance premiums
as the payment vehicle for expanding health care coverage, was used to evaluate
household support for two categorically-nested goods : (i) basic health care; and (ii)
primary health care. Since the services offered under basic health care encompass and
exceed that of primary health care, standard economic theory suggests that the WTP for
the inclusive good, basic care, should be at least no less (but not necessarily higher) than
that of the subset good, primary care (Bateman et al. 2008). After carefully controlling
for response uncertainty and relying on a robust and conservative median WTP estimator,
results how: (i) there is evidence of scope sensitivity (Carson and Mitchell 1995), as a
measure of validity; (ii) that the type of payment vehicle matters in this health policy
context, as increases in state and local taxes are preferred to higher insurance premiums;
(iii) WTP results are highly sensitive to how response uncertainty is handled, consistent
with the accumulating body of evidence from CV meta-analysis (Little and Berrens
2004); and (iv) while results provide evidence that households are willing to pay
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significant positive amounts for the expansion and provision of health care to the
uninsured in NM, a state “universal health coverage plan” would not achieve majority
support among New Mexicans, once response (un)certainty and costs are accounted for,
and no matter which payment vehicle is proposed (higher taxes or increased premiums).
Results indicate that policies aimed at extending coverage to wider segments of the
population will garner greater public support if they are aimed at providing residents with
basic care. Yet, much of the value (approximately 75%) of extending basic care is based
on primary care (i.e., access to a primary care physician), and this additional benefit
would have to be considered against incremental program costs in any full benefit-cost
analysis. Although clear differences emerge as more restrictive certainty level
assumptions are applied, our results suggest that funds generated from increasing taxes or
premiums can be rather substantial. For example, the range of the median WTPBASICARE
drops from $942 (no certainty correction) to $128 (CERT85, and from $819 (no certainty
correction) to $71 (CERT85) for the median WTPPRIMCARE. Based on the more
conservative CERT85 response re-coding model, the aggregate WTP amounts for
expanding basic care and primary care are $177 million and $129 million per year,
respectively. However, while such a referendum would appear to pass a benefit-cost
analysis (BCA), it might fail to achieve a majority support for passing any public
referendum. As other studies have found (Kessler and Brady 2009), this thought
experiment suggests that while New Mexican may widely express support for health care
reform, they may be collectively and politically unwilling to finance expansion to all the
uninsured, with either higher taxes or increased premiums. As such, the results also
suggest that an incremental approach, in the search for majority support (and presumably
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more political support), might be to expand health care coverage to specific segments of
the population such as individuals with chronic conditions. It appears that such
incremental packages would have to be carefully tailored to achieve majority public
support. We leave the evaluation of specific incremental approaches to future research.
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Table 4.1: Definitions and Weighted Descriptive Statistics for Variables in the WTP Models
BASIC
+PRIMARY
(N=953)
Mean

Variable

Descriptions

AGE
AGESQ
MALE

Respondent’s age
Age * Age
Indicator variable of gender: 0=female,
1=male
Employment status of respondent:
1=full-time, else =0
Indicator variables of respondent’s political ideology varying from 1 to 7, with
1=strongly liberal, 7=strongly conservative
Indicator variable of respondent’s vote
registration, 1=registered to vote,
else=0
Indicator variable of race: 1=Hispanic,
else =0
Indicator variable of race: 1=white nonHispanic, else =0
Indicator variable of race: 1=Native
America/Black/Asian, else =0
Repondent’s perceived importance that
affordable programs be provided to
cover unmet needs for health care in
NM. 0-10 scale, with 0=not at all important and 10=extremely important
Indicator variable of payment vehicle:
1=Taxes, else =0
Randomly assigned health care coverage, 0=primary care provider, 1=basic
health care
Number of children in the household under 17 yearls old: 1 = if children in
household, else =0
Repondent’s actual health status based
on BMI Index, with underweight=1,
obese=4

EMPSTAT
IDEO

REGVOTE

HISP
WHITE
OTHERACE
PROGIMP

TAXES
BASICARE

CHILDNUM

BMI
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BASIC PRIMARY
CARE
CARE
(N=474) (N=479)
Mean
Mean

43
2,157
0.49

42
2,065
0.49

0.45
2,248
0.49

0.66

0.64

0.64

3.84

3.87

3.82

0.84

0.86

0.83

0.41

0.42

0.40

0.48

0.46

0.49

0.11

0.42

0.40

8.36

8.49

8.30

0.50

0.50

0.51

0.49

1

1

0.45

0.47

0.45

2.86

2.86

2.84

Table 4.1: Definitions and Weighted Descriptive Statistics for Variables in the WTP Models
(cont’d)

Variable

BASIC
+PRIMARY
(N=953)
Mean

Descriptions

PERCHEALTH

Repondent’s perceived health status
ranging from 1 to 4, with 1=poor, 4=excellent
CVPOLICY
Repondent’s opinion on whether CV is
a good way fo decision makers to make
policy about NM health care: CVPOLICY = 1 if good way, else = 0
COVERPREX
Repondent’s view on whether basic
health care coverage should be provided
to individuals with high care needs
or pre-existing conditions in NM: 1 =
strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree
COVERADULT Repondent’s view on whether basic
health care coverage should be provided
to the uninsured adult population in
NM: 1 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly
agree
COVERKIDS
Repondent’s view on whether basic
health care coverage should be provided
to all uninsured children in NM: 1 =
strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree
COVERUNDOC Repondent’s view on whether basic
health care coverage should be provided
to undocumented immigrants in NM: 1
= strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree
COVERUNEM
Repondent’s view on whether basic
health care coverage should be provided
to the unemployed in NM: 1 = strongly
disagree, 4 = strongly agree
COVEREGARD Repondent’s view on whether basic
health care coverage should be provided regardless of changes in someone’s
health in NM: 1 = strongly disagree, 4
= strongly agree
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BASIC PRIMARY
CARE
CARE
(N=474) (N=479)
Mean
Mean

3.11

3.08

3.08

0.78

0.81

0.79

3.00

3.03

3.00

2.78

2.74

2.80

3.38

3.40

2.37

2.07

2.06

2.08

2.78

2.76

2.78

3.01

3.04

3.03

Table 4.1: Definitions and Weighted Descriptive Statistics for Variables in the WTP Models
(cont’d)
BASIC
+PRIMARY
(N=953)
Mean

Variable

Descriptions

COVERAGE

Repondent’s health care coverage status: 1 = continuous coverage in the past
12 months, else = 0
Randomly assigned payment amount
($2007 US), from $10 to $1000
Indicator variable of respondent’s voting for a health program for all New
Mexican, 0=No, Yes=1
Respondent’s certainty level on their
referendum voting decisin, on a 0-100
scale: 0=absolutely certain to vote NO,
1=absolutely certain to vote YES
Indicator variable of respondent’s voting decision, 1=YES and CERT ≥ 70,
else =0
Indicator variable of respondent’s voting decision, 1=YES and CERT ≥ 75,
else =0
Indicator variable of respondent’s voting decision, 1=YES and CERT ≥ 80,
else =0
Indicator variable of respondent’s voting decision, 1=YES and CERT ≥ 85,
else =0
Annual Household Income

PAY
VOTE

CERT

CERT70

CERT75

CERT80

CERT85

INC1
1

BASIC PRIMARY
CARE
CARE
(N=474) (N=479)
Mean
Mean

0.73

0.74

0.75

324

326

330

0.79

0.78

0.79

76.93

76.64

75.66

0.58

0.61

0.64

0.55

0.57

0.58

0.49

0.49

0.51

0.42

0.42

0.43

5.02

5.18

5.06

Household income, 16 categories in $1,000s: 1=≤10, 2=$10-20, 3=$20-30, 4=$30-40,
5=$40-50, 6=$50-60, 7=$60-70, 8=$70-80, 9=$80-90, 10=$90-100, 11=$100-110, 12=$110120, 13=$120-130, 14=$130-140, 15=$140-150, 16=≥150.
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Table 4.2: Weighted Respondent Profiles
Description
Mean Std. Dev.
White, Non-Hispanic
48%
0.49
Hispanic
41%
0.50
Other Race
11%
0.31
Associate Degree or Higher
70%
0.48
Annual Household Income ($)
45,000
39,522
Number of Children in the Household
1
1.30
Percentage of Respondents between 18 85%
0.36
and 64 of Age
Part-Time or Full-Time Employment
63%
0.76
Health Insurance (does not include 70%
0.46
Medicare)
Health Care Rating (GOOD or Excel- 85%
0.20
lent)
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Table 4.3: Estimation Results, Dependent Variable = log(Unobserved WTP)

Variable
AGE
AGESQ
MALE
EMPSTAT
INCOME
IDEO
REGVOTE
HISP
OTHERACE
PROGIMP
TAXES
BASICARE
CHILDNUM
BMI
PERCHEALTH
CVPOLICY
COVERPREX
COVERADULTS

Model 1:
No Certainty
Correction

Model 2:
CERT70

Model 3:
CERT75

Model 4:
CERT80

Model 5:
CERT85

-0.12***
(0.04)
0.00***
(0.00)
-0.19
(0.21)
0.07
(0.26)
0.09**
(0.05)
-0.13**
(0.06)
0.54**
(0.26)
-0.16
(0.23)
-0.05
(0.34)
0.18***
(0.05)
0.58***
(0.23)
0.03
(0.20)
-0.17
(0.23)
0.14
(0.12)
0.36***
(0.13)
0.60**
(0.22)
0.46**
(0.19)

-0.12***
(0.04)
0.00*
(0.00)
-0.45***
(0.17)
-0.11
(0.22)
0.25***
(0.04)
-0.14***
(0.05)
0.60*
(0.33)
-0.25
(0.23)
-0.10
(0.28)
0.19***
(0.05)
0.60***
(0.20)
0.17
(0.19)
-0.50***
(0.20)
0.12
(0.13)
0.37**
(0.13)
0.75***
(0.20)
0.67***
(0.25)

-0.10**
(0.04)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.50***
(0.17)
0.23
(0.21)
0.30***
(0.04)
-0.26***
(0.05)
0.85**
(0.23)
-0.24
(0.23)
-0.11
(0.28)
0.27***
(0.05)
0.81***
(0.19)
0.37**
(0.16)
-0.92***
(0.18)
0.11
(0.10)
0.32**
(0.10)
0.74***
(0.19)
0.95***
(0.26)

-0.10**
(0.03)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.83***
(0.16)
0.28
(0.21)
0.36***
(0.04)
-0.16*
(0.05)
0.21
(0.22)
-0.25
(0.24)
-0.24
(0.27)
0.31***
(0.05)
1.42***
(0.18)
0.38**
(0.19)
-1.16***
(0.18)
0.11
(0.10)
0.55***
(0.10)
0.58***
(0.19)
0.82***
(0.29)

-0.10***
(0.03)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.30
(0.17)
0.46
(0.22)
0.27***
(0.04)
-0.17**
(0.05)
0.25
(0.23)
-0.23
(0.24)
-0.22
(0.27)
0.37***
(0.05)
1.13***
(0.19)
0.36**
(0.18)
-0.62**
(0.18)
0.14
(0.10)
0.25*
(0.10)
0.51
(0.20)
1.07***
(0.27)

0.23

0.00

0.17

0.80***

0.83***
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Table 4.3: Estimation Results, Dependent Variable = log(Unobserved WTP) (contd)

Variable

COVERKIDS
COVERUNDOC
COVERUNEM
COVEREGARD
COVERAGE
INTERCEP
k (scale parameter)
Pseudo R2

Model 1:
No Certainty
Correction

Model 2:
CERT70

Model 3:
CERT75

Model 4:
CERT80

Model 5:
CERT85

(0.17)
0.16
(0.16)
0.09
(0.14)
0.54***
(0.17)
0.17
(0.16)
-0.25
(0.27)
4.85***
(1.22)
0.93***
(0.10)
0.34

(0.23)
0.66***
(0.21)
0.00
(0.17)
0.21
(0.21)
0.06
(0.22)
-0.04
(0.21)
2.85**
(1.22)
1.52***
(0.07)
0.26

(0.22)
0.53**
(0.21)
0.14
(0.17)
-0.01
(0.23)
0.09
(0.22)
-0.10
(0.21)
2.12***
(0.91)
1.60***
(0.06)
0.23

(0.25)
0.69***
(0.24)
0.08
(0.18)
0.39
(0.24)
-0.16
(0.25)
0.09
(0.20)
2.75***
(0.90)
1.82***
(0.06)
0.23

(0.23)
0.63***
(0.22)
-0.02
(0.16)
0.12
(0.23)
-0.17
(0.23)
0.14
(0.20)
2.92***
(0.92)
1.47***
(0.06)
0.23

*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
( )a : Standard deviation
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Table 4.4: Estimated Median WTP ($)

Median
95% CI
WTP Lower Bound

Model 1: No Certainty
Correction
BASICARE = 1
BASICARE = 0
Model 2: CERT70
BASICARE = 1
BASICARE = 0
Model 3: CERT75
BASICARE = 1
BASICARE = 0
Model 4: CERT80
BASICARE = 1
BASICARE = 0
Model 5: CERT85
BASICARE = 1
BASICARE = 0

95% CI
Upper Bound

Median WTP
as Percentage
of Median
Household
Income

942
819

669
626

1566
1199

2.09%
1.82%

467
320

314
221

795
519

1.04%
0.71%

372
254

254
174

601
405

0.83%
0.56%

186
127

125
75

285
208

0.41%
0.28%

128
71

88
44

183
106

0.28%
0.16%

Note: 95% confidence intervals based on Krinsky and Robb (1986) procedure
with 5,000 simulation draws.

141

Table 4.5: Median WTP Differences (Hypothesis 3)
P(WTPBASICARE > WTPPRIMCARE )
Model 1: No Certanty
Correction
Model 2: CERT70
Model 3: CERT75
Model 4: CERT80
Model 5: CERT85

P = 0.70 (pvalue < 0.01)
P
P
P
P

=
=
=
=

0.89
0.88
0.89
0.98

(pvalue
(pvalue
(pvalue
(pvalue

<
<
<
<

0.01)
0.01)
0.01)
0.01)

Note: Probabilities based on Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test
(Rank-sum test)
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Table 4.6: Median WTP Differences (Hypothesis 4)

P(WTPNo Certanty Correction > WTPCERT70 )
P(WTPCERT70 > WTPCERT75 )
P(WTPCERT75 > WTPCERT80 )
P(WTPCERT80 > WTPCERT85 )

P
P
P
P

BASICARE = 1
BASICARE = 0
= 0.98 (pvalue < 0.01) P = 0.99 (pvalue < 0.01)
= 0.77 (pvalue < 0.01) P = 0.78 (pvalue < 0.01)
= 0.99 (pvalue < 0.01) P = 0.98 (pvalue < 0.01)
= 0.92 (pvalue < 0.01) P = 0.96 (pvalue < 0.01)

Note: Probabilities based on Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test (Rank-sum test)
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Figure 4.1: Predicted YES Responses for Expanding Basic Health Care (Cost of
Providing Insurance to all non-elderly uninsured New Mexicans: $390 million)
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Chapter 5
Summary and Conclusions: Evaluating empirical evidence for allocating resources
with public good attributes

The allocation of resources with public good attributes requires a careful accounting
of the costs and benefits of the different allocation schemes to achieve their most
beneficial and fair use. This has been the case in the policy debate for managing public
forest lands and for providing health care coverage in the United States. In both cases, the
challenge for policymakers is related to the fact that these goods generate benefits that are
beyond those captured in their market prices. For many public lands, such as inventoried
roadless areas (IRAs), the debate centers on whether to open them for development or
managing them as protected areas. In the case of health care, the policy question is
whether the private market results in a level of health care coverage that is lower than the
efficient outcome. The presence of positive externalities has been at the center of the
debate over whether universal health care is a socially optimal provision of health
coverage.
In light of these debates, this work applies two methods for valuing changes in the
provision of public lands and health care coverage: revealed preference method and the
contingent valuation method (CVM). The former estimates offsite benefits of protecting
public lands and the CVM estimates individuals’ willingness to pay for expanding health
care coverage.
One goal of this work has been to improve the understating of the role that forest
lands and other natural amenities play in an economy. The broad hypothesis is that the
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role of public lands extends beyond the traditional view of inputs of production (e.g.,
extractive uses). The benefits that these lands may generate in their pristine status (e.g.,
ecosystem services) require recognition of these values to implement a proper
management process of these lands. In light of petitions filed by various U.S. states to
maintain the status of IRAs as roadless lands, chapters 2 and 3 report off-site benefits that
these land may generate. Since these benefits represent only a portion of IRAs’ total
economic value (TEV) as protected lands, these values can be interpreted as lower bound
estimates (Loomis and Richardson 2000; Berrens et al. 2006).81 The results in chapters 2
and 3, suggest that the role of public forests, such as IRAs, cannot be limited to inputs of
production. Using a utility theory framework, hedonic results support the hypothesis that
implicit prices for forest characteristics are paid through the housing and labor markets.
This suggests that the presence of natural amenities partially determines housing prices
and the amount and distribution of human capital across a region. These implicit price
results also provide evidence that where people live and what jobs they have is affected
by natural amenities.
81

These benefits are a component of the larger bundle of ecosystem services and non-

market benefits that protected lands may offer. For instance, there may also be on-site
recreation values, and passive use values that are not captured in the housing or labor
markets. Loomis (1996) reviews evidence from various contingent valuation studies that
passive use values may represent a significant percentage, and sometimes a majority
proportion, of the TEV associated with protected forest areas in the U.S. This suggests
that off-site amenity values to residents, as measured here, might represent just one of
several significant components of the TEV.
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The results in chapters 2 and 3 also provide further evidence on the importance of
spatial considerations in non-market valuation techniques such as hedonic price
functions. A recurring issue when using geographic data is the specification of spatial
relationship between observations. A common assumption in hedonic analyses is that, for
instance, the value of house j is determined only by the independent characteristics
associated with that house and not the values and characteristics of neighboring homes.
Two conceptual models are applied to address spatially-dependent relationships: the
spatial lag and the spatial error models. In the context of the housing market, a spatial lag
model assumes that one’s housing price is explained by that house’s structural, locational,
and neighborhood characteristics. The hypothesis is that the weighted average of
neighborhood’s housing values partially explains the price of an individual house. In this
case, the presence of a significant spatial lagged coefficient indicates that ignoring this
would result in biased and inconsistent estimators. The spatial error model assumes that
spatial dependence arises due to the omission of variables that are related in space. Thus,
ordinary least square estimators would be unbiased but inefficient.
Chapter 2, using Census tracts as the level of observation, shows that for the State of
NM, the higher the percentage of IRA lands in a census tract, the higher the value of the
houses. Based on a hypothetical policy experiment, which supposed a decrease of IRA
lands as protected areas in NM, on the margin, the total housing value would decrease by
3.5 percent across the state. This would suggest a population shift to other locations that
would become relatively more attractive. However, and as it is the case in other studies
that looked at the role of forest amenities (e.g., Hand et al. 2008), the nature of the data
raise some issues. Since the geographic data used in this study pertain to census tract-
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defined locations, the possibility of measurement errors due to geographic aggregation
bias requires careful interpretation of the econometric results. A spatial-lag model
specification partially addresses this bias by allowing spatial effects among houses that
go beyond those delineated by the aggregated geographic boundaries (e.g., census tracts).
However, given that the size of the census tracts significantly varies upon the location
(e.g., rural areas tend to be much larger census tracts compared to urban areas) creating
precise distance measures to location-specific amenities would be a difficult task. For
instance, disaggregating large census tracts to match smaller census tracts may change
the results if the distance measure is related to the size of a census tract.
This issue is addressed in chapter 3 by using micro-level data. In this case,
households are identified to points on a map as opposed to a representative agent level of
observation. Since each observation represents a particular house in space (e.g., point
data), precise linear distance to forest areas are calculated. In this case, the effect of
natural amenities on the housing and labor markets is a function of distance instead of a
function of percentage of forests. The results show that compensating differentials arise
both in the housing market (e.g., the shorter the distance to a forest the higher home
prices) and in the labor market (e.g., the shorter the distance to a forest the lower the
wage). Given these findings, the presence of forest and other natural amenities may
partially determine the amount and characteristics of human capita in an economy. In
order to test for aggregation bias, a natural extension of this chapter is to estimate a
hedonic model where locations are aggregated to match census tract areas and compare
the results with those found here.
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Chapter 4 provides further evidence of the importance of applying valuation
techniques to measure the social benefits of goods with public attributes. Using a
hypothetical public referendum format to elicit household voting responses and estimate
willingness to pay (WTP) for expanding health care coverage in New Mexico (NM),
results show mixed support for a universal health care system in NM. While such a
referendum would appear to pass a benefit-cost analysis (BCA), it might fail to achieve a
majority support for passing any public referendum. The suggested though experiment
presented in chapter 4 indicates that while New Mexican may widely express support for
health care reform, they may be collectively and politically unwilling to finance
expansion to all the uninsured, with either higher taxes or increased premiums. As such,
the results also suggest that an incremental approach, in the search for majority support
(and presumably more political support), might be to expand health care coverage to
specific segments of the population such as individuals with chronic conditions. In light
of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) signed into law on March 23, 2010, the question
becomes, how should the information presented here be used in the current policy
debate?
One year after ACA became law public support for such a reform is still significantly
divided (42% in favor and 46% against, The Kaiser Family Foundation, 2011). The
current economic recession has brought numerous concerns about the feasibility of such a
plan. At the forefront is the fiscal impact that ACA may have on state budgets given their
current level of deficit. In a 2011 Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) report, a five-state
analysis shows that the impact of expanding Medicaid eligibility on state budgets ranges
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from high budgetary costs to low savings.82 For instance, for the state of Texas (TX) this
would increase costs by $27 billion compared to savings of $0.8 billion for Maryland
(MD). One of the main reasons for these findings is the size of states’ uninsured gap
(KFF 2011). Being the state with the highest uninsured rate, TX uninsured gap is 11.4
percent of its total population compared to 5.4 percent for MD.
While the state of New Mexico was not included in this analysis, looking at the
number of uninsured adults that would become eligible for Medicaid gives an idea of the
impact that this may have on its budget. Since about 12.1 percent of its adult population
below 138 percent does not have insurance, NM may not experience any savings by
2019.83 In light of this, states like NM may have to finance the potential raised in budget
costs by increasing state and local taxes. For policymakers, studies like the one presented
in chapter 4 may reveal useful information to identify the public’s willingness to pay for
expanding health care coverage in anticipation of potential cost increases as Medicaid
eligibility is expanded.
5.1

Limitations and Future Research
One of the main objectives of this work has been to estimate monetary values (e.g.,

willingness to pay) and public support for changes in the provision of resources with
public good attributes. From a policy perspective, values provide a tangible and explicit

82

The ACA law requires that nearly all individuals under 65 earning up to 138% of the

federal poverty level (FPL) receive health coverage under Medicaid by 2019.
83

In NM, the total number of individuals under 65 years of age who ear up to 138% of

FPL is 238,200. Based on a total population of 1.97 million, this represents 12.1 percent.
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way to summarize how competing allocation schemes will affect individuals. However,
while results show compensating differentials for forest lands and substantial willingness
to pay amounts for expanding health care coverage, there are some empirical issues that
need special attention.
For instance, the estimation of implicit prices assumes an equilibrium framework.
This means that households are completely mobile and migration is costless, thus
implying that utility differences between locations have already been eliminated or that
the market is at its spatial equilibrium (Blomquist et al. 2007). Since public lands may be
endogenously determining where people live and work, such an assumption may be too
restrictive. Analyzing migration patterns could indicate that the presence of natural
amenities affects migration behavior and thus, that the market is not in equilibrium
(Garber-Yonts 2004). Addressing this issue would require additional independent
variables which may explain migration such as health status and environmental quality
indexes (Rupasingha and Goetz, 2004). A second methodological issue related to the
geographic nature of observations refers to spatial heterogeneity. The estimated
coefficients in this work are assumed to be constant in space. This implies that reducing
the distance between the average house and a public forest area by 1 percent or 0.4 miles,
has the same effect on a house value regardless of where the house is located. Spatial
heterogeneity addresses this issue by allowing the coefficients to vary in space.
Depending on the sample size, an efficient approach could be to disaggregate a market in
smaller submarkets and estimate separate spatial models and test whether the estimators
are statistically different from each other.
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The mixed support for a universal health care system in NM may indicate that
redefining the good in question would shed more light to the current debate. Future
research should elicit people’s willingness to pay (WTP) to expand health care coverage
to specific segments of the uninsured population. Building on the work done by Bundorf
and Fucks (2006) and Kessler and Brady (2009), a promising route would be to include a
contingent valuation scenario to elicit WTP for low-income individuals and for people
incurring high medical costs due to preexisting or chronic conditions.
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Appendix A: Maximum likelihood estimation
Following Anselin (1988) notation, the maximum likelihood (ML) coefficients
presented in chapter 2 are the result of the following log-likelihood function assuming
homoscedasticity (e.g., Ω = σ2I):

L = −( N ) ln π − ( N ) ln σ 2 + ln A − ( 1 2 )( Ay − Xβ )′( Ay − Xβ )
2
2
2σ

(A.1)

where A = I-ρW
Applying the first order conditions to equation (A.1) yields the following estimator for β:

b = ( X ′X ) −1 X ′y − ρ ( X ′X ) −1 X ′Wy = b0 − ρbL

(A.2)

Since the estimator b is a function of ρ, the value for the autocorrelation coefficient has to
be found for b to be determined. The first step is to run the following two ordinary square
estimations to obtain e0, eL, and σ2:
e0 = y − Xb0
(A.3)

eL = Wy − XbL
σ 2 = ( 1 N )(e0 − ρe L )′(e0 − ρe L )

(A.4)
(A.5)

A concentrated likelihood function can be obtained by substituting the estimates for β
and σ2 in equation (A.1):

LC = C − ( N ) ln[( 1 )(e0 − ρe L )′(e0 − ρe L )] + ln I − ρW
2
N

(A.6)

where C is a constant. Since the likelihood expression in equation (A.6) is a non-linear
function of one parameter, ρ, numerical techniques, such as a bisection search, has to be
applied to find the value of this parameter. In summary, the ML estimation process used
to obtain the results in chapter 2 was based on the following steps:
1) OLS of X on y to obtain b0
2) OLS of X on Wy to obtain bL
3) residual e0 and eL are calculated
4) ρ is obtained via a non-linear optimization technique
5) b and σ2 are estimated
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Table B.1: Additional Spatial-Lag Models

Variables
DROOMS

Spatial-lag (ML)
W3
W4
W6
0.176***
(3.87)
0.315***
(6.38)

0.175***
(3.89)
0.304***
(6.19)

0.168***
(3.72)
0.303***
(6.17)

HPERACRE

0.020
(1.45)

0.020
(1.40)

0.018
(1.29)

DCENSIZE

-0.270***
(5.54)

-0.260
(5.38)

-0.264***
(5.47)

HAGE

-0.004***
(2.70)

-0.005***
(2.88)

-0.005***
(2.92)

IRAS

0.981**
(2.39)

0.947**
(2.33)

0.949**
(2.33)

WILD

0.651**
(2.31)

0.614**
(2.19)

0.593**
(2.12)

ρHV ALU E

0.337***
(8.59)

0.376***
(9.02)

0.396***
(8.97)

7.409

6.977

6.757

0.332
-198.35
0.232

0.398
-196.9
0.165

0.381
-195.7
0.083

DINCOME

CONS
R2
LK
LM-error

154

Table C.1: SUR Results for IRAs (Spatial-lag: 3KM and Spatial error: 4KM)

ROOMS
HAGE
LOTSIZE
LNHIGHWAY
LNSHCOOL
LNRAILROAD
LNGOLF
EDUC
WORKPT
RETIRED
HOMEMAKER
STUDENTFT
STUDENTPT
ACTIVEMIL
RESMIL
UNEMPL
TWORACES
ASIAN
BLACK
AMERINDIAN
HAWAIIAN
MALE
LIVINGNRE
GROUPMEM
LNIRAS
LNSPFUND
LNURBAN
LNLAKES
LNCAMP
LNWATERSHED
ρ
λ
McElroy R2
N
Residu. Corr

Weighted Model
3KM(lag) 4KM(error)
Housing
Wage
0.14***
-0.01***
0.24***
-0.01
-0.01
0.05***
-0.02
0.10***
-0.83***
-0.36***
0.14**
-0.06
-0.31
-12.68**
-0.20
-0.66***
-0.49***
0.18
-0.22
0.08
0.15
0.11***
-0.11
0.07
-0.11***
0.14*
-0.03*
0.03**
-0.10
0.03
-0.04** 0.11***
-0.06**
-0.02
-0.02*** 0.14***
0.41***
0.36
0.57
0.43
1,885,059
0.12

Unweighted Model
3KM(lag) 4KM(error)
Housing
Wage
0.12***
-0.01***
0.04***
-0.03*
-0.01
-0.01*
-0.01
0.09***
-0.13**
-0.31***
0.09
-0.39**
-0.24
0.87
0.09
-0.41***
0.03
0.04
0.00
-0.03
0.24
0.21***
-0.08
-0.02
-0.04*
0.03*
-0.02*
0.07***
-0.05**
0.03
-0.02**
0.04*
-0.05**
0.06
0.01*
0.09**
0.54***
0.31
0.27
0.43
1014
0.19

*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table C.2: SUR Results for IRAs (Spatial-lag: 3KM and Spatial error: IWD)

ROOMS
HAGE
LOTSIZE
LNHIGHWAY
LNSHCOOL
LNRAILROAD
LNGOLF
EDUC
WORKPT
RETIRED
HOMEMAKER
STUDENTFT
STUDENTPT
ACTIVEMIL
RESMIL
UNEMPL
TWORACES
ASIAN
BLACK
AMERINDIAN
HAWAIIAN
MALE
LIVINGNRE
GROUPMEM
LNIRAS
LNSPFUND
LNURBAN
LNLAKES
LNCAMP
LNWATERSHED
ρ
λ
McElroy R2
N
Residu. Corr

Weighted Model
3KM(lag) IWD(error)
Housing
Wage
0.13***
-0.01***
0.20***
-0.01
-0.01
0.04***
-0.01
0.10***
-0.80***
-0.35***
0.13*
-0.16*
-0.20
-0.31
0.34
-0.66***
-0.58***
0.52***
-0.26
0.33***
0.27
0.12***
-0.14*
0.06
-0.07**
0.05**
-0.04***
0.05*
-0.10***
0.02
-0.06*** 0.15***
-0.01***
0.01
-0.07*** 0.14***
0.50***
0.32
0.37
0.47
1,885,059
0.11

Unweighted Model
3KM(lag) IWD(error)
Housing
Wage
0.12***
-0.00***
0.04***
-0.02**
-0.01
-0.01*
-0.01
0.09***
-0.12**
-0.32***
0.08
-0.49***
-0.26
-1.16**
0.22
-0.42***
0.02
0.10
0.06
0.01
0.28
0.21***
-0.10
-0.02
-0.03*
0.04*
-0.02*
0.07***
-0.05***
0.02
-0.02*
0.05**
-0.05**
0.07**
-0.01*
0.09***
0.65***
0.17
0.17
0.47
1014
0.19

*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table C.3: SUR Results for IRAs (Spatial-lag: 3KM and Spatial error: IWD1.5 )

ROOMS
HAGE
LOTSIZE
LNHIGHWAY
LNSHCOOL
LNRAILROAD
LNGOLF
EDUC
WORKPT
RETIRED
HOMEMAKER
STUDENTFT
STUDENTPT
ACTIVEMIL
RESMIL
UNEMPL
TWORACES
ASIAN
BLACK
AMERINDIAN
HAWAIIAN
MALE
LIVINGNRE
GROUPMEM
LNIRAS
LNSPFUND
LNURBAN
LNLAKES
LNCAMP
LNWATERSHED
ρ
λ
McElroy R2
N
Residu. Corr

Weighted Model
3KM(lag) IWD1.5(error)
Housing
Wage
0.13***
-0.01***
0.21***
-0.01
-0.01
0.05***
-0.02
0.10***
-0.80***
-0.35***
0.13*
-0.17*
-0.21
-1.14
0.29
-0.68***
-0.55***
0.52***
-0.24
0.33
0.26
0.11***
-0.14*
0.06
-0.07**
0.05**
-0.04**
0.04*
-0.10***
0.02
-0.06*** 0.15***
-0.06***
0.00
-0.02*** 0.14***
0.48***
0.32
0.35
0.49
1,885,059
0.11

Unweighted Model
3KM(lag) IWD1.5(error)
Housing
Wage
0.12***
-0.00***
0.04***
-0.03**
-0.01
-0.01*
-0.01
0.09***
-0.13**
-0.32***
0.08
-0.48***
-0.26
1.12
0.24
-0.43***
0.03
0.10
0.06
0.02
0.27
0.21***
-0.09
-0.02
-0.03*
0.03
-0.02*
0.07***
-0.05***
0.02
-0.02*
0.05**
-0.05**
0.07**
0.01*
0.09***
0.64***
0.19
0.17
0.49
1014
0.19

*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table C.4: SUR Results for IRAs (Spatial-lag: 4KM and Spatial error: 3KM)

ROOMS
HAGE
LOTSIZE
LNHIGHWAY
LNSHCOOL
LNRAILROAD
LNGOLF
EDUC
WORKPT
RETIRED
HOMEMAKER
STUDENTFT
STUDENTPT
ACTIVEMIL
RESMIL
UNEMPL
TWORACES
ASIAN
BLACK
AMERINDIAN
HAWAIIAN
MALE
LIVINGNRE
GROUPMEM
LNIRAS
LNSPFUND
LNURBAN
LNLAKES
LNCAMP
LNWATERSHED
ρ
λ
McElroy R2
N
Residu. Corr

Weighted Model
4KM(lag) 3KM(error)
Housing
Wage
0.14***
-0.01***
0.25***
-0.01
-0.01
0.06***
-0.03*
0.08***
-0.81***
-0.31***
0.07
-0.06
-0.14
-0.50
0.03
-0.69***
-0.41
0.12
-0.24
0.10
0.11
0.08**
-0.11
0.07
-0.13***
0.08*
-0.02*
0.03**
-0.10***
0.03
-0.04** 0.11***
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02** 0.14***
0.37***
0.36
0.47
0.44
1,885,059
0.13

Unweighted Model
4KM(lag) 3KM(error)
Housing
Wage
0.12***
-0.01***
0.05***
-0.02*
-0.01
-0.01*
-0.01
0.08***
-0.13**
-0.31***
0.08
-0.45***
-0.25
-1.00*
0.10
-0.42***
0.04
0.02
0.00
-0.02
0.22
0.21***
-0.10*
-0.02
-0.07*
0.03*
-0.02*
0.07***
-0.05***
0.03
-0.02**
0.05**
-0.05**
0.06*
0.00*
0.09**
0.63***
0.24
0.19
0.44
1014
0.20

*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table C.5: SUR Results for IRAs (Spatial-lag: 4KM and Spatial error: IWD)

ROOMS
HAGE
LOTSIZE
LNHIGHWAY
LNSHCOOL
LNRAILROAD
LNGOLF
EDUC
WORKPT
RETIRED
HOMEMAKER
STUDENTFT
STUDENTPT
ACTIVEMIL
RESMIL
UNEMPL
TWORACES
ASIAN
BLACK
AMERINDIAN
HAWAIIAN
MALE
LIVINGNRE
GROUPMEM
LNIRAS
LNSPFUND
LNURBAN
LNLAKES
LNCAMP
LNWATERSHED
ρ
λ
McElroy R2
N
Residu. Corr

Weighted Model
4KM(lag) IWD(error)
Housing
Wage
0.13***
-0.01***
0.22***
-0.01
-0.01
0.04***
-0.01
0.09***
-0.79***
-0.30***
0.11*
-0.16*
-0.15
-0.29
0.34
-0.70***
-0.41**
0.47***
-0.48***
0.40***
0.19
0.08*
-0.17**
0.05
-0.06**
0.05**
-0.03*
0.03*
-0.10***
0.01
-0.07*** 0.16***
-0.04**
-0.03
-0.02*** 0.13***
0.52***
0.36
0.37
0.51
1,885,059
0.12

Unweighted Model
4KM(lag) IWD(error)
Housing
Wage
0.12***
-0.00***
0.04***
-0.02**
-0.01
-0.02*
-0.01
0.09***
-0.12**
-0.33***
0.07
-0.47***
-0.26
-0.98*
0.21
-0.43***
-0.11
0.05
0.05
0.06
0.16
0.21***
-0.10*
-0.02
-0.02**
0.05*
-0.03**
0.08***
-0.05***
0.02
-0.02*
0.05**
-0.05***
0.06**
-0.01*
0.10***
0.72***
0.18
0.17
0.51
1014
0.19

*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table C.6: SUR Results for IRAs (Spatial-lag: 4KM and Spatial error: IWD1.5 )

ROOMS
HAGE
LOTSIZE
LNHIGHWAY
LNSHCOOL
LNRAILROAD
LNGOLF
EDUC
WORKPT
RETIRED
HOMEMAKER
STUDENTFT
STUDENTPT
ACTIVEMIL
RESMIL
UNEMPL
TWORACES
ASIAN
BLACK
AMERINDIAN
HAWAIIAN
MALE
LIVINGNRE
GROUPMEM
LNIRAS
LNSPFUND
LNURBAN
LNLAKES
LNCAMP
LNWATERSHED
ρ
λ
McElroy R2
N
Residu. Corr

Weighted Model
4KM(lag) IWD1.5(error)
Housing
Wage
0.14***
-0.01***
0.22***
-0.01
-0.01
0.05***
-0.02
0.10***
-0.79***
-0.34***
0.12*
-0.17*
-0.20
-1.29
0.29
-0.69***
-0.54***
0.54
-0.23
0.36**
0.26
0.11***
-0.14*
0.06
-0.05*
0.03**
-0.02*
0.04*
-0.11***
0.02
-0.07*** 0.15***
-0.03
0.00
-0.02*** 0.14***
0.47***
0.37
0.35
0.49
1,885,059
0.12

Unweighted Model
4KM(lag) IWD1.5(error)
Housing
Wage
0.12***
-0.00***
0.04***
-0.02*
-0.01
-0.02**
-0.01
0.09***
-0.13**
-0.32***
0.07
-0.48***
-0.27
-1.15**
0.22
-0.43***
0.02
0.10
0.06
0.03
0.26
0.20***
-0.10*
-0.03
-0.02*
0.02*
0.03***
0.07***
-0.05***
0.02
-0.03*
0.05**
-0.05**
0.06**
-0.01*
0.09***
0.70***
0.19
0.17
0.49
1014
0.19

*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table C.7: SUR Results for IRAs (Spatial-lag: IWD and Spatial error: 3KM)

ROOMS
HAGE
LOTSIZE
LNHIGHWAY
LNSHCOOL
LNRAILROAD
LNGOLF
EDUC
WORKPT
RETIRED
HOMEMAKER
STUDENTFT
STUDENTPT
ACTIVEMIL
RESMIL
UNEMPL
TWORACES
ASIAN
BLACK
AMERINDIAN
HAWAIIAN
MALE
LIVINGNRE
GROUPMEM
LNIRAS
LNSPFUND
LNURBAN
LNLAKES
LNCAMP
LNWATERSHED
ρ
λ
McElroy R2
N
Residu. Corr

Weighted Model
IWD(lag) 3KM(error)
Housing
Wage
0.15***
-0.01***
0.22***
-0.01
-0.02*
0.10***
-0.04**
0.07***
-0.80***
-0.30***
0.02
-0.03
-0.10
-0.41
-0.05
-0.70***
-0.38***
0.07
-0.18
0.08
0.05
0.07*
-0.08
0.08*
-0.12*** 0.03**
0.06***
0.02*
-0.09***
0.02
-0.01**
0.09**
-0.03
-0.10
0.00
0.12***
0.07**
0.49
0.47
0.32
1,885,059
0.14

Unweighted Model
IWD(lag) 3KM(error)
Housing
Wage
0.12***
-0.01***
0.05***
-0.04**
-0.01
0.05***
-0.02
0.07***
-0.14**
-0.29***
0.09
-0.40**
-0.26
0.81
0.11
-0.42***
0.07
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.18
0.20***
-0.10*
-0.01
-0.01**
0.02*
0.01*
0.07**
-0.07***
0.04
-0.02**
0.07**
-0.07**
0.06
0.03*
0.08*
0.12***
0.53
0.19
0.32
1014
0.20

*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table C.8: SUR Results for IRAs (Spatial-lag: IWD and Spatial error: 4KM)

ROOMS
HAGE
LOTSIZE
LNHIGHWAY
LNSHCOOL
LNRAILROAD
LNGOLF
EDUC
WORKPT
RETIRED
HOMEMAKER
STUDENTFT
STUDENTPT
ACTIVEMIL
RESMIL
UNEMPL
TWORACES
ASIAN
BLACK
AMERINDIAN
HAWAIIAN
MALE
LIVINGNRE
GROUPMEM
LNIRAS
LNSPFUND
LNURBAN
LNLAKES
LNCAMP
LNWATERSHED
ρ
λ
McElroy R2
N
Residu. Corr

Weighted Model
IWD(lag) 4KM(error)
Housing
Wage
0.15***
-0.01***
0.23***
-0.02
-0.02*
0.10***
-0.04**
0.09***
-0.83***
-0.37***
0.12*
-0.04
-0.34
-11.49***
-0.42
-0.66***
-0.47***
0.14
-0.17
0.06
0.09
0.10**
-0.08
0.09*
-0.16***
0.14**
0.04**
0.01*
-0.09***
0.02
-0.01**
0.08**
-0.03
-0.07
-0.01
0.13***
0.11***
0.52
0.57
0.33
1,885,059
0.12

Unweighted Model
IWD(lag) 4KM(error)
Housing
Wage
0.13***
-0.01***
0.05***
-0.05**
-0.01
0.05**
-0.01
0.08***
-0.14**
-0.29***
0.09
-0.33*
-0.25
0.66
0.05
-0.40***
0.04
0.02
0.00
-0.01
0.20
0.20***
-0.06
-0.02
-0.05*
0.03**
0.01*
0.07**
-0.06***
0.03
-0.02**
0.04**
-0.08**
0.05
0.03
0.09*
0.12***
0.58
0.27
0.33
1014
0.20

*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table C.9: SUR Results for IRAs (Spatial-lag: IWD and Spatial error: IWD1.5 )

ROOMS
HAGE
LOTSIZE
LNHIGHWAY
LNSHCOOL
LNRAILROAD
LNGOLF
EDUC
WORKPT
RETIRED
HOMEMAKER
STUDENTFT
STUDENTPT
ACTIVEMIL
RESMIL
UNEMPL
TWORACES
ASIAN
BLACK
AMERINDIAN
HAWAIIAN
MALE
LIVINGNRE
GROUPMEM
LNIRAS
LNSPFUND
LNURBAN
LNLAKES
LNCAMP
LNWATERSHED
ρ
λ
McElroy R2
N
Residu. Corr

Weighted Model
IWD(lag) IWD1.5(lag)
Housing
Wage
0.15***
-0.01***
0.22***
0.00
-0.03*
0.15***
-0.03**
0.09***
-0.78***
-0.34***
0.11
-0.18*
-0.19
-0.97
0.30
-0.69***
-0.55***
0.56***
-0.20
0.40
0.27
0.10**
-0.14*
0.07
-0.17*** 0.02**
0.05***
0.03
-0.14***
0.01
-0.08*** 0.16***
-0.05**
-0.02
-0.02*** 0.14***
0.11***
0.43
0.35
0.37
1,885,059
0.13

Unweighted Model
IWD(lag) IWD1.5(lag)
Housing
Wage
0.14***
-0.01***
0.09***
-0.04**
-0.01
0.08***
-0.04**
0.08***
-0.13**
-0.31***
0.09
-0.46***
-0.30
-1.07*
0.34
-0.45***
0.03
0.14
0.10
0.05
0.21
0.20***
-0.08
-0.03
-0.05*
0.03*
0.01**
0.08***
-0.12***
0.02
-0.05***
0.05**
-0.10***
0.07*
0.02*
0.10***
0.10***
0.34
0.17
0.37
1014
0.20

*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table C.10: SUR Results for IRAs (Spatial-lag: IWD1.5 and Spatial error: 3KM)

ROOMS
HAGE
LOTSIZE
LNHIGHWAY
LNSHCOOL
LNRAILROAD
LNGOLF
EDUC
WORKPT
RETIRED
HOMEMAKER
STUDENTFT
STUDENTPT
ACTIVEMIL
RESMIL
UNEMPL
TWORACES
ASIAN
BLACK
AMERINDIAN
HAWAIIAN
MALE
LIVINGNRE
GROUPMEM
LNIRAS
LNSPFUND
LNURBAN
LNLAKES
LNCAMP
LNWATERSHED
ρ
λ
McElroy R2
N
Residu. Corr

Weighted Model
IWD1.5(lag) 3KMerror
Housing
Wage
0.14***
-0.01***
0.22***
-0.01
-0.02
0.09***
-0.04**
0.07***
-0.81***
-0.30***
0.04
-0.04
-0.11
-0.50
-0.06
-0.70***
-0.39***
0.07
-0.19
0.07
0.06
0.08*
-0.09
0.08*
-0.12*** 0.04**
0.05**
0.02
-0.09***
0.02
-0.02** 0.10***
-0.03
-0.09
-0.01*
0.13***
0.14***
0.47
0.47
0.33
1,885,059
0.13

Unweighted Model
IWD1.5(lag) 3KMerror
Housing
Wage
0.12***
-0.01***
0.05***
-0.04*
-0.01
0.05**
-0.02
0.07***
-0.14***
-0.29***
0.09
-0.40**
-0.26
0.83
0.09
-0.42***
0.06
-0.01
0.00
0.00
0.18
0.21***
-0.10
-0.01
-0.01*
0.02*
0.01*
0.07**
-0.07***
0.04
-0.02**
0.06*
-0.07**
0.06
0.03
0.08*
0.18***
0.50
0.19
0.33
1014
0.20

*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table C.11: SUR Results for IRAs (Spatial-lag: IWD1.5 and Spatial error: 4KM)

ROOMS
HAGE
LOTSIZE
LNHIGHWAY
LNSHCOOL
LNRAILROAD
LNGOLF
EDUC
WORKPT
RETIRED
HOMEMAKER
STUDENTFT
STUDENTPT
ACTIVEMIL
RESMIL
UNEMPL
TWORACES
ASIAN
BLACK
AMERINDIAN
HAWAIIAN
MALE
LIVINGNRE
GROUPMEM
LNIRAS
LNSPFUND
LNURBAN
LNLAKES
LNCAMP
LNWATERSHED
ρ
λ
McElroy R2
N
Residu. Corr

Weighted Model
IWD1.5(lag) 4KM
Housing
Wage
0.15***
-0.01***
0.23***
-0.02
-0.02
0.10***
-0.04**
0.09***
-0.83***
-0.37***
0.13**
-0.04
-0.34
-11.86***
-0.41
-0.66***
-0.48***
0.13
-0.17
0.05
0.10
0.10**
-0.08
0.09*
-0.15***
0.14**
0.04*
0.01*
-0.09***
0.02
-0.02**
0.08**
-0.03
-0.06
-0.01*
0.14***
0.19***
0.50
0.57
0.34
1,885,059
0.11

Unweighted Model
IWD1.5(lag) 4KM
Housing
Wage
0.13***
-0.01***
0.05***
-0.05**
-0.01
0.04**
-0.01
0.08***
-0.14***
-0.30***
0.09
-0.34*
-0.25
0.68
0.04
-0.40***
0.04
0.02
0.00
-0.01
0.20
0.20***
-0.06
-0.01
-0.02*
0.03*
0.00
0.07**
-0.06***
0.03
-0.02*
0.04*
-0.07**
0.05
0.03*
0.09*
0.18***
0.55
0.27
0.34
1014
0.20

*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table C.12: SUR Results for IRAs (Spatial-lag: IWD1.5 and Spatial error: IWD)

ROOMS
HAGE
LOTSIZE
LNHIGHWAY
LNSHCOOL
LNRAILROAD
LNGOLF
EDUC
WORKPT
RETIRED
HOMEMAKER
STUDENTFT
STUDENTPT
ACTIVEMIL
RESMIL
UNEMPL
TWORACES
ASIAN
BLACK
AMERINDIAN
HAWAIIAN
MALE
LIVINGNRE
GROUPMEM
LNIRAS
LNSPFUND
LNURBAN
LNLAKES
LNCAMP
LNWATERSHED
ρ
λ
McElroy R2
N
Residu. Corr

Weighted Model
IWD1.5(lag) IWD(error)
Housing
Wage
0.15***
-0.01***
0.22***
-0.01
-0.02
0.11***
-0.04***
0.10***
-0.80***
-0.35***
0.13*
-0.16*
-0.20
-0.54
0.33
-0.67***
-0.57***
0.54
-0.25
0.34**
0.27
0.11***
-0.13*
0.06
-0.06**
0.05*
0.04***
0.05*
-0.13***
0.01
-0.08*** 0.15***
-0.05**
0.00
-0.01*
0.14***
0.13***
0.37
0.37
0.41
1,885,059
0.13

Unweighted Model
IWD1.5(lag) IWD(error)
Housing
Wage
0.13***
-0.01***
0.08***
0.03*
0.00
0.05***
-0.03**
0.08***
-0.12***
-0.33***
0.09
-0.47***
-0.27
-1.14*
0.22
-0.43***
0.02
0.12
0.07
0.02
0.25
0.21***
-0.09
-0.02
-0.02*
0.05*
0.00
0.08***
-0.10***
0.02
-0.04***
0.05**
-0.09***
0.06**
-0.01*
0.10***
0.35***
0.21
0.17
0.41
1014
0.19

*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table D.1: Dependent Variable = log(Unobserved WTP)
Variables

Raw vote

CERT70

CERT75

CERT80

CERT85

AGE

-0.12***
(0.04)
0.00***
(0.00)
-0.19
(0.21)
0.07
(0.26)
0.09**
(0.05)
-0.13**
(0.06)
0.54**
(0.26)
-0.16
(0.23)
-0.05
(0.34)
0.18***
(0.05)
0.58***
(0.23)
0.03
(0.20)
-0.17
(0.23)
0.14
(0.12)
0.36***
(0.13)
0.60**
(0.22)
0.48***
(0.11)
-0.25
(0.27)

-0.12***
(0.04)
0.00*
(0.00)
-0.45***
(0.17)
-0.11
(0.22)
0.25***
(0.04)
-0.14***
(0.05)
0.60*
(0.33)
-0.25
(0.23)
-0.10
(0.28)
0.19***
(0.05)
0.60***
(0.20)
0.17
(0.19)
-0.50***
(0.20)
0.12
(0.13)
0.37**
(0.13)
0.75***
(0.20)
0.41***
(0.09)
-0.04
(0.21)

-0.10**
(0.04)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.50***
(0.17)
0.23
(0.21)
0.30***
(0.04)
-0.26***
(0.05)
0.85**
(0.23)
-0.24
(0.23)
-0.11
(0.28)
0.27***
(0.05)
0.81***
(0.19)
0.37
(0.16)
-0.92***
(0.18)
0.11
(0.10)
0.32**
(0.10)
0.74***
(0.19)
0.38
(0.09)
-0.10
(0.21)

-0.10**
(0.03)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.83***
(0.16)
0.28
(0.21)
0.36***
(0.04)
-0.16*
(0.05)
0.21
(0.22)
-0.25
(0.24)
-0.24
(0.27)
0.31***
(0.05)
1.42***
(0.18)
0.38
(0.16)
-1.16***
(0.18)
0.11
(0.10)
0.55***
(0.10)
0.58***
(0.19)
0.73***
(0.09)
0.09
(0.20)

-0.10***
(0.03)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.30
(0.17)
0.46
(0.22)
0.27***
(0.04)
-0.17**
(0.05)
0.25
(0.23)
-0.23
(0.24)
-0.22
(0.27)
0.37***
(0.05)
1.13***
(0.19)
0.12
(0.16)
-0.62**
(0.18)
0.14
(0.10)
0.25*
(0.10)
0.51
(0.20)
0.40
(0.09)
0.14
(0.20)

4.85***

2.85**

2.12***

2.75***

2.92***

AGESQ
MALE
EMPSTAT
INCOME
IDEO
REGVOTE
HISP
OTHERACE
PROGIMP
TAXES
BASICARE
CHILDNUM
BMI
PERCHEALTH
CV POLICY
PROVISION INDEX
COVERAGE
INTERCEP
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Table D.1: Dependent Variable = log(Unobserved WTP) (cont’d)
Variables
k (scale parameter)
Pseudo R2

Raw vote

CERT70

CERT75

CERT80

CERT85

(1.22)
0.93***
(0.10)
0.34

(1.22)
1.52***
(0.07)
0.26

(0.91)
1.60***
(0.06)
0.23

(0.90)
1.82***
(0.06)
0.23

(0.92)
1.47***
(0.06)
0.23

*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
( )a : Standard deviation
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